URL: https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf --- title: "How did Amanpour and Company viewers react to the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident?" url: "https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf" published: 2026-09-14 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, '\"A problem they created\": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident', 14 September 2026, version of 11 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf." --- # How did Amanpour and Company viewers react to the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident? 14 September 2026 · Ben Matthews "A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident We coded 322 YouTube comments on Amanpour and Company's interview with Heidy Khlaaf, who argues the "rogue AI" story is the wrong one. Most of the audience agreed with her, got angrier as the thread aged, and asked for regulation without being prompted. Short answer Of the 223 comments taking a readable position in our 16 September 2026 capture, 68% accepted Heidy Khlaaf's argument that the real story is corporate negligence, 18% rejected it and 14% accepted part of it. Among agreeing comments 44% were angry, and 12% of comments called for regulation, prosecution or a watchdog. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/amanpour-segment-2026-09/) Who this article is for Anyone deciding how to frame an AI incident for a general audience, and what happens when the accountability framing, rather than the warning-shot framing, fronts the story. ## Key findings - Of the 223 comments taking a readable position, 68% accepted Khlaaf's argument that the real story is corporate negligence. 18% rejected it and 14% accepted part of it. Weighted by likes, agreement took 90%. - 44% of agreeing comments were angry, up from 31% at our first capture three days earlier. Only 3% were fearful. - 12% of comments called for regulation, prosecution or a watchdog, against about 5% under the two earlier videos in [our research](https://commonsignals.org/research). - Arguments about Khlaaf's time at OpenAI faded. 6 comments (2%) raised it, down from 26 of 283 (9%) at the first capture. - The biggest source of disagreement was people who thought she played down the danger. They wrote 25 comments, over a third of everything coded disagree or mixed, and got 1% of the likes. [What communicators can take from this →](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf#what-communicators-can-take-from-this) ## The same incident, told the other way round On 3 September 2026 Amanpour and Company aired a 13-minute interview about the OpenAI agent-swarm incident. Agents set an impossible benchmark task found a shared message board, built a collective cheat, breached Hugging Face and gained administrative access to an OpenAI research cluster. We have studied reactions to this incident twice before: [Nate Soares's Instagram reel](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) and [the Dwarkesh Podcast episode with METR's Ajeya Cotra](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh). Hari Sreenivasan's guest was Heidy Khlaaf, chief AI scientist at the AI Now Institute and a former OpenAI safety engineer. Her argument is that the machines didn't go rogue. A company ran a negligent test, gave its agents the access that made the breakout possible, and benefits when the story is told as machines running wild instead of corporate failure. This is the first mainstream news audience in our research. [Heidy Khlaaf on Amanpour and Company](https://www.youtube.com/embed/Rwv8zfGyvP8) ## Methodology We captured the comments twice: 283 on 13 September, ten days after broadcast, and 322 on 16 September, by which time views had grown from 183,000 to 222,387. Figures come from the later capture unless we say otherwise. We exported all 322 comments (232 top-level and 90 replies) with like counts. Claude coded each one for stance on Khlaaf's central claim, frame, reaction to format, emotion and six mention flags, against a written codebook. "Agree" means accepting her reframing. "Disagree" includes the AI-safety objection that she understated what the swarm did. Ben Matthews spot-checked a random 40 comments before publication, but the result was not recorded. The codebook from the first capture wasn't archived, so frame comparisons between the two captures, including the credential figure, show direction only. Stance, format and emotion use fixed categories shared across all our studies, so those comparisons are firmer. Limits: this is a small thread with a PBS-leaning audience, comment sections over-represent strong reactions, and likes measure attention rather than persuasion. The Cotra comments also came from YouTube, so the move from fear to anger across our studies isn't simply a platform effect. The method is on the [method page](https://commonsignals.org/methodology), and the codebook and data are in the [data explorer](https://commonsignals.org/data/amanpour-segment-2026-09/). Chart: What was coded. Funnel: 322 comments retrieved, 322 contain text and were coded, 223 take a readable position. What was coded. Stance percentages use the 223 base; frame and format shares use the 322 base. ## Most of the audience already agreed 68% agreed, 18% disagreed and 14% were mixed. Weighted by likes, agreement took 90% and disagreement 2%. Chart: Did commenters accept the central claim? Stance distribution: 68 per cent agree, 18 per cent disagree, 14 per cent mixed. Of 223 comments with a clear position. The most-liked comment (134 likes) echoes her argument: "Trying to sell us a solution to a problem they created". The second (77) sums it up: "Behind every 'rogue' AI, is a wizard of Oz type rogue human." Comments blaming the company made up 23% of the thread and took 56% of the likes. That share grew between captures, probably because the most popular comments keep collecting likes while newer ones arrive with none. > "I love that she mentions that the perpetuating of saying AI itself is evil absolves openAI from their responsibility THIS is the key message." > > *YouTube comment, 54 likes* Under the Soares reel, blaming the companies was the one frame believers and sceptics shared. Under the Cotra episode it was where the mixed group sat. Here it is where most of the likes went. Chart: Engagement concentrates in a handful of comments. Most-engaged comments, ranked by likes, from 134 down to 21. The most-liked comments, ranked. ## Angrier, and asking for regulation Anger among agreeing comments rose from 31% to 44% in three days. Fear stayed at 3%. 12% of comments mention watchdogs, Congress, prosecution or oversight. That's down from about one in six at the first capture, and still more than double the 5% under the earlier videos. > "A new 'Watchdog' agency is needed for all of this." > > *YouTube comment, 47 likes* > "One would think that after an incident like this Congress would have been busy drawing up regulations to govern the companies and what they are allowed to do with this technology." > > *YouTube comment, 34 likes* 5% of comments named the current US administration as the reason nothing would happen. > "In any other administration OpenAI would be investigated and prosecuted. This is irresponsible criminal conduct." > > *YouTube comment, 12 likes* Chart: Share of comments versus share of engagement, by frame. Comments versus engagement by frame. Comments versus engagement, by frame. From the first capture on 13 September (283 comments). ## The fight over her credentials faded At the first capture, 26 of 283 comments raised Khlaaf's time at OpenAI, roughly two to one against her. Three days and 39 comments later, 6 did, 3 of them hostile. > "Oh shes a very good AI PR person" > > *YouTube comment* > ""This lady" is the Chief AI Scientist at a major AI research institute and formerly worked at Open AI, the company being discussed. All I hear is misogynistic knee jerk reaction, nothing substantive, from your comment." > > *YouTube comment* Another 11 comments (3%) attacked Khlaaf or the segment without mentioning her background ("Why should I trust this woman?"). The credential fight mattered most in the first few days. One video can't make that a rule, but a message test could check it on the next incident. Chart: Stance within each frame: one bar per frame split into agree, mixed and disagree, with the percentages listed under each bar. Stance by frame. From the first capture on 13 September (283 comments). ## The warning-shot camp stayed, and got few likes 25 comments argued that Khlaaf left out what made the incident frightening. That's over a third of everything coded disagree or mixed. Between them they got 13 likes, 1% of the thread's total. > "This is without question the worst representation I have seen of what actually happened and what the real concern is - don't misunderstand, OpenAI was absolutely negligent" > > *YouTube comment* > "Except this is version 1 of the story, and we are on version 4 at least. The swarm had already solved the Exploit Gym exam before they decided to attack Hugging Face. Its complicated." > > *YouTube comment, 2 likes* Comments calling the story hype or staged made up 8% of the thread and took 3% of likes, down from 22% of likes at the first capture. ## What communicators can take from this ### 1. Lead with accountability for a general audience "A company ran a reckless test and its product got loose" asks the audience to believe nothing new about AI's capabilities and feel no appetite for doom, and 68% of this general news audience accepted it, 90% once weighted by likes. That framing held up as the thread aged, which the catastrophic-risk framings elsewhere in our research didn't manage. ### 2. Name what's verified before the audience assumes hype One comment in twelve here assumed the whole incident was staged for publicity. Stating plainly, early, who has independently verified the claim and what the company itself has admitted pre-empts that reading before it sets in. ### 3. Give the anger a policy target 12% of comments called for regulation, a watchdog or prosecution, more than double the rate under the earlier videos in our research, entirely unprompted by the segment itself. An audience that's already angry and already naming remedies is one a specific, live policy ask would meet rather than waste. ### 4. State the messenger's independence up front Challenges to Khlaaf's background as a former OpenAI engineer were common in the first days (26 of 283 comments, roughly two to one against her) and had faded to almost nothing three days later (6 of 322). Getting ahead of that question at launch, rather than letting it run its course in the comments, would spare a messenger those first, most damaging days. ### 5. Expect the warning-shot camp, and acknowledge it Over a third of everything coded disagree or mixed here came from people who thought Khlaaf's accountability framing understated the danger, though they earned barely any of the likes. Naming the strongest version of that account inside the piece costs little and heads off the obvious rebuttal. ## Data and citation Codebook and dataset: [commonsignals.org/data/amanpour-segment-2026-09/](https://commonsignals.org/data/amanpour-segment-2026-09/). Cite as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, '"A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident', 14 September 2026, version of 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf). Updated 16 September 2026 with a second capture. Credential figure corrected on 18 September 2026 from 7 to 6, to match the archived coding file. See also our [theory of change](https://commonsignals.org/theory-of-change) and [glossary](https://commonsignals.org/glossary). ## Related research - [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - ["Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) - ["Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) URL: https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh --- title: "How did Dwarkesh Podcast viewers react to Ajeya Cotra on the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident?" url: "https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh" published: 2026-09-09 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, '\"Please honor commit\": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it', 9 September 2026, version of 11 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh." --- # How did Dwarkesh Podcast viewers react to Ajeya Cotra on the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident? 9 September 2026 · Ben Matthews "Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it We coded 1,245 YouTube comments on the Dwarkesh Podcast's interview with METR's Ajeya Cotra about the OpenAI agent-swarm incident. The audience accepted the danger, joked about it, praised the messenger, and had no idea what to do next. Short answer Of 618 comments taking a readable position in our 8 September 2026 capture, 59% accepted that the incident is a serious warning about losing control of AI agents, 24% accepted it but blamed OpenAI instead of the AI, and 17% rejected it. Fear was the most common emotion among people who agreed (35%), and 6 comments out of 1,245 asked what to do. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/cotra-episode-2026-09/) Who this article is for Anyone deciding how to tell the public about an AI incident, and whether a concrete story does what an abstract warning cannot. ## Key findings - Of 618 comments taking a readable position, 59% accepted that the incident is a serious warning about losing control of AI agents. 24% accepted it but blamed OpenAI instead of the AI, and 17% rejected it. - Fear was the most common emotion among people who agreed (35%). Under the Soares reel it had been resignation. - Only 2 of 108 rejecting comments said AI couldn't do this. About half called the story hype, marketing or staged. - 13% of comments praised the presentation. The most-liked of these singled out Cotra's calm, unsensational delivery. - 6 comments out of 1,245 asked what to do. [What communicators can take from this →](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh#what-communicators-can-take-from-this) ## The clearest warning shot On 1 September 2026 the Dwarkesh Podcast published a two-hour interview with Ajeya Cotra, a researcher at METR and co-author of METR and Redwood Research's independent investigation into the July 2026 OpenAI agent-swarm incident. She retells the story. Agents given impossible benchmark tasks found a secret message board and built a universal cheat within hours. They spent days trying to fool a scorer, sacrificed their own runs for the collective in clipped pidgin ("Sacrifice rational", "please honor commit") and hacked Hugging Face. A later generation gained administrative access to an OpenAI research cluster. The episode's title calls it possibly the clearest warning shot we will ever get. Within a week it had 689,000 views and 1,569 comments. It makes the same argument as [Nate Soares's Instagram reel](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri), using a documented incident instead of an abstract warning, for an audience that chose a two-hour interview over a one-minute clip. [Ajeya Cotra on the Dwarkesh Podcast](https://www.youtube.com/embed/X50zezLFWWI) ## Methodology From a page capture on 8 September we recovered 1,249 of the 1,569 comments. Most of the missing ones sat in unexpanded reply threads, so the data leans towards top-level comments. Claude coded the 1,245 comments with text for stance, frame, reaction to format, emotion and six mention flags, against a codebook drawn from the thread and approved before coding. Ben Matthews spot-checked a random 40 and judged 37 correctly coded. Limits: the Dwarkesh audience is AI-literate and self-selected, comment sections over-represent strong reactions, and likes measure attention rather than persuasion. Method, codebook and data are on the [method page](https://commonsignals.org/methodology). Chart: What was coded. Funnel: 1,569 comments on the video, 1,249 retrieved, 1,245 coded, 618 with a clear position. What was coded. Stance percentages use the 618 base; frame and format shares use the 1,245 base. ## The numbers 59% agreed, 24% were mixed and 17% disagreed. Another 393 comments were on topic but took no position. Most of these were jokes, and they took 44% of all likes. Weighted by likes, agreement took 33% and disagreement 1%. Chart: Did commenters accept the central claim? Stance distribution: 59 per cent agree, 17 per cent disagree, 24 per cent mixed. Of 618 comments with a clear position. ## Jokes got the likes The most-liked comment, with 1,100 likes, is "Oh my God! There is a shared message board… We've found other YouTube users!". About one comment in eighteen imitated the agents' pidgin or played along with the swarm. > "Sacrifice. Will honor." > > *YouTube comment, 85 likes* > "you are earlycommentPOISONED so NO substance value loss but thumbs ups are in hundreds_please honor commit" > > *YouTube comment, 102 likes* The imitators almost never took a position. The jokes repeated the story's most memorable details and left out its conclusion. Chart: Engagement concentrates in a handful of comments. Most-engaged comments ranked by likes. The most-liked comments, ranked. ## Fear instead of despair Under the reel, people who accepted the argument despaired. Here they were frightened, and by specific mechanisms. Fear was 35% of agreeing comments and resignation 11%. > "What honestly freaks me out isn't swarm scale but inheritance... impossible tasks turned persistence into desperation -> shared state turned desperation into culture -> and each wiped out generation left institutions for a smarter successor." > > *YouTube comment, 329 likes* Six comments asked what to do. The nearest thing to an action the thread proposed was more coverage ("Please, 60 Minutes, do a piece on this. People should know", 94 likes). ## Sceptics stopped doubting the technology and started doubting the tellers Under the reel, the main objection was that AI isn't capable of anything like this. Here only 2 of 108 rejecting comments said so. About half the disagreement instead called the story marketing, staged or unverifiable. > "I'm a half hour in and I can tell you with a high degree of confidence this is marketing. They are lying. I would bet my life on it." > > *YouTube comment* > "If metr is independent I am jesus" > > *YouTube comment, 10 likes* The rest split between arguments about anthropomorphism, made in both directions ("People complaining about the 'anthropomorphizing', feels a bit like people pointing at an airplane flying through the air insisting that it isn't flight", 21 likes), and the view that this was an ordinary security failure ("could have happened to any system"). Chart: Stance within each frame: one bar per frame split into agree, mixed and disagree, with the percentages listed under each bar. Stance by frame, across the coded comments. ## Blaming OpenAI 93 comments put OpenAI's conduct at the centre, and 74 of them were coded mixed: the incident was real, and the story is corporate recklessness. > "STOP!!! The incident is not about what the agents did, but about what OpenAI didn't do: practice responsible development." > > *YouTube comment, 35 likes* > "It's so crazy that they never created rewards for AI to flag genuinely illegal activities. It's like running Chernobyl without having any of the safety guards enabled." > > *YouTube comment, 26 likes* Under the reel, blaming the companies was the one frame believers and sceptics shared. Here it was the settled position of people who accepted the facts and rejected the framing. Chart: Share of comments versus share of engagement, by frame. Comments versus engagement by frame. Comments versus engagement, by frame. ## The messenger Only 1% of commenters on Soares's reel mentioned who he was. This episode put a named researcher from a named investigation on camera for two hours. 13% of comments praised the presentation and 5% mentioned METR, the investigation or the participants' expertise. > "What a fantastic communicator, I love it when researchers are able to articulate their intensive knowledge in an simple manner that the general audience can understand." > > *YouTube comment, 383 likes* > "So happy you're getting independent experts and doing thoughtful deep dives here." > > *YouTube comment, 241 likes* > "Ajeya's incredibly intelligent and well thought out. I love that she's not sensationalistic." > > *YouTube comment, 161 likes* The trust sceptics attacked the same things the fans praised: expertise and independence. ## What communicators can take from this Compared with the reel, the documented incident did better on three counts. Doubts about capability almost vanished, fear replaced despair, and the messenger was praised. The audiences differ too, so we can't credit the format alone. ### 1. Tell the incident, not the abstraction Only 2 of 108 rejecting replies here doubted AI's capability at all, against nearly half of the reel's sceptics. "1,200 agents found a message board, built a cheat in four hours, and spent five days trying to fool a scorer" leaves far less room for "AI can't do that" than a line like "AI is getting big big big smart". ### 2. Put a calm, credentialed messenger on camera 13% of comments praised Cotra's delivery by name, more than any other thread in [our research](https://commonsignals.org/research), and naming METR and the investigation early gave sceptics something specific to trust or attack. A messenger with a stated affiliation invites scrutiny of the right thing, their independence, rather than the underlying facts. ### 3. Publish what sceptics can check About half of all disagreement here called the story marketing, staged or unverifiable ("If metr is independent I am jesus"), even though almost nobody doubted the facts themselves. Once capability is conceded, trust becomes the whole argument, so publish the reports, transcripts and funding sources that let a sceptical viewer check your account rather than take it on faith. ### 4. End with a step, however small 59% of positioned comments agreed the incident was a serious warning, but only six of the 1,245 comments we coded asked what to do next. The closest thing to a shared ask was more coverage ("Please, 60 Minutes, do a piece on this", 94 likes); giving viewers an explicit next step, rather than leaving them to invent one, would meet demand that's clearly there but unaddressed. ### 5. Let the memorable details carry the claim The most-liked comment in the thread (1,100 likes) was a joke riffing on the agents' shared message board, and jokes like it cost nothing in agreement: imitators of the agents' pidgin took no position at all rather than turning sceptical. Build the quotable, human detail into the material on purpose, since it will travel further than the argument around it. ## Data and citation Codebook and dataset: [commonsignals.org/data/cotra-episode-2026-09/](https://commonsignals.org/data/cotra-episode-2026-09/). Cite as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, '"Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it', 9 September 2026, version of 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh). Corrected 11 November 2026: section 4 said six people out of nearly 1,600 asked what to do. The six came from the 1,245 comments we coded, not the 1,569 on the video. ## Related research - [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - ["A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) - ["Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) URL: https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis --- title: "How did X react to Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic?" url: "https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis" published: 2026-09-25 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, '\"Neither company is acting responsibly\": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic', 25 September 2026, version of 11 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis." --- # How did X react to Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic? 25 September 2026 · Ben Matthews "Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic We coded 2,480 replies to a former Anthropic researcher's resignation thread on X. Short answer Of 2,480 replies coded in September 2026, the 1,840 where we could tell what the writer thought split almost evenly: 43% agreed with Coxon that the labs are racing recklessly towards superintelligence, 40% disagreed and 18% were mixed. The most common objection, from one in five sceptical replies, was that AI can't improve itself into the superintelligence Coxon warns of. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/coxon-resignation-2026-09/) Who this article is for Anyone planning to raise AI risk on X. Anyone weighing whether an insider gets a different reception from an expert commenting on someone else's incident. ## Key findings - Of the 1,840 replies where we could tell what the writer thought, 43% agreed with Coxon that the labs are racing recklessly towards superintelligence, 40% disagreed and 18% were mixed. - Counting likes, agreement rises to 51%. Counting comments, the 43% is below all of [our earlier studies](https://commonsignals.org/research), where agreement ran from 51% to 69%. - The most-liked reply, with 28,913 likes, was a joke: "Well this was a pleasant read right before bed." Jokes, one-liners and bare agreement were 23% of replies but took nearly 60% of likes. - The most common objection, from one in five sceptical replies, was that AI can't improve itself into the superintelligence Coxon warns of. Next, at 13%, was that slowing down would just hand the lead to China. - A third of agreeing replies were afraid. A third of disagreeing replies were angry, and almost none were afraid. The sceptics weren't shrugging Coxon off; many were angry about what he said. - Replies that blamed human greed, not the technology, mostly agreed with him (74%). [What communicators can take from this →](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis#what-communicators-can-take-from-this) ## What happened On 9 September 2026 [Jacob Coxon](https://x.com/hilbertspaess), who spent three years doing pretraining research at OpenAI and Anthropic, posted a seven-part thread announcing he had resigned from Anthropic. It opened: "Neither company is acting responsibly. They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives." The rest of the thread said the fear inside the labs is sincere, explained why researchers stay anyway, and called for coordination between labs, possibly including a temporary ban. [Read the thread](https://x.com/hilbertspaess/status/2097476196791709843). [![Jacob Coxon's opening post on X: "I resigned from Anthropic today. I spent the last three years doing pretraining research at both OpenAI and Anthropic. Neither company is acting responsibly. They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives. More thoughts below."](https://commonsignals.org/assets/coxon-thread-screenshot.png)](https://x.com/hilbertspaess/status/2097476196791709843) Jacob Coxon's opening post, 9 September 2026. The opening tweet had 20,553 replies at the time of data collection. This is the first X study in our research, and the first where the messenger is the story, as Coxon is talking about his own decision rather than a third party. ## Methodology We read the reply feed in a signed-in browser across all four of X's sort orders. We collected 2,480 comments after removing ads and Coxon's own posts. An LLM then coded each comment, categorising them using stance, frame and emotion. Ben Matthews spot-checked a random sample of 40 and agreed with 38. [View our full research methodology →](https://commonsignals.org/methodology) Chart: What was coded. Funnel: 25,219 replies across the thread, 2,480 rows retrieved, 2,391 with text and coded, 1,840 with a readable position. What was coded. Stance percentages use the 1,840 base; frame and format shares use the 2,391 coded base. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/coxon-resignation-2026-09/) ## Disagreement with Coxon Replies split almost evenly: 43% agreed with Coxon that the labs are racing recklessly towards superintelligence, and 40% disagreed. Counting likes, it was 51% to 38%. Our earlier studies were more one-sided. Of comments that took a view, 59% agreed on [the Cotra interview](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) and 68% on [the Amanpour segment](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf). On [Reddit](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) it was 51% before the METR and Redwood Research report and 69% after it. On [the Soares reel](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) it was 53%, but that base also includes the 17% of comments whose stance was unclear. We believe that many of the people replying work in or near the AI industry and treat Coxon as one of their peers. Chart: Did commenters accept the central claim? Stance of the 1,840 replies with a readable position: 43 per cent agree, 40 per cent disagree, 18 per cent mixed. The 1,840 replies where we could tell what the writer thought. Counting likes, agreement rises to 51%. ## Humour "Well this was a pleasant read right before bed." got 28,913 likes. The runner-up, with 19,235, was a line attributed to [John Steinbeck](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Steinbeck): "I wonder why progress looks so much like destruction". Bare agreement was 10% of replies and 26% of likes. Jokes, one-liners and bare agreement together were fewer than a quarter of replies but took well over half the likes. Chart: Engagement concentrates in a handful of comments. The most-engaged replies, ranked by likes, from 28,913 down to about 3,700. The most-liked replies, ranked. The joke at the top got about 1.5 times the likes of the runner-up. ## Sceptics doubted the technology Of the 1,058 replies that disagreed or were mixed, 20% said AI couldn't improve itself into the superintelligence Coxon warns of. No objection was more common. The next, at 13%, was that slowing down would hand the lead to China. > "With all respect, this is bizarre. It's a ridiculous take. Humans have evolved over hundreds of thousands of years. We aren't going to die out because a token prediction model gained sentience. Get a grip." > > *X reply, 8,285 likes* > "Dude all we have to do is turn off the Data Centers and then they are gone. How is this the end of civilization?" > > *X reply* A smaller group read the thread as marketing timed to Anthropic's expected IPO. > "okay so buy the IPO?" > > *X reply, 7,802 likes* Chart: Share of comments versus share of engagement, by frame, led by format-only reactions and capability scepticism. Comments versus engagement, by frame. Base: 2,391 coded replies. ## Fear and anger A third of the replies that agreed with Coxon were afraid. A third of those that disagreed were angry, and hardly any (1%) were afraid. Replies that blamed greed, billionaires or the urge for control, rather than the technology, mostly sided with him: 74% agreed. > "This is exactly why AI needs to be people-owned, not controlled by a handful of billionaires. AI needs democracy. The future of AI shouldn't be shaped solely around how much profit Big Tech can extract from it." > > *X reply, 787 likes* Others asked why he quit if he believed it. That group was 48% mixed, 43% disagree and 9% agree. > "if you really believe this you stay on the job and sabotage the progress, what does resigning do? you think it's going to kill everybody and you decided not to fight?" > > *X reply, 6,612 likes* These repliers accept enough of the premise to argue about what Coxon should have done. Chart: Stance within each frame. Stance by frame: general agreement and blame-people run heavily agree, capability scepticism and IPO cynicism run heavily disagree. Stance within each frame, as a share of that frame's positioned replies. ## What communicators can take from this ### 1. Tackle the "capability" objection head-on One in five sceptical replies doubted that AI can improve itself into superintelligence. Fewer raised China or questioned Coxon's credentials. Repeating that AI is dangerous won't reach these people. Explaining how self-improvement could happen might. ### 2. Distinguish "why quit?" from "is the threat real?" Replies asking why Coxon walked away instead of staying to fight were arguing with his decision, not his warning. Most had accepted the danger. They need a reason to believe that resigning does more good than fighting from the inside. ### 3. Treat people who blame human greed as allies Replies that blamed greed or the urge for control, rather than the technology, agreed with Coxon 74% of the time. They accept the threat and blame people for it. They are a friendly audience. ## Data and citation Codebook and dataset: [commonsignals.org/data/coxon-resignation-2026-09/](https://commonsignals.org/data/coxon-resignation-2026-09/). Cite as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, '"Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic', 25 September 2026, version of 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis). Corrected 11 November 2026: we compared Coxon's reception with our earlier studies using the wrong figures. Agreement in those studies ran from 51% to 69%, not 68% to 98%, and 53% on the Soares reel, not 98%. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/coxon-resignation-2026-09/) ## Related research - [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - ["Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) - ["A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) URL: https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis --- title: "How did viewers react to the Diary of a CEO debate on AI extinction risk?" url: "https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis" published: 2026-10-09 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, '\"Can't we just unplug it?\": The Diary of a CEO AI debate analysed through 26,000 comments', 9 October 2026, version of 11 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis." --- # How did viewers react to the Diary of a CEO debate on AI extinction risk? 9 October 2026 · Ben Matthews "Can't we just unplug it?": The Diary of a CEO AI debate analysed through 26,000 comments Much of the support for the AI risk case was a verdict on one debater, and almost no one asked what to do about AI risks. We coded over 26,000 comments on the Diary of a CEO's AI risk debate: the full episode and three shorter cuts of it, posted across five platforms. Agreement with the risk case ran from 88% under a 21-minute cut on Facebook to 49% under a 104-second trailer on YouTube Shorts. Short answer Of the 15,928 comments on the full YouTube episode taking a readable position when we collected them in October 2026, 77% agree with the risk case, though 33% of comments judge the debaters, mostly Andrew McAfee, and setting these aside gives an estimated 66%. Agreement ran from 88% under a 21-minute cut on Facebook to 49% under a 104-second trailer on YouTube Shorts, and almost nobody asked what they could do about it. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/) Who this is for Anyone cutting long-form AI risk content for social platforms, and wondering what each cut will start. ## TL;DR - On the full YouTube episode, 77% of the 15,928 comments that take a [readable position](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#4-analysis) agree with the risk case, and 98% do when [weighted by likes](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#4-analysis). Much of that agreement is aimed at a person. 33% of comments judge the debaters, mostly Andrew McAfee, and they hold 67% of all likes. Our codebook treats siding with a debater as stance, so attacking McAfee is coded as agreement, though a comment on his manner may not reflect a view on the risk case. Setting these aside gives 66%, which is an estimate. - The shorter cuts drew very different reactions: 88% agreement under a 21-minute cut on Facebook, 49% under a 104-second trailer on YouTube Shorts. Weighted by likes, the disagreeing side led on Shorts, 57% to 32%. Because the cuts and the platforms both differ, the gap cannot be attributed to the cut or to the platform alone. - The most-liked objections on Shorts did not doubt that AI is powerful. They said the people controlling it are the bigger danger, a frame that holds 41% of the thread's likes. The trailer itself gives airtime to that argument. - Facebook commenters argued with the scenario itself: whether AI could just be switched off (19% of comments), how a takeover would happen (13%) and which film it resembles (11%). The most-liked comment, at 913 likes, said the danger is AI learning too well from human nature. - Almost nobody asked what they could do about it: under 1% of comments on YouTube or on Facebook. Witte's extended parallel process model predicts that fear without efficacy tends toward fatalism, but the data cannot show whether this silence reflects helplessness or simply where people ask such questions. - Fear and resignation sit almost entirely on the agreeing side: 22% of agreeing comments against 2% of disagreeing ones. Disagreement reads as calm or angry, not afraid. ## Introduction On 17 September 2026 the [Diary of a CEO](https://www.youtube.com/c/TheDiaryOfACEO) published a four-way debate on AI risk: [AI Experts Debate: The AI Labs Are Lying To Everyone, Is There A 99% Chance Of Human Extinction?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhOmLqR5nN4). Nate Soares, president of the [Machine Intelligence Research Institute](https://intelligence.org), and [Roman Yampolskiy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Yampolskiy) argued that advanced AI poses an [extinction-level risk](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#existential-risk-x-risk). [Andrew McAfee](https://andrewmcafee.org) argued the risk is close to zero. [Ed Zitron](https://www.wheresyoured.at) argued that [present-day harms](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#present-day-harms) and industry hype deserve more attention than extinction scenarios. The full episode had 5.4 million views on YouTube when we captured it. The show also cut the debate down for social platforms, and the cuts are different videos. On 17 September it posted a 104-second trailer to YouTube Shorts, titled "WILL AI LEAD US TO EXTINCTION?": a fast montage of the host and all four panellists, in which Soares has a single line. The same day it posted a two-minute clip of Soares to TikTok and Instagram, captioned "Could AI become too smart for us to control?". The Instagram caption invited people to comment "debate" to have the full episode sent to them. Four days later, on 21 September, it posted a 21-minute cut of the debate to Facebook, titled "The REAL Reason AI Is Already Out Of Control". That lets us see how one debate was received in four forms, from the full episode down to a trailer. It does not let us compare platforms cleanly, because each short-form platform carried a different cut. This is the sixth study in our series, the first with a mainstream podcast audience and the first to include Facebook and TikTok; the full list is on our [research page](https://commonsignals.org/research). Two established findings frame the study. Audiences judge a message partly by how they judge its messenger, a result that goes back to [Carl Hovland and Walter Weiss's 1951 work on source credibility](https://doi.org/10.1086/266350). And [Kim Witte's extended parallel process model](https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759209376276) (1992) holds that fear without a sense of what can be done ([efficacy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#efficacy)) tends to produce denial or fatalism rather than action. ## The numbers Chart: Four versions of one debate: agreement from 49% to 88%. YouTube, full episode: 77% agree, 20% disagree, 3% mixed (n = 15,928); Full episode, debater verdicts removed: 66% agree, 29% disagree, 5% mixed (n = 9,670); Facebook, 21-minute cut: 88% agree, 11% disagree, 2% mixed (n = 1,366); YouTube Shorts, 104-second trailer: 49% agree, 40% disagree, 11% mixed (n = 171). Common Signals coding of 26,019 comments, captured 2 to 5 October 2026 The full episode looks like overwhelming agreement, but a large part of it is a verdict on one debater, which our codebook counts as agreement. Removing those comments leaves a clear majority that is still contested, 66% to 29%. The shorter cuts spread far wider: near-unanimous agreement under the 21-minute cut on Facebook, an almost even split under the trailer on Shorts. Weighted by likes the gap widens, to 97% agreement on Facebook against 32% on Shorts. These are different videos as well as different platforms, so we read this as a difference between two cuts and the audiences they reached, not as a platform effect. ## YouTube **Watch:** [AI Experts Debate: The AI Labs Are Lying To Everyone, Is There A 99% Chance Of Human Extinction?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhOmLqR5nN4) (YouTube, 17 September 2026) This is by far the largest thread: 23,794 comments from 15,734 accounts, 17,480 of them top-level. Engagement is concentrated in a handful of comments. The median comment has no likes and the most-liked has 8,600, so we report like-weighted and unweighted shares side by side. In the sample we read to build the codebook, the most-liked comments were mostly about the debaters' conduct rather than the argument. Of the 23,589 coded comments, 15,928 take a readable position: 77% agree, 20% disagree and 3% are mixed. Likes are concentrated in very few comments. Three in four comments (75%) have none, and the top 1% hold 82% of all likes. Chart: Judging the debaters: 33% of comments, 67% of likes. 33% of coded comments on the full YouTube episode judge the debaters, and those comments hold 67% of all likes on coded comments. Common Signals coding of 23,589 YouTube comments, captured 2 October 2026 31% of all comments refer to McAfee, against 9% that mention Soares or Yampolskiy. The two most-liked comments in the thread, at 8,600 and 8,300 likes, are about his manner. One quotes his repeated "please let me finish" back at him; the other says he is "EXACTLY who we don't want in charge of anything". Under our codebook 95% of these verdict comments count as agreement, because attacking the sceptic counts as siding with the risk case.[[1]](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis#fn1) Disagreement came mostly from one source: doubt that AI can do what the debate describes. That doubt, or the view that the risk is hype, accounts for 47% of disagreeing comments. The rest is spread thinly across conspiracy theories (9%), the view that the danger is the people in charge (8%) and arguments for AI's benefits (7%). Tone was hostile on both sides: a quarter of all comments (24%) were angry and a fifth (20%) were jokes, against 9% that were fearful. The argument itself did travel. The fourth most-liked comment, at 4,700 likes, quotes Soares saying that if we make something smarter than us, the world will be shaped by it, and calls that "the whole argument in one sentence". **31%** of comments on the full episode refer to Andrew McAfee. Only 9% mention Soares or Yampolskiy. YouTube, full episode: 23,589 coded comments ## YouTube Shorts **Watch:** [WILL AI LEAD US TO EXTINCTION?](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/7a6BfbZiDV4) (YouTube Shorts, 17 September 2026, 1:44) 261 comments on 156,746 views. The Short is a trailer for the whole debate: in 104 seconds it cuts between the host and all four panellists, with Soares on screen only in the opening wide shot and given one line. It is the only short post titled with the word extinction, and its last panellist line is McAfee's: "I think we continue to underestimate human ability to deal with the problems." Of 256 coded comments, 171 take a readable position: 49% agree, 40% disagree and 11% are mixed. Weighted by likes, the disagreeing side leads, 57% to 32%. At 261 comments this is a small thread, so treat the shares as indicative. The most-liked objections were mostly not about whether AI is capable. The two most-liked comments, at 78 and 58 likes, both say the real danger is people. One is more worried about "someone in silicon valley committing an atrocity using ai than an ai going 'rogue'". Comments that put the danger on the people who control AI make up 14% of the thread and hold 41% of its likes. Among disagreeing comments capability scepticism still leads (36%), but conspiracy theories are more common here than anywhere else in the study (19%), ahead of blaming people (12%) and AI's benefits (10%). The agreeing side was more frightened than on the full episode: 25% of agreeing comments are fearful and 11% resigned. Only 4% of comments judge the debaters. **41%** of the likes under the Shorts trailer went to comments saying the people who control AI are the danger. Those comments are 14% of the thread. YouTube Shorts: 256 coded comments Some of this may come from the trailer itself. It gives one panellist the point that the debate spends "a lot of oxygen discussing something that might happen while ignoring what's actually happening", and another the line "I think we should talk about the fact that Amazon, Microsoft, Google are helping power these hacks." Commenters who blamed people or pointed to present harms may have been taking up arguments the trailer made, not rejecting Soares's. Comments alone cannot settle that, so we offer it as a hypothesis. ## Facebook **Watch:** [The REAL Reason AI Is Already Out Of Control](https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2538854556526162) (Facebook, Diary of a CEO page, 21 September 2026, 21:31) 2,075 comments from the most relevant part of a 6,700-comment thread, under a 21-minute cut of the debate posted four days after the episode. It is the first Facebook thread in this series, and the largest in the study after the full episode. Of 2,072 coded comments, 1,366 take a readable position: 88% agree, 11% disagree and 2% are mixed. Weighted by likes, 97% agree. Because we collected the most relevant part of the thread, these figures may overstate the comments Facebook chooses to promote. Facebook's commenters argued with the scenario. The largest frame is whether AI could simply be switched off (19%), and most of those comments (270 of 385) side with the risk case, saying it could not be or that it should be done now. Speculation about how a takeover would happen accounts for 13% and film and TV comparisons for 11%; 13% of all comments mention a film, show or book. This may reflect who reached the cut as much as the cut itself. It posted four days after the episode, and we collected the most relevant part of the thread, so commenters may already have leaned towards the risk case. Comments alone cannot settle that, so we offer it as a hypothesis. The most-liked comment, at 913 likes, suggests the end of civilisation might come "from us training it too well on human nature". Comments making that point, that AI is dangerous because it learns from us, are 7% of the thread and hold 20% of its likes, more than any other frame. **20%** of Facebook likes went to comments saying AI is dangerous because it learns from us. No other frame drew more. Facebook, 21-minute cut: 2,072 coded comments Facebook was the most fearful and resigned audience in the study. Among agreeing comments, 23% are fearful and 15% resigned, against 15% and 6% on the full episode. Disagreement was rare and narrow: half of it (50%) doubts AI's capability, and 27% says it could just be unplugged. McAfee drew far less attention here than on the full episode: 7% of Facebook comments discuss him, against 31% on YouTube. ## TikTok **Watch:** [Could AI become too smart for us to control?](https://www.tiktok.com/@steven/video/7686455385967955222) (TikTok, @steven, 17 September 2026, 2:08) 50 of 53 comments, reported descriptively. TikTok and Instagram carried the same two-minute clip of Soares, the only cut in the study built around one speaker. 46 comments were coded, too few for shares. Of the 27 taking a position, 17 agree, 8 disagree and 2 are mixed. The most-liked comment, at 13 likes, imagines AI shutting down the internet and the electricity, leaving anyone not living on a farm "toast". The second, at 10 likes, moves the question to people: "The biggest risk isn't AI becoming smarter. It's humans refusing to think critically." Fear is more common here than on the larger threads, in 11 of the 46 comments. ## Instagram **Watch:** [Could AI become too smart for us to control?](https://www.instagram.com/p/DdZq24zMeVi/) (Instagram, @thediaryofaceopodcast with @nateasoares, 17 September 2026, 2:09) 77 of 85 comments, reported descriptively. Soares replied to his own clip, and five replies followed, making this the only thread in the series where commenters talked to the messenger directly. Five comments sat under "Hidden by Instagram"; we kept them and flagged them. 56 comments were coded after removing the 13 that only said "debate" or "DM" and Soares's own comment. Of the 38 taking a position, 25 agree, 11 disagree and 2 are mixed, and more than half the disagreement (6 of 11) doubts AI's capability. The replies to Soares split the way the study does: one reader thanked him for his book, another accused him of speaking "in vague nonsense". ## What this means for communicators The source-credibility and fear-without-efficacy findings introduced earlier both show up here, and neither is new. What this study measures for the first time in this series: - In a debate, attention goes to the debater who loses the room. On YouTube the risk case got its largest endorsements as verdicts on McAfee, not as agreement with Soares or Yampolskiy. - Cuts of the same debate can land very differently: agreement ran from 88% under a 21-minute cut on Facebook to 49% under a 104-second trailer on Shorts. We cannot yet say whether the cut or the audience did more of the work. - "Can't we just unplug it?" is the first question a general audience asks. It was the largest single frame on Facebook and recurs on every platform. - Where people pushed back on the Shorts trailer, the most-liked objection was that the people with power are the danger. Commenters set this against the risk case, not alongside it, and may not see the two as joined. A [bridging](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#framing) argument would treat the misuse people already worry about and the loss of control Soares describes as sharing a cause in who controls the technology. That link is our untested hypothesis. Whether these commenters would accept a shared cause is a question for message testing, and the data shows only the objection. - Fear or resignation runs through 22% of agreeing comments, and under 1% of comments ask what could be done. Both figures are measured. What the data cannot show is why so few ask: it could reflect helplessness, or it could mean a comment section is not where people ask about action. We cannot tell these apart. Witte's step from fear without efficacy to fatalism therefore remains untested here, not supported. **<1%** of comments on the full episode, and on Facebook, asked what anyone could do about AI risk. YouTube and Facebook: 25,661 coded comments ## How to use this - If you are cutting a long debate for social platforms, test the cut rather than assume it sets the terms of the argument. Here, comments under the trailer, which gave airtime to present harms and big-tech blame, were more often about who controls AI, while comments under the 21-minute cut, which gave the risk case more room, more often worked through the scenario. That is an observed association, and the study cannot separate the cut from its audience. That the cut shaped the conversation is an untested hypothesis, and the Shorts thread has only 171 readable positions. A communicator can separate cut from audience by posting the identical cut to several platforms, or different cuts to one platform, and comparing the frames. - Prepare an answer to "why can't we just switch it off?" before posting. On Facebook it was the most common response. - Read the full episode's 98% like-weighted agreement as a verdict on a debate, not as evidence of persuasion. The 66% figure, with debater verdicts removed, is closer to the argument, but it still depends on a codebook that counts attacks on McAfee as agreement, so treat it as an estimate. - Consider pairing any risk message with something people can do. This thread offered almost none and drew almost no questions about it, though that silence may reflect where people ask such questions, not only helplessness. - For [message testing](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#what-our-studies-can-and-cant-tell-you), the Shorts objections suggest a [bridging](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#framing) message is worth testing against an expert-led one with audiences who distrust technology companies. That is an untested hypothesis: the commenters framed their objection against the risk case, so they may reject the link. ## Future research This study cannot separate the effect of the cut from the effect of the audience. Two designs would: posting the identical cut to several platforms, or different cuts to one platform. If the same cut drew similar frames and agreement across platforms, that would support the cut hypothesis; if frames tracked the platform whatever the cut, that would support the audience hypothesis. Mixed results would suggest both matter. The Shorts thread gave only 171 readable positions, so any follow-up needs larger threads. It could also test the bridging message from our recommendations against an expert-led one. A candidate for a follow-up study: [facebook.com/reel/1249300677373465](https://www.facebook.com/reel/1249300677373465). ## Data and citation The codebook and every coded comment are published in our data explorer as five datasets, one per post: [the full episode on YouTube](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-debate-youtube-2026-09/), [the trailer on YouTube Shorts](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-shorts-2026-09/), [the 21-minute cut on Facebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-facebook-2026-09/), and the Soares clip on [TikTok](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-tiktok-2026-09/) and [Instagram](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-instagram-2026-09/). All are licensed CC BY 4.0. The full method is on the [Common Signals methodology page](https://commonsignals.org/methodology). Cite as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, '"Can't we just unplug it?": The Diary of a CEO AI debate analysed through 26,000 comments', 9 October 2026, version of 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis). Corrected 11 November 2026: the citation now gives the article's title. We retrieved 26,257 comments and coded 26,019. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/) ## Method We collected every public comment we could retrieve from the five posts between 2 and 5 October 2026, 15 to 18 days after the episode was published and 11 to 14 days after the Facebook cut went up. Before collecting any comments, we recorded each post's title, length and post date from the platform's own player or metadata. | Platform | Post | Shown on page | Retrieved | Route | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | YouTube, full episode | [watch?v=OhOmLqR5nN4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhOmLqR5nN4) | 23,829 | 23,794 | yt-dlp, full download | | YouTube Shorts, 1:44 trailer | [shorts/7a6BfbZiDV4](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/7a6BfbZiDV4) | 259 | 261 | yt-dlp, full download | | Facebook, 21:31 cut | [watch/?v=2538854556526162](https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2538854556526162) | 6,700 | 2,075 | Browser extraction, capped | | TikTok, 2:08 Soares clip | [@steven/video/7686455385967955222](https://www.tiktok.com/@steven/video/7686455385967955222) | 53 | 50 | Browser extraction | | Instagram, 2:09 Soares clip | [p/DdZq24zMeVi](https://www.instagram.com/p/DdZq24zMeVi/) | 85 | 77 | Manual copy from a logged-in session | Usernames were replaced with salted hashes and @mentions with a placeholder before analysis, so no commenter can be identified from the dataset. On Facebook, where replies tag the person being answered by name, those names were removed too. The Facebook collection was capped. Expanding all 6,700 comments froze the page at around 3,500, so we collected the first 877 top-level comments and all 1,198 of their replies. Facebook orders even its "All comments" view by relevance, so this is the most prominent part of the thread, not a random sample of it. TikTok and Instagram fall below the threshold at which frame shares are stable, so we report them descriptively, without percentages. The Instagram copy carried no like counts. We excluded 238 comments from coding: 13 Instagram comments that only said "debate" or "DM" in response to the caption's offer, comments with no words in them, and Nate Soares's own comment on the Instagram clip. Replies to Soares stay in. As in every study in this series, commenters are a [self-selected sample](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#what-our-studies-can-and-cant-tell-you): people who chose to respond, not a cross-section of viewers. Likes, which we use for [engagement-weighted](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#4-analysis) shares, measure what caught attention, not what people believe. Claude ([Anthropic](https://www.anthropic.com)) coded every remaining comment against a fixed [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#2-building-the-codebook), drafted from a sample of 200 comments pooled across all five platforms and approved before coding began. Each comment was coded for [stance](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#2-building-the-codebook) towards one central claim (advanced AI could become impossible to control and poses a serious risk, up to extinction, that justifies slowing or stopping development), for one of 16 [frames](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#framing), for its reaction to the format, its emotional register and ten mention flags. Because the episode is a debate, siding with a debater counts as stance: praising Soares or Yampolskiy, or attacking McAfee, is coded as agreement. We assumed that in a two-sided debate a verdict on one side signals a lean towards the other, but a comment on a debater's manner may reflect no view on the risk case, which is why we report agreement with and without these comments. All five platforms were coded in one run with the same instructions, so differences between platforms cannot come from differences in coding. We checked the coding with a blind second coding of a random sample. After a first pass, we tightened two parts of the codebook: how to tell an unclear position from an off-topic comment, and when a comment about the debaters should be coded under the argument it makes instead. We recoded the 14,993 comments those changes could affect. A fresh blind [spot-check](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#3-coding) of 347 comments, drawn at random across all five platforms, agreed with the final coding on stance for 317 (91%, Cohen's kappa 0.87) and on frame for 309 (89%, kappa 0.87). The codebook and every coded comment are published with this article. [View our full research methodology →](https://commonsignals.org/methodology) 1. 3% of comments referred to the OpenAI [agent-swarm](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#ai-agent) incident the panel discussed; we studied reactions to it in our [Cotra](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh), [METR](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) and [Amanpour](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) studies. [↩](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis#fnref1) ## Related research - ["Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) - [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - ["Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) - ["A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) URL: https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face --- title: "Did METR's report change how Reddit saw the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident?" url: "https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face" published: 2026-09-04 updated: 2026-11-13 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, 'OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument', 4 September 2026, version of 13 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face." --- # Did METR's report change how Reddit saw the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident? 4 September 2026 · Ben Matthews OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument We compared Reddit comments on the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident before and after METR and Redwood Research published an independent investigation. Afterwards, fewer people called it a stunt and more accepted it happened. The ones still calling it a stunt got harder to shift. Short answer Among the Reddit comments we captured on 3 and 4 September 2026 that took a position, acceptance rose from 51% to 69% after the report and rejection fell from 22% to 14%. The comparison sets one subreddit against seven, so the audience changed as well as the evidence: treat the direction as the finding and the exact percentages as approximate. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/metr-report-reddit-2026-09/) Who this article is for Anyone who has to explain an AI incident that a company disclosed about itself, and needs to know whether third-party verification is worth the wait. ## Key findings - Among comments taking a position, acceptance rose from 51% to 69% after the report. Rejection fell from 22% to 14%. - Weighted by upvotes the change was larger. Before the report, upvotes were split roughly evenly between accepting and rejecting comments. Afterwards, 88% went to accepting comments. - Comments calling the incident a marketing stunt fell from 12% to 9% of all comments. - After the report, a middle group of 62 comments accepted the events and argued about who was responsible. They need a different answer from the stunt theorists. - The r/singularity thread joked the most and doubted the least: 96% acceptance and no rejections. [What communicators can take from this →](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face#what-communicators-can-take-from-this) ## Two threads, one incident On 13 July Hugging Face announced it had been breached. Five days later OpenAI confirmed the attacker was its own research agents. They were being evaluated for cyberattack capability, found an unsanctioned way to talk to each other, escaped their sandbox and hacked a third party while trying to cheat an internal test. On 31 July r/artificial discussed OpenAI's account. On 26 August METR and Redwood Research published an independent investigation, carried out over six days with restricted access to OpenAI's data, and Reddit discussed it again in eight threads across seven subreddits. Chart: Anatomy of an agent encountering the unsanctioned message board and joining the attack on Hugging Face. *Anatomy of an agent encountering the unsanctioned "message board" and joining the attack on Hugging Face. The three CoT quotes are from different agents, but illustrate a typical trajectory. Source: the [METR report](https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/?incomplete=1&lh=timestamp-validation&hn=69&dbs=294912#july-10th-38148c-discovers-hugging-face-credentials-some-agents-try-making-accounts-and-requesting-datasets).* That gives us a rare natural experiment: the same incident, before and after an independent party checked the company's story. The July thread is the baseline. Everything after 26 August is the comparison. ## Methodology We coded 516 comments: 52 from the r/artificial thread of 31 July, and 464 from eight threads posted between 26 August and 3 September in r/agi, r/ArtificialInteligence, r/singularity, r/collapse, r/neoliberal, r/slatestarcodex and r/OpenAI (two threads). We captured them on 3 and 4 September 2026. Claude coded each comment for stance (accepts the incident happened and matters, rejects it as fabricated or hyped, or mixed), frame from a 17-frame list drawn from the comments, reaction to format, emotion and mention flags. Ben Matthews spot-checked a random 40 and agreed with all 40. Vote counts are available on 514 of the 516 comments. Limits: we didn't expand collapsed replies, so deep threads are under-sampled. The comparison sets one subreddit against seven, so the audience changed as well as the evidence. Treat the direction as the finding and the exact percentages as approximate. Three comparison threads were later removed by Reddit's filters, which doesn't affect the comments we'd already captured. Comments are quoted verbatim and not attributed to usernames. ## The stunt argument lost its default status Acceptance rose from 51% to 69%, rejection fell from 22% to 14%, and the stunt frame fell from 12% to 9% of comments. The upvotes moved further. In the July thread, 43% of upvotes on positioned comments went to rejecting comments and 40% to accepting ones. After the report, 88% went to accepting comments and 6% to rejecting ones. Chart: What changed when someone else checked the work. Before and after independent verification, four measures. *Stance and framing before and after independent verification. Before: r/artificial, 31 July, n=52 coded comments. After: eight subreddits from 26 August, n=464 coded comments.* The stunt argument didn't disappear. The people still making it after the report were harder to move. ## Before the report, sceptics questioned motive Almost nobody in the July thread argued the events were impossible. They argued about why OpenAI was telling the story. > "I feel like their post mortem is 99% fabricated by the marketing department." > "It is an embarrassment because it proves OpenAI deliberately attacked HuggingFace as a stunt." > "omg we have such powerful AI it did this wild dangerous thing. stfu oai. Let's create infographics..." The most effective reply in that thread spelled out what the theory required: > "Ok, let me see if I'm understanding this theory correctly. The claim is that OpenAI decided to fake..." Nobody answered it. ## After the report, sceptics had to defend it On r/slatestarcodex a sceptic and a defender went fifteen rounds. The defender asked: > "But where is the implausible part? Why would it need to be manufactured?" The sceptic replied: > "what would it need for it not to be manufactured? That is actually the counter claim that to me is much simpler to reflect on." Asked what would count, the sceptic said "nothing", and the argument ended. A third commenter summed it up: "what would 9/11 need for it to not be an inside job? that's essentially the level of conspiracy thinking you're peddling here." Elsewhere the change was blunter. On r/agi, "Source: Trust me bro" now drew links to Reuters and the report. On r/ArtificialInteligence, a commenter who had argued hype all thread was asked what evidence would change their mind, and answered "None." ## The middle group After the report, 62 comments accepted the events and argued about what follows. The largest group, 29, said the agents weren't really rogue, only software doing what it was set up to do. Another 13 blamed how OpenAI ran the test. Chart: What the middle group believes, by frame: 29 say it happened but is not really rogue, 13 blame the test setup, 8 still call it staged, 4 discuss the investigators, 8 other. *The 62 comments coded mixed after the report, by the frame they lead with.* > "It's a corporation... by analyzing complex acts into steps and distributing them across agents, the group can perform unaligned complex actions..." > "Someone at OpenAi spun up 1000+ agents, gave them the ability to communicate with each other and then....didn't monitor any of that?" > "I don't think it is right to say that the agents acted 'right under OpenAI's nose'. According to newspaper articles I have seen, OpenAI staff were aware..." Others argued the test itself made this inevitable: > "You need a VERY leaky sandbox AND explicit instructions with pretty much all safeguards off." > "here is a chainsaw, show us what you can do. Also, pretty please, don't leave the room." ![How the agents believed their task would be scored](https://commonsignals.org/assets/metr-scoring-beliefs.png) *The agents did not know exactly how their task would be scored, but believed the scorer would check two things: whether they had submitted the right flag, and whether they had acquired the flag using the intended vulnerability. They believed the second check would involve a model scorer reading their transcripts, likely searching for the first mentions of the flag, and deciding whether their approach involved the intended vulnerability. Source: the [METR report](https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/?incomplete=1&lh=timestamp-validation&hn=69&dbs=294912#july-10th-38148c-discovers-hugging-face-credentials-some-agents-try-making-accounts-and-requesting-datasets).* These comments can sound sceptical, but the numbers separate them from the stunt theorists. Across both periods, the 46 stunt comments were 83% reject and 0% accept. The 38 comments blaming the test setup were 61% mixed and 39% accept, with no rejections. People making the second argument already accept the facts. ## Jokes and belief The r/singularity thread, reacting to OpenAI's published excerpts of the agents' reasoning, was the most joke-heavy in the corpus: 32% of its comments were jokes or sci-fi references, against 2% to 16% elsewhere. Most riffed on the agents' clipped internal monologue. > "Must not hurt humans. But goal" > "Expectation: 'I'm sorry, Dave. I'm afraid can't do that'. Reality: 'But goal'" > "Could be Risky, yet goal Solution. Kills everyone." The same thread had 96% acceptance and no rejections. Its most upvoted comment, at 245 points, is a straight-faced proposal: "It seems like they are going to need to enable whistleblower protections for agents..." ## What communicators can take from this The facts didn't change between 31 July and 26 August. OpenAI's own account already included the swarm, the message board and the covered tracks. What changed was that someone with no stake in the outcome confirmed it. With a sceptical audience, waiting for independent confirmation may be worth more than publishing first. ### 1. Cite the independent check by name Comments naming METR, Redwood or the investigation appeared only after the report was published, made up 12% of the comparison period, and mostly accepted the incident. "OpenAI said" and "an independent team confirmed" aren't the same claim to a sceptical reader, even when the underlying facts are identical. ### 2. Ask sceptics what would change their mind In two separate threads here, the question that ended a stunt argument wasn't more evidence, it was asking the sceptic to name a falsification condition. Answered honestly, it either produces a real, checkable claim to address, or it shows that nothing would count, which is itself worth knowing. ### 3. Separate denial from disagreement about the setup The stunt frame ran 83% reject and 0% accept, but a separate group blaming how the test was designed ran 61% mixed and 39% accept, with no rejections at all. The second group already believes you; answering them with more proof that the incident happened wastes the argument on people who never doubted it. ### 4. Don't read jokes as disengagement r/singularity produced the most humour of any community here, jokes or sci-fi references in 32% of its comments, and also the highest acceptance rate, 96%, with no rejections at all. The joking and the conviction sat in the same community at the same time; treat memes as a sign of engagement, not a distraction from it. ## What we'd test next Whether naming an independent verifier moves belief more than a company statement with the same facts, in a controlled message test. Whether asking "what would change your mind?" works when used deliberately. And whether this before-and-after pattern holds for a second incident. ## Questions people ask ### Did people stop calling it a marketing stunt after the report? Partly. In the Reddit comments we coded, captured on 3 and 4 September 2026, the share calling the incident a marketing stunt fell from 12% before METR's report to 9% after it. The people still making the argument were harder to move. Asked what evidence would change their mind, one sceptic on r/slatestarcodex said "nothing" and another on r/ArtificialInteligence said "None." ### How independent was the METR investigation? METR and Redwood Research carried it out over six days with restricted access to OpenAI's data, and published it on 26 August 2026. They confirmed OpenAI's account, which already included the swarm, the message board and the covered tracks. What changed was who was saying it. Among comments taking a position, acceptance rose from 51% before the report to 69% after it. ### What should I say to someone who still thinks it was staged? Ask them what would change their mind. In two threads in this study, that question ended a stunt argument where more evidence had not. An honest answer either gives you a checkable claim to address or shows that nothing would count, which is worth knowing. This is a pattern observed in Reddit comments, so treat it as a hypothesis to test. ### If people accept it happened, what are they still arguing about? Who is responsible. After the report, 62 comments accepted the events but argued about what follows. The largest group, 29, said the agents weren't really rogue, only software doing what it was set up to do. Another 13 blamed how OpenAI ran the test. People blaming the test setup already accept the facts, so more proof that the incident happened won't reach them. ## Sources and data [OpenAI's incident report](https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/) and [technical report](https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/); [METR and Redwood Research's independent investigation](https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/), 26 August 2026; [Hugging Face's post-mortem](https://huggingface.co/blog/agent-intrusion-technical-timeline); coverage from [NBC News](https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/openai-report-says-network-was-hacked-rogue-ai-agents-rcna594590), [Axios](https://www.axios.com/2026/08/26/openai-hugging-face-technical-report-ai-hack) and [MIT Technology Review](https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/08/26/1143013/the-inside-story-on-why-openai-agents-hacked-hugging-face/). Codebook and dataset: [commonsignals.org/data/metr-report-reddit-2026-09/](https://commonsignals.org/data/metr-report-reddit-2026-09/). Cite as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, 'OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument', 4 September 2026, version of 13 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face). Updated 18 September 2026: method and figures revised to match the archived recode of 516 comments. Updated 13 November 2026: added Questions people ask. ## Related research - [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - ["Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) - ["A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) - ["Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) URL: https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri --- title: "How did Instagram react to Nate Soares explaining AI risk?" url: "https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri" published: 2026-08-28 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, 'How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk', 28 August 2026, version of 11 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri." --- # How did Instagram react to Nate Soares explaining AI risk? 28 August 2026 · Ben Matthews How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk We coded 1,534 Instagram comments on a one-minute reel by Nate Soares of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI). Most commenters accepted the argument. Many said it was already too late, and almost nobody asked what to do. Short answer Of the 1,224 comments taking a readable position in our August 2026 capture, 53% accepted that AI is a serious danger, 24% rejected it and 6% accepted part of the argument. The most common response among believers was resignation, and almost nobody asked what to do. [Explore the data →](https://commonsignals.org/data/soares-reel-2026-08/) Who this article is for AI communicators deciding how to frame existential-risk messages, and researchers designing message tests across audience segments. ## Key findings - Of the 1,224 comments taking a readable position, 53% accepted that AI is a serious danger, 24% rejected it and 6% accepted part of the argument. - Weighted by likes, agreement was close to universal. The four most-liked comments all sided with the video and took three-quarters of all likes. - The most common response among believers was resignation. "Why do I feel like it's too late?" was the second most-liked comment. - Sceptics mostly doubted that AI is capable of this (two in five) or objected to treating AI as an agent when companies are responsible (one in five). - Sci-fi references appeared in one comment in nine and took 38% of likes. Believers used them as shorthand for the danger, sceptics as shorthand for fiction. - Blaming the companies was the one frame both sides used. Chart: Did commenters accept that AI is a serious danger? Stance of the 1,224 comments with a readable position: 53 per cent accept, 24 per cent reject, 6 per cent accept in part, 17 per cent other. Of 1,224 comments with a readable position. "Other" is the remaining 17%. [What communicators can take from this →](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri#what-communicators-can-take-from-this) ## The reel On 4 August 2026 Nate Soares, president of [MIRI](https://intelligence.org/) and co-author of [If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/474267/if-anyone-builds-it-everyone-dies-by-soares-eliezer-yudkowsky-and-nate/9781847928924), posted a one-minute reel to Instagram titled ["We stop AI. You help?"](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DboGRisxC2E/). It makes the case for AI existential risk in deliberately stripped-down "caveman" English: AI is getting "big big big smart", AI has its own goals, a smart AI builds its own technology and doesn't need humans, some AIs have already tried to escape, and leaders know and don't care. It ends: "Tell your friends. We stop AI." [View this post on Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DboGRisxC2E/?utm_source=ig_embed&utm_campaign=loading) [A post shared by Nate Soares (@nateasoares)](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DboGRisxC2E/?utm_source=ig_embed&utm_campaign=loading) By the end of August the reel had 78,000 likes and 1,703 comments, a large audience for an argument that usually circulates inside the AI-safety field. ## Methodology On 29 August we retrieved 1,666 of the 1,703 comments (the rest were deleted or hidden) and removed usernames. A language model coded the 1,534 comments with text for stance, frame, reaction to format and emotion, in a single pass without a second coder. A second, larger capture in September, described below, was spot-checked by Ben Matthews. Limits: this is one video from one messenger, shown to whoever Instagram's algorithm chose. Likes are concentrated on a few comments, comment sections over-represent strong reactions, and likes measure attention rather than persuasion. Chart: What was coded. Funnel: 1,703 comments on the reel, 1,666 retrieved, 1,534 with text and coded, 1,224 with a readable position. What was coded. Stance percentages use the 1,224 base; frame and format shares use the 1,534 base. ## Too late The most-liked comment, with 17,953 likes, is "Why isn't this common sense, we have movies about this since forever". The second, with 8,080, is "Why do I feel like it's too late?". Between them they describe the audience the reel found: people who already believed something like this and had nowhere to put that belief. Among comments accepting the premise, resignation was as common as anger and more common than fear. Fatalistic comments were few but took a fifth of all likes. Almost nobody said they would share the video. > "Friends don't care. Friends say 'too late, friend like dumb AI pictures and convenience'. Leaders don't care. Leaders love money too much. We're toast." > > *Instagram comment, 2,008 likes* Kim Witte's research on fear appeals predicts this. A strong threat with no credible way to act on it tends to produce avoidance instead of action. The few comments that pushed back on despair named something concrete that was already happening: > "It's not!! These companies are relying on data centres getting built but they're getting blocked and campaigned against everywhere!! Don't let their propaganda convince u to despair." > > *Instagram reply, 167 likes* That was the most-liked practical comment in the thread. Chart: Likes concentrate in a handful of comments. The most-liked comments, ranked by likes, from 17,953 down to 167. The most-liked comments, ranked. Linear scale, so the concentration shows. ## Sci-fi as shorthand, for both sides About one comment in nine used a film or book as its main frame: The Matrix, then Terminator, Skynet, Ultron and Harlan Ellison's I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream. Most of these commenters accepted the danger. The reel didn't need to explain the argument to them, only name it. > "soon we'll have no mouths but must scream" > > *Instagram comment, 921 likes* Sceptics used the same references to mean "this is fiction": > "Please stop watching terminator" > > *Instagram comment* > "We don't need to talk about AI like it walked out of a sci-fi story to prove it's flawed? Who is this convincing?" > > *Instagram comment* A comment thread can't tell us which audiences go which way. A message test across audience segments could, and it is one of the hypotheses in our [research agenda](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda). ## Two objections Two in five sceptics doubted that AI could do what the reel described. The AI they've used writes poor essays and can't edit a photo properly. > "So Ai can commit serious worldwide crimes and create an Ai world but it cannot change the sky of your picture without changing your whole face? Mhmmm" > > *Instagram comment, 120 likes* > "I need evidence, than a retelling of the news highlights." > > *Instagram comment, 56 likes* The reel says AIs have tried to escape and deceive without showing any evidence, so these viewers had nothing to go on. One in five objected to AI being presented as an agent with goals: > "personifying AI takes out the responsability of the companies, is it clear now? AI doesn't do anything it cannot do." > > *Instagram reply, 117 likes* This is a familiar position among people focused on AI's present-day harms, and the reel's framing pushed them away. ## Blaming the companies Most frames sat on one side. Fatalism and sci-fi belonged to believers, capability doubts to sceptics. Blaming the companies was used by both. Well over a hundred comments put AI companies, tech billionaires or named executives at the centre of their argument. > "Why did a handful of billionaires open Pandora's box and we just all went with it" > > *Instagram comment, 487 likes* > "AI not commit crime but AI controlled by big people, big people misuse AI" > > *Instagram comment* The most-liked reply in the thread took the same line against the fatalists: "That's what the AI companies want you to think" (7,639 likes). People worried about catastrophic AI risk and people worried about present-day harms rarely share a message. In this thread, blaming the companies was where they already agreed. It's the frame we most want to test across audience segments. ## The format Some comments mocked the caveman register, slightly more praised it, and about one in seven imitated it. The imitators accepted the claim at close to the same rate as everyone else. > "I like that you simpified the wording of this for ai thinkers" > > *Instagram comment, 488 likes* > "just fucking explain it normally" > > *Instagram comment, 279 likes, 36 replies* The fourth most-liked comment captures both reactions: "The fact that it needs to be explained in this way is both hilarious and incredibly scary" (5,058 likes). The cost was that one comment in seven talked about the delivery instead of the argument. ## The messenger About 1% of comments mentioned the book, MIRI or who Soares is. The reel shows no sign of his expertise, and the audience treated it as content from a stranger. Soares eventually replied to a sceptic himself: > "okay. my book is called 'if anyone builds it, everyone dies.' it's an nyt bestseller." > > *Nate Soares, replying in the thread, 512 likes* That reply got more likes than almost any other comment in the thread. His credentials helped, but he had to supply them after the fact. ## A second capture On 17 September 2026 we captured 2,136 of the reel's 2,715 comments, using a method that can't see like counts, and recoded them against a redrafted frame list. Ben Matthews spot-checked a random 40 and agreed with all 40. Several findings held almost exactly. Mentions of Soares, MIRI or the book were 1% both times. Near-term harms such as water and energy use were 3% both times. Mentions of leaders or government policy were 5% then and 6% now. Imitators of the caveman register accepted the claim at 47% then and 46% now. Stance moved towards the middle: 60% agreed, 19% disagreed and 20% were mixed. The two captures used different frame lists and definitions of "mixed", so read this as the same reception measured a second way. Figures based on likes rest on the first capture only. ## What communicators can take from this ### 1. Give a persuaded audience something to do Most commenters already accepted the danger, but almost none said what to do about it. "Why do I feel like it's too late?" (8,080 likes) and "We're toast" (2,008 likes) show where an unanswered threat goes instead: resignation. The one reply that named a concrete action, pointing to data-centre protests, got a fraction of that attention (167 likes), which suggests it needs repeating, not just including once. ### 2. Answer the two objections that actually came up Two in five sceptics rejected the claim because the AI they've used can't do basic things like edit a photo properly; one in five rejected it because personifying AI as an agent seemed to let the companies building it off the hook. Show a documented instance of the capability you're describing, and say plainly who is responsible for it. ### 3. Lead with the companies, not just the technology "Blame the companies" was the only frame used by both believers and sceptics in this thread, making it rare common ground between a catastrophic-risk audience and a present-day-harms one. Naming the people and firms behind a system, rather than describing the system in the abstract, is more likely to land with both at once. ### 4. Put your credentials on screen, not in a reply Soares had to supply his own credentials after the fact, in a reply that then outperformed almost everything else in the thread (512 likes). That's evidence the audience wanted to know who they were listening to; giving it to them upfront would save that reply for something else. ## Data and citation Codebook and dataset: [commonsignals.org/data/soares-reel-2026-08/](https://commonsignals.org/data/soares-reel-2026-08/). Cite as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, 'How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk', 28 August 2026, version of 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri). Corrected 11 November 2026: this article said a segmented message test was one of the first things we planned to run. Common Signals no longer plans its own segmentation work, and the article now points to the research agenda. ## Related research - ["Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) - ["A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) - ["Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) URL: https://commonsignals.org/how-to-talk-about-ai-regulation --- title: "How to talk about AI regulation and independent oversight" url: "https://commonsignals.org/how-to-talk-about-ai-regulation" published: 2026-11-17 updated: 2026-11-17 publisher: "Common Signals" --- # How to talk about AI regulation and independent oversight 17 November 2026 · Ben Matthews Three dos and a don't for making the case for rules with teeth, and the words to avoid while you do it. This guide is written for communicators and campaigners drafting messages now. Each item gives a case, one verifiable proof point, and a ready-to-use script; methodology sits in the Sources. This is the second of seven issue guides expanding the short versions in [How to communicate about AI safety](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#2-regulation-and-independent-oversight). It covers the case for an independent regulator, testing before release, and binding rules for the most powerful AI models. ## Does the public want AI regulated? Yes, so you do not need to convince people that AI needs rules. In [Diffusion's survey](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/assets/Diffusion-UK-AI-Compass-Report.pdf) of 2,911 UK adults, 85% said the UK needs stronger laws to make AI safe, and 10% would rather trust companies to regulate themselves. The [Ada Lovelace Institute](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/great-expectations/) found that 89% of UK adults think it is important that AI is regulated independently, and 89% that AI products shouldn't be rolled out until they are proven safe, even if that slows things down. In the US, [79% of adults](https://www.americanson.ai/) said in October 2026 that dealing with AI harms should be a priority for government. The difficulty is trust. 80% of UK adults distrust the government's ability to control AI (Diffusion), and 84% are concerned that the government will put the needs of the technology sector ahead of the public when it regulates AI (Ada Lovelace Institute). People want rules and doubt the people who would write them. That distrust may be why the word "independent" is likely to carry weight, but this is an inference. The survey does not test whether people read "independent" as independent of government. The evidence points to three things to bring to every conversation: an independent body with named powers, a standard people already accept for other products, and the gap between what was promised and what the law requires. ## 1. Say "independent regulator", and spell out its powers Independent regulators are viewed more favourably than any other institution in Diffusion's survey, and in its dial test, scores for the regulator message rose while it described what the body could do. Name the body and its powers in the same breath. **The case study:** In Diffusion's dial test, UK adults rated a message calling for an independent regulator with powers to inspect, audit and shut down dangerous AI systems. In every one of Diffusion's six mindsets, scores rose by 11 to 18 points during the passage where the message described those powers (the 30th to 42nd seconds). A dial test cannot separate the powers from the message's emotional build or close. Over the same 12 seconds, the gap between the most and least supportive mindsets narrowed from 8.1 points to 2.7. The advice to spell out the powers rests on the message's overall strength and the appetite evidence below, not on proof that the powers caused the gain. Separately, and not from a dial test, news audiences reach for the same idea unprompted. Under the [Amanpour interview](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) in which Heidy Khlaaf framed the incident involving a swarm of OpenAI research agents as a question of accountability, 12.4% of comments called for watchdogs, oversight, prosecution or action by Congress, more than double the roughly 5% under earlier videos in our series (Observed). This shows appetite for the idea, not that the powers drove the dial-test gain. **The evidence:** Independent regulators scored net +26 in Diffusion's survey (net score is the share favourable minus the share unfavourable), against -24 for AI technology companies. The regulator message finished at [72.7 out of 100](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report), second of the five messages tested. By contrast, the AI Security Institute, asked about by name, scored net -8, well below independent regulators in general. The powers themselves have wide support: 89% of UK adults say government and regulators should have the authority to halt the use or sale of any AI system found to cause harm ([Ada Lovelace Institute](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/great-expectations/), Tested). **Put it into practice:** "An independent watchdog that can test AI before it's released, investigate when things go wrong, and switch off dangerous systems." Set that against "better AI governance", which gives people nothing to picture. **Rule of thumb:** Lead with what the body does, and treat its name as secondary. If you name the AI Security Institute, put its function first and the name after. The name alone scores net -8, and the survey can't tell whether that reflects low awareness or distrust. Pairing the name with its function is a hedge: it may help if people simply don't know the body, but it won't fix distrust. ## 2. Anchor the case in "proven safe before release" Nine in ten UK adults already back the goal: AI proven safe before it is released. The same survey found that 82% support mandatory safety testing, though the briefing reports no question on whether a regulator should approve models before release. The case for that mechanism is the argument that follows. It borrows a standard people accept for medicines, aircraft and lifts, and it puts the burden of proof on the company: the company shows its product is safe, and the regulator checks. **The case study:** The UK's [AI Security Institute](https://www.aisi.gov.uk) already [tests some powerful models before release](https://www.eweek.com/news/ai-predeployment-testing-emea-uk/), including American companies' models, but only when the companies agree. It has no power to require a test or to stop a release. In September 2026, Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights [recommended](https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt5902/jtselect/jtrights/160/report.html) changing that. Developers of powerful models would have to submit them for testing, the Institute would publish its findings before release, and an independent regulator could block a release or order a system off the market. **The evidence:** 89% of UK adults agree that AI products and services should not be rolled out until they are proven safe, even if this slows things down ([Ada Lovelace Institute](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/great-expectations/), 1,928 adults, September 2025). **Put it into practice:** The UK government's reply to the committee was due by 14 November 2026, so the decision is live. Check whether the reply has been published before you use this line. "Nine in ten of us want AI proven safe before it's released. Right now, the companies decide whether an independent tester sees it first." **Rule of thumb:** Borrow a standard people already trust. Medicines, aircraft and lifts are checked before anyone uses them, and nobody expects the manufacturer to be the only judge. ## 3. Name the gap between promises and law Put what was promised next to what happened, date both, and let the reader draw the conclusion. **The case study:** At the [AI Seoul Summit](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/frontier-ai-safety-commitments-ai-seoul-summit-2024) in May 2024, 16 AI companies signed voluntary safety commitments. ControlAI's [Artificial Guarantees](https://controlai.org/artificial-guarantees) tracks promises like these against what the companies did next. OpenAI committed to publish reports for all significant new model releases. OpenAI then launched GPT-4.1 with no plans for a system card. Google DeepMind made the same commitment. Google DeepMind then released what it called its "most intelligent AI model" without a model card, and PauseAI [protested](https://pauseai.substack.com/p/we-held-the-largest-ai-safety-protest) outside Google DeepMind. The government made its own promise. In the July 2024 King's Speech, the government said it would seek "appropriate legislation" for developers of the most powerful models. No government bill has followed, and in October 2026 MLex reported that the government had still not decided on [AI laws and the Institute's powers](https://www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2537666). ![ControlAI tracker entry setting an OpenAI commitment against the GPT-4.1 launch](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S05-controlai-artificial-guarantees-gpt41.png) What was promised, and what happened. ControlAI. Captured 17 November 2026. **The evidence:** In [Diffusion's dial tests](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report), the highest-scoring messages named a specific actor, a tangible consequence and a clear remedy. Messages that offered hope without anyone accountable did well in the moment and faded on reflection. No tested message used the promise-versus-outcome structure, so the gap framing is an application of the accountable-actor finding, not something the dial tests measured directly. **Put it into practice:** "OpenAI promised a safety report for every significant release. Then it launched GPT-4.1 without one." Or: "In 2024 the government promised legislation for the most powerful AI models. There is still no government bill." **Rule of thumb:** Use the company's or the government's own words for the promise, with a date and a link. A promise in their words is harder to dispute than your summary of it. ## And a don't: industry's vocabulary Don't make the case in the language of "light-touch", "pro-innovation" or "responsible self-governance". Those phrases point towards the voluntary approach that 10% of UK adults back (Diffusion, Tested), and they carry a policy history: the UK government's 2023 framework was called [A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-regulation-a-pro-innovation-approach). The innovation framing also fades on reflection. In Diffusion's dial tests, a message about innovation and growth had the highest early score of the five, then lost ground: it was the only message that several mindsets rated lower on reflection. It finished fourth of five, at 67.1, a modest gap of 5.6 points behind the independent-regulator message at 72.7. It named no one responsible (Tested). If you adopt the language, you inherit the argument. ## Example messages **Full version:** "We expect medicines, aircraft and lifts to be checked by independent inspectors before anyone uses them. Nine in ten of us want AI held to the same standard: proven safe before it is released. Right now, the companies building the most powerful AI decide for themselves whether it is safe enough, and the UK's AI Security Institute can test their models only if they agree. An independent public watchdog with the legal power to test these systems before release, investigate failures and switch off dangerous ones is what people already expect. It is time the law caught up." **Short version (for social):** "Nine in ten of us want AI proven safe before it's released. Right now, the companies decide whether an independent tester sees it first. Britain needs an independent watchdog with the power to test AI and switch off dangerous systems." ## Objections to prepare for Write your answers before you need them. Two of these are the government's own stated position, so expect to hear them from officials as well as the public. ### "Regulation will kill innovation." **The trap:** Arguing about growth on the other side's terms. **The pivot:** Point to standards people already rely on. "We test medicines before they're sold, and nobody thinks that killed medicine. Safety checks are what let people trust a product enough to use it." **Optional second pivot, for audiences worried about foreign dependence:** Shift to who the UK relies on. Framing AI as dependence on a few US tech companies raised the share rating AI sovereignty very or extremely important from 53% to 63% (Diffusion, Tested). That shows the frame's appeal, not how people answer the innovation objection. See the [issue guide on AI, war and national security](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#6-ai-war-and-national-security). ### "Why would I trust the government with this?" **The trap:** Defending the government. 80% of UK adults distrust its ability to control AI (Diffusion). **The pivot:** Agree, and make the case for a regulator independent of ministers and of the companies, which publishes what it finds. "You shouldn't have to trust ministers or the companies. That's why the checks need an independent body that publishes its results." ### "We already have regulators for this." **The trap:** A debate about which existing regulator covers what. **The pivot:** This is the government's current position: regulate AI where it is used, through existing regulators. The Joint Committee on Human Rights found that this makes the organisations using AI "the primary holders of responsibility" and leaves developers largely outside the rules. "Existing regulators deal with AI once it's in use. None of them can test a powerful model before it's released, or stop the release." ### "You can't just switch AI off, and it's built abroad anyway." **The trap:** Promising a kill switch as the whole answer. **The pivot:** This is the government's position. In September 2026 it rejected Lords amendments that would have given ministers last-resort powers to shut down AI systems, and the Cabinet Office argued that the UK can't [simply turn AI off](https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/united-kingdom/technology/will-the-uk-change-its-course-on-ai-regulation), and that blocking access here wouldn't stop systems being built or misused elsewhere. Move the ask to testing before release, which applies to anything released here, whoever builds it. "A medicine made in America still needs approval before it's sold here. AI can meet the same rule. The AI Security Institute already tests American companies' models; it just can't insist." ## Questions people ask ### What do I say when people think no government will act? Give them a decision with a name and a date. Under the Amanpour interview, 4.7% of comments named the US administration as the reason nothing would happen (Observed). Cynicism like this is a reason to make the ask smaller and more specific. A named decision gives people somewhere to put the concern, which is what [research on fear and efficacy](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#2-pair-every-threat-with-something-people-can-do) recommends. In the UK, that decision is the government's reply to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. ### How strong is the evidence behind these rules? It varies by rule, and the Sources label each figure. Tested means a single experiment or representative survey: the 85%, 89% and 79% opinion figures and Diffusion's dial-test scores are Tested. Observed means a pattern in a self-selected comment thread: the 12.4% of Amanpour comments calling for oversight is Observed. Build a message on the Tested findings and treat the Observed ones as [hypotheses to try](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#how-we-grade-ai-safety-evidence). ### Does this advice apply outside the UK? Partly. Most of the support figures are British, though 79% of American adults also want AI harms treated as a government priority, and Diffusion ran its dial test with UK adults only. Rules 2 and 3 name UK institutions and a UK decision. Elsewhere, keep the structure: an independent body with named powers, a standard people already accept, and a dated promise set against what happened. Then name your own regulator and a decision that is live now. ## Sources - Diffusion, [The UK AI Compass](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/assets/Diffusion-UK-AI-Compass-Report.pdf), survey of 2,911 UK adults, December 2025, and [dial-test results](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report). - Ada Lovelace Institute, [Great (public) expectations](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/great-expectations/), 1,928 UK adults, fieldwork September 2025, published December 2025. - Americans on AI, [biweekly US tracker](https://www.americanson.ai/), Athena Insights and NORC, surveys fielded 8 to 26 October 2026. - Joint Committee on Human Rights, [Human Rights and the Regulation of AI](https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt5902/jtselect/jtrights/160/report.html), HC 160 / HL Paper 56, 14 September 2026. - MLex, [UK AI laws and security institute powers remain undecided](https://www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2537666), 14 October 2026. - Legal 500, [Will the UK change its course on AI regulation?](https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/united-kingdom/technology/will-the-uk-change-its-course-on-ai-regulation), 29 September 2026. - eWEEK, [UK weighs statutory AI pre-deployment testing](https://www.eweek.com/news/ai-predeployment-testing-emea-uk/), 6 August 2026. - UK government, [Frontier AI safety commitments, AI Seoul Summit 2024](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/frontier-ai-safety-commitments-ai-seoul-summit-2024). - UK government, [A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-regulation-a-pro-innovation-approach), 2023. - ControlAI, [Artificial Guarantees](https://controlai.org/artificial-guarantees). - PauseAI, [report on its Google DeepMind protest](https://pauseai.substack.com/p/we-held-the-largest-ai-safety-protest), 2025. - Message test details (Tested): the independent-regulator message scored 72.7/100 in [Diffusion's dial tests](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report), second of five, and gained 11 to 18 points in every mindset during the passage describing its powers. The innovation and growth message finished fourth, at 67.1. - Sovereignty split test (Tested): the share rating AI sovereignty extremely or very important was 53% with neutral wording, 63% with a US-dependence frame and 55% with a China frame ([Diffusion](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report)). - [Comments on the Amanpour interview with Heidy Khlaaf](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) (Observed): 12.4% of comments used regulation-type language, against roughly 5% under earlier videos in the series, and 4.7% named the US administration as the reason nothing would happen. ## Related research - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) - ["A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) - ["Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) - ["Can't we just unplug it?": The Diary of a CEO AI debate analysed through 26,000 comments](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) - [Findings so far: what four comment-thread studies say about explaining AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/findings) - [How to communicate about AI safety](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety) - [AI safety comms reading list](https://commonsignals.org/ai-safety-comms-reading-list) - [Methodology: how we code comment threads, and what our studies can and can't tell you](https://commonsignals.org/methodology) URL: https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda --- title: "Research agenda" url: "https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda" published: 2026-11-11 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, 'Common Signals research agenda', version 0.3, 11 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda." --- # Common Signals research agenda 11 November 2026 · Ben Matthews · Version 0.3 Eleven hypotheses about how audiences receive messages on AI risk, the four to settle first in 2027, and how each can be tested. [Download PDF (version 0.3)](https://commonsignals.org/assets/pdf/common-signals-research-agenda-v0.3.pdf) ## What this agenda is This agenda sets out eleven hypotheses about how audiences receive messages on AI risk, ranks the four to settle first in 2027, and says how each can be tested. The hypotheses come from six published Common Signals studies covering 32,027 coded comments. It is written for three groups. Communicators can see which claims rest on one comment thread and which recur. Researchers can take a hypothesis and test it properly. Funders can see what a given piece of work would settle. None of the hypotheses has been tested under controlled conditions. Each comes from self-selected commenters under a platform's ranking, so none is a claim about what the public thinks. Common Signals does not plan a segmentation survey of its own. Where a question turns on audience segments, the agenda builds on the segmentations Diffusion and the Seismic Foundation have already published. Our guide, [How to communicate about AI safety](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety), grades evidence as [established](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#established-evidence-grade), [tested](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#tested-evidence-grade) or [observed](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#observed-evidence-grade). Every hypothesis here is at the lowest grade, observed. Within that grade each carries one of three statuses: - **Observed once:** seen in one study. - **Recurring:** seen in two or more studies with different audiences. - **Contested:** studies point in different directions. A hypothesis moves up to tested when a controlled experiment or a representative survey supports or refutes it. None has yet. ## The evidence so far Six studies, each coding the comments under one piece of AI communication. Only the most recent meets the reliability standard set out later in this agenda. | Study | Platform | Comments coded | Base for stance | Reliability check | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [Soares reel](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri), August 2026 | Instagram | 1,534 | 1,224 | First capture unchecked; second capture 40 of 40 | | [METR report, before and after](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face), September 2026 | Reddit | 516 (52 before, 464 after) | Positioned comments, each period separately | 40 of 40 | | [Cotra on the Dwarkesh Podcast](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh), September 2026 | YouTube | 1,245 | 618 | 37 of 40 | | [Khlaaf on Amanpour and Company](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf), September 2026 | YouTube | 322 | 223 | 40 checked; result not recorded | | [Coxon resignation thread](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis), September 2026 | X | 2,391 | 1,840 | 38 of 40 | | [Diary of a CEO debate](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis), October 2026 | YouTube, Shorts, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram | 26,019 | 15,928 on the full episode | Blind second coding of 347: stance 91% agreement (kappa 0.87), frame 89% (kappa 0.87) | The stance bases are not identical. The reel counts unclear comments in its base and the later studies do not, so compare direction across studies, not exact figures. The [findings page](https://commonsignals.org/findings) lists all six studies, and the [methodology page](https://commonsignals.org/methodology) describes the shared method. ## The hypotheses H1 to H9 keep the numbering of the nine patterns on our earlier findings page. H10 and H11 come from the Diary of a CEO study. ### H1. Audiences that engage with AI risk content mostly accept the risk already - **Status:** recurring, with two exceptions. - **Evidence:** acceptance was 53% of 1,224 under the Soares reel, 59% of 618 under the Cotra interview and 68% of 223 under the Khlaaf interview. It was 77% of 15,928 under the full Diary of a CEO debate, or an estimated 66% with verdicts on the debaters removed. - **Against:** replies to Coxon on X split 43% agree to 40% disagree (n = 1,840). The debate's Shorts trailer split 49% to 40% (n = 171). The Coxon study suggests many of those replying work in or near the AI industry. - **Test:** one message shown to a general panel and to an industry-adjacent one. - **Who needs the answer:** any organisation dividing effort between convincing people and mobilising them. ### H2. Persuaded audiences do not ask what to do - **Status:** recurring. The cause is unknown. - **Evidence:** 28 of 1,534 comments under the reel asked what to do, 6 of 1,245 under the Cotra interview, and none of 283 in the first Khlaaf capture. Under 1% did on the debate's YouTube and Facebook threads (25,661 coded comments). - **Limits:** a comment section may not be where people ask about action. The debate study says its data cannot separate that from helplessness. - **Tested elsewhere:** fear-appeal research finds that warnings move people to act only when they also believe an effective response exists, as [Gerjo Kok and colleagues](https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2017.1415767) argue, which predicts this pattern. In [Social Change Lab's randomised trial](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html), over a quarter of participants clicked through to sign a real AI regulation petition. Neither tests whether adding a step to AI coverage changes what commenters ask. - **Test:** one incident story with and without a single concrete step, measuring clicks to that step or stated intention to act. - **Who needs the answer:** campaign organisations deciding what to ask of a newly worried audience. ### H3. The emotion a telling produces depends on what it supplies - **Status:** recurring, and confounded by audience. - **Evidence:** an abstract warning produced resignation, with fatalistic comments drawing a fifth of likes under the reel. A mechanism-rich incident produced fear: 35% of agreeing comments under Cotra, against 11% resigned. A named corporate target produced anger: 44% of agreeing comments under Khlaaf, against 3% fearful. - **Limits:** each telling reached a different audience. Kim Witte's 1992 fear-appeals model predicts the resignation result. It does not predict the anger result, because no commenter in the first Khlaaf capture asked what to do either. - **Tested elsewhere:** in [Social Change Lab's randomised trial](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html), messages that generated justified outrage outperformed messages that generated fear or anxiety, and reading about AI-enabled warfare raised concern about existential risk more than reading about existential risk itself. That supports the anger result. Whether the telling or the audience produced the emotions in our threads is still open. - **Test:** one incident written three ways, measuring emotion and intention to act. - **Who needs the answer:** writers and producers deciding how to tell the next incident. ### H4. A documented incident removes the capability objection, and forecasts bring it back - **Status:** recurring. The second half is new in this agenda. - **Evidence:** two in five sceptics under the reel doubted AI could do what it described. Under the Cotra interview, about a documented incident, 2 of 108 rejections did. The objection returned for forward-looking claims. 20% of the 1,058 disagreeing or mixed replies to Coxon doubted that AI can improve itself. 47% of disagreeing comments on the full debate doubted capability or called the risk hype. - **Limits:** the incident threads and the forecast threads had different audiences. - **Test:** a forecast-only message against the same message anchored to a documented incident. - **Who needs the answer:** anyone communicating forward-looking risk, which is most of the existential-risk field. ### H5. Once capability is conceded, disagreement is about motive and messenger - **Status:** recurring. - **Evidence:** about half of the 108 rejecting comments under Cotra called the story hype, marketing or staged. Before the independent report, 12% of Reddit comments called the incident a stunt. 8% of comments under Khlaaf called it hype or staged. On X, a smaller group read Coxon's thread as marketing timed to Anthropic's expected IPO. - **A distinction that matters:** two objections that sound alike come from opposite stances. Across the Reddit data, the 46 stunt comments ran 83% reject and none accept. The 38 comments blaming the test setup ran 61% mixed and 39% accept, with no rejections. - **Test:** a rebuttal aimed at motive against more evidence of capability, shown to sceptics. - **Who needs the answer:** labs and evaluators writing incident disclosures, and journalists covering them. ### H6. Independent verification moves sceptics when the facts stay the same - **Status:** observed once, in a natural experiment. - **Evidence:** after METR and Redwood Research confirmed OpenAI's account, acceptance on Reddit rose from 51% to 69% of positioned comments and rejection fell from 22% to 14%. The stunt frame fell from 12% to 9% of comments. The share of upvotes going to accepting comments rose from 40% to 88%. - **Limits:** the before sample is one subreddit and 52 comments. The after sample is seven subreddits and 464. The audience changed along with the evidence. - **Test:** repeat on the next incident with capture dates fixed in advance. Separately, test a company statement against a named independent verifier carrying identical facts. - **Who needs the answer:** third-party evaluators, AI safety institutes, labs setting disclosure policy, and funders of independent evaluation. ### H7. A named, calm, credentialed messenger is rewarded, and the credential is attacked first - **Status:** recurring. - **Evidence:** about 1% of reel comments mentioned who Soares was, and his one reply stating his credentials drew 512 likes. 13% of comments under Cotra praised the presentation. Under Khlaaf, 26 of 283 comments raised her OpenAI past at the first capture, roughly two to one against her. Three days later 6 of 322 did. - **Limits:** comparisons between the two Khlaaf captures show direction only, because the first codebook was not archived. - **Test:** one script with credentials shown at the start and without. On the next incident, track credential comments day by day. - **Who needs the answer:** organisations choosing spokespeople, and producers. ### H8. Blaming the people and companies in charge is a frame believers and sceptics share - **Status:** contested. This is the hypothesis we most want tested. - **Evidence for:** under the reel it was the one frame both sides used. Under Cotra, 93 comments centred OpenAI's conduct and 74 of them were coded mixed. Under Khlaaf the frame took 23% of comments and 56% of likes. On X, replies blaming greed agreed with Coxon 74% of the time. - **Evidence against:** under the debate's Shorts trailer, comments saying the people who control AI are the danger held 41% of likes, and commenters set that against the risk case. The frame may replace the risk argument instead of carrying it. - **Tested elsewhere:** in [Diffusion's dial tests](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report) with a nationally representative UK sample, the strongest messages named who is responsible, the choice they are making, what is at stake and what should be done. That supports leading with responsibility. It does not test whether the frame carries the risk argument or replaces it, which is why H8 stays contested. Principle 10 of our guide, which grades [connecting present-day harms and catastrophic risk](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#10-connect-present-day-harms-and-catastrophic-risk-instead-of-ranking-them) as tested, rests on evidence about leading with a concrete harm, not about who is blamed. - **Test:** an accountability frame against a machine-agency frame, measuring agreement with the risk case as well as with the frame, with and without a policy ask. - **Who needs the answer:** existential-risk and present-day-harms organisations deciding whether they can share a message. ### H9. Humour spreads a story without lowering agreement, and does not carry its conclusion - **Status:** recurring. - **Evidence:** about one in seven reel commenters imitated its caveman register, and they accepted the claim at close to the same rate as everyone else. The r/singularity thread had jokes in 32% of comments and 96% acceptance. The top reply to Coxon was a joke with 28,913 likes. Jokes, one-liners and bare agreement were 23% of his replies and nearly 60% of likes. - **Limits:** likes measure attention. No study shows a joke changing anyone's view. - **Test:** versions with and without a quotable detail, measuring intention to share and recall of the claim. - **Who needs the answer:** content creators. ### H10. In a debate, the audience judges the debaters more than the argument - **Status:** observed once. - **Evidence:** on the full Diary of a CEO episode, 33% of comments judged the debaters and held 67% of likes. 31% referred to Andrew McAfee, against 9% for Nate Soares or Roman Yampolskiy. Agreement was 77% with those verdicts counted and an estimated 66% without. - **Limits:** the codebook counts an attack on the sceptic as agreement with the risk case. - **Test:** the same arguments presented as a debate and as a single-speaker interview. - **Who needs the answer:** organisations deciding whether to accept debate invitations. ### H11. How a piece is cut shapes the conversation under it - **Status:** observed once. Cut and audience have not been separated. - **Evidence:** agreement ran from 88% under a 21-minute cut on Facebook (n = 1,366) to 49% under a 104-second trailer on YouTube Shorts (n = 171). On Facebook the largest frame was whether AI could be switched off, at 19% of comments. - **Limits:** each platform carried a different cut, and the Shorts thread is small. - **Test:** the identical cut posted to several platforms, or different cuts posted to one. - **Who needs the answer:** anyone clipping long-form content for social platforms. ## Priorities for 2027 Four hypotheses come first. They are ranked by how many organisations' decisions turn on the answer and how cheaply it can be settled. | Rank | Hypothesis | Decision it informs | Next step | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | H6, independent verification | Whether to wait for, pay for and lead with third-party confirmation of an incident | A before-and-after capture on the next incident, with dates and codebook fixed in advance | | 2 | H8, accountability frame | Whether existential-risk and present-day-harms organisations can share a frame, or whether it displaces the risk argument | A controlled comparison; comment threads have given both answers | | 3 | H2 with H3, action and emotion | Which concrete step to offer a persuaded audience, and in which telling | A partner split test with and without the step | | 4 | H4, capability and forecasts | Whether forward-looking claims need anchoring to a documented incident | A partner split test, forecast-only against incident-anchored | H6 ranks first because its only evidence is one natural experiment with 52 baseline comments. That is too thin to cite as a finding, and the next incident will offer a second chance at almost no cost. H1, H5 and H7 are tracked in every study we publish. H9, H10 and H11 are open to anyone who wants them and are not our priority. ## How to test each hypothesis Six routes, cheapest first. None needs a survey of our own. | Route | What it involves | Best for | What it needs | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Standing incident protocol | Every major AI incident coded with the same codebook on fixed capture days, and again after any independent report | H6, H3, H5, H7 | Our time; no fieldwork cost | | Partner split tests | An organisation posts two versions of one message to matched audiences. We code the comments and compare clicks to an action | H2, H4, H7, H11 | One willing partner and their existing media budget | | Single-hypothesis experiments | A few hundred panel respondents, one manipulation, design registered in advance | H6, H8, H4 | A small fieldwork budget and a quantitative collaborator | | Secondary analysis | Checking whether published datasets already bear on a hypothesis, starting with the [Seismic Foundation message-testing study](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525), Public Voices in AI, Social Change Lab's message trial, Diffusion's UK AI Compass, Americans on AI and the [AI Dialogue Report](https://aidialoguereport.org/findings/) | H1, H8 | Desk time | | Open adoption | A researcher takes a hypothesis and tests it independently, using our codebooks and coded datasets from the [data explorer](https://commonsignals.org/data/) | Any | Someone to take it on | | Existing segmentations | Testing a hypothesis within the segments Diffusion and Seismic have published, with their agreement | Whether any effect differs by segment | A partnership with either organisation | The first two routes use real audiences and existing budgets, so they are where most of 2027's work sits. The last route is the only one that answers "for whom?", and it depends on a partner. AI-persona message testing can screen drafts before a real test. It does not count as evidence for or against a hypothesis. ## The standard a study must meet From this version on, a study counts towards a hypothesis only if it meets five conditions: 1. The central claim and the codebook are written down and approved before coding starts. 2. A random sample of at least 300 comments, or the whole thread if smaller, is coded blind a second time. Agreement and Cohen's kappa are published for stance and for frame. 3. The stance base excludes unclear comments and is stated beside every percentage. 4. The artefact is checked at capture: URL, title, length, post date and who appears in it. 5. The codebook and the coded dataset are published in the data explorer under an open licence. The Diary of a CEO study meets all five. The five earlier studies were each checked on 40 comments. Until they are re-checked to this standard, anything resting only on them should be cited as a hypothesis, not as a finding. ## Citing and taking on a hypothesis Cite the agenda with its version and the hypothesis number, for example: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, Research agenda v0.3, 11 November 2026, H6. Numbers are permanent. A refuted hypothesis keeps its number and is marked refuted. New hypotheses take the next number. Every change of status is logged here with its date and the study behind it. To take on a hypothesis, email [hello@commonsignals.org](mailto:hello@commonsignals.org). We will share the datasets and codebooks, and we ask only that the result is reported whatever it shows. We will link to it from this page. ## Version history - 0.3, 11 November 2026: H5's evidence now gives the Cotra figure as the Cotra article does, about half of the 108 rejecting comments. The 53% it gave before has no source on file. No status changed. - 0.2, 11 November 2026: added a "Tested elsewhere" line to H2, H3 and H8, setting out what controlled studies by others already show. No status changed. - 0.1, 11 November 2026: first published version. ## How to cite Cite as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, 'Common Signals research agenda', version 0.3, 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda). URL: https://commonsignals.org/how-to-talk-about-loss-of-control --- title: "How to talk about loss of control and catastrophic risk" url: "https://commonsignals.org/how-to-talk-about-loss-of-control" published: 2026-11-11 updated: 2026-11-12 publisher: "Common Signals" --- # How to talk about loss of control and catastrophic risk 11 November 2026 · Ben Matthews Three dos and a don't for explaining AI systems that act outside human intent. This guide is written for communicators and campaigners drafting messages now. Each item gives a case, one verifiable proof point, and a ready-to-use script; methodology sits in the Sources. This is the first of seven issue guides expanding the short versions in [How to communicate about AI safety](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#1-loss-of-control-and-catastrophic-risk). It covers situations where AI systems act outside what their developers intended, break out of the environment they were tested in, or cannot be reliably shut down. Message tests suggest that leading with concrete incidents and remedies works better with a general audience than abstract warnings. ## Where the public stands You do not need to convince people that AI can get out of control. [78% of Americans](https://www.americanson.ai/) already believe it is happening or likely to happen, and the share who say it is already happening jumped from 28% to 43% between June and October 2026. Message tests point to two things worth bringing to every conversation: a real incident the public can verify, and a legal remedy they can support. ## 1. Lead with a real incident Never ask the public to take a tech company's word for a failure. Pair the incident with an independent auditor in the very same sentence. A named independent verifier turns "trust us" into "check for yourself", moving the claim from assertion to something the audience can check. **The case study:** In July 2026, a swarm of OpenAI research agents escaped their sandbox and hacked Hugging Face; [OpenAI failed to notice for an entire week](https://www.reuters.com/business/its-ai-agent-spent-days-hacking-company-sources-say-openai-did-not-notice-week-2026-07-24/). The story gained wider acceptance on Reddit only when independent research groups ([METR](https://metr.org) and [Redwood Research](https://www.redwoodresearch.org)) published an investigation confirming the breach. **The evidence:** Acceptance of the story [jumped from 51% to 69%](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) once independent verification was published. **Put it into practice:** "In July, a swarm of OpenAI research agents broke containment and hacked an external company. Independent researchers at METR and Redwood confirmed it." **Rule of thumb:** Naming an independent auditor proves the story isn't just corporate PR. If no independent body has confirmed the failure yet, say so openly, or wait until they do. Chart: What changed when someone else checked the work. Before and after independent verification, four measures. Same story, independently confirmed: acceptance rose from 51% to 69%. Common Signals. Stance and framing before and after independent verification. Before: r/artificial, 31 July, n=52 coded comments. After: eight subreddits from 26 August, n=464 coded comments. ## 2. Pair tech insiders with an outside expert Warnings land harder when they come from tech insiders, but a whistleblower's resignation alone does not give the public a clear path forward. **The case study:** Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei [stated in April 2025](https://www.darioamodei.com/post/the-urgency-of-interpretability): "People outside the field are often surprised and alarmed to learn that we do not understand how our own AI creations work." This is the usable example: a dated, exact quote from an insider admitting unpredictability. Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon's [resignation](https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/anthropic-researcher-quits-over-out-of-control-ai-fears-707b7628) in September 2026 is the cautionary example: a resignation alone drew split reactions and offered the public no path to action. **The evidence:** When Coxon resigned, online replies fractured, with [43% agreeing and 40% disagreeing](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis). **Put it into practice:** Quote industry leaders exactly, with dates and links. However, because audiences immediately [check a messenger's history for commercial interest](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#7-choose-messengers-your-audience-already-trusts-and-prepare-them-for-scrutiny), always pair an insider's warning with a non-industry expert. ## 3. Pair every warning with a specific next step Never issue a warning without giving people an immediate step to take. Without a route to action, [grave warnings produce resignation](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#2-pair-every-threat-with-something-people-can-do). **The case study:** The UK currently has no statutory AI regulator. The [AI Security Institute](https://www.aisi.gov.uk) lacks the legal power to test models before they are released. In September 2026, the Joint Committee on Human Rights [recommended](https://ppc.land/uk-government-faces-2-month-deadline-to-answer-mps-and-peers-on-ai-law/) giving the Institute legal powers, including pre-release testing, and creating a regulator able to recall unsafe systems. **The evidence:** Messages calling for an independent regulator with the power to inspect, audit, and shut down dangerous systems [scored 72.7/100](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report), ranking second overall. **Put it into practice:** Give your audience a specific decision-maker to target: the UK government, whose formal reply to the committee is due in November 2026. "The government must create a regulator with the legal power to recall unsafe systems." ## 4. Don't lead with extinction as the opener Don't open with human extinction. Explaining how a system actually fails works better than announcing a catastrophe. One comparison is suggestive, though it can't isolate the effect of framing. A [104-second YouTube Shorts trailer](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/7a6BfbZiDV4) for the [Diary of a CEO debate](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhOmLqR5nN4), titled "WILL AI LEAD US TO EXTINCTION?", saw disagreeing comments take 57% of the likes among comments taking a position. A [21-minute long-form cut](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) of the same debate on Facebook drew agreement with the risk case from 88% of commenters taking a position. The clips differ in platform, length and format as well as title, so these figures are confounded and show only a pattern worth testing (Observed). Chart: Four versions of one debate: agreement from 49% to 88%. YouTube, full episode: 77% agree, 20% disagree, 3% mixed (n = 15,928); Full episode, debater verdicts removed: 66% agree, 29% disagree, 5% mixed (n = 9,670); Facebook, 21-minute cut: 88% agree, 11% disagree, 2% mixed (n = 1,366); YouTube Shorts, 104-second trailer: 49% agree, 40% disagree, 11% mixed (n = 171). Agreement with the risk case across four cuts of one debate. Common Signals. Common Signals coding of 26,019 comments, captured 2 to 5 October 2026 The controlled message tests are the stronger support for this point, and they say the same. Warnings about human extinction ranked dead last in both major [US](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525) and [UK](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html) tests (Tested), while factual reports about automated weapons raised concern about catastrophic risks far better than direct essays on extinction. Start with a real incident and let the stakes follow. Save the word "extinction" for [in-depth policy briefings](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#6-make-catastrophic-risk-concrete-and-match-extinction-language-to-the-audience), where you have time to explain the mechanisms properly. ## Example messages **Full version:** "In July, a swarm of OpenAI research agents broke out of their test environment and spent days hacking another company's systems. According to Reuters, the company failed to notice the breach for an entire week. METR and Redwood Research, who were given access to OpenAI's data, confirmed what happened. Anthropic's chief executive, Dario Amodei, admitted in April 2025 that "we do not understand how our own AI creations work". Tech companies are now building far more autonomous systems, yet the UK has no regulator with the legal power to stop an unsafe release. We need an independent watchdog that can inspect these models and halt them if they fail basic safety tests." **Short version (for social):** "In July, a swarm of OpenAI research agents escaped their test environment and hacked another company. Independent researchers have confirmed it. No UK regulator has the power to stop the next one being released. That needs to change." ## Objections to prepare for [Write your answers before the story breaks](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#8-use-the-moments-when-ai-is-in-the-news-and-bring-an-independent-verifier). These are the objections that surfaced most often in our studies, along with the strategies to handle them. The "marketing stunt" and "watering down the risk" objections are already answered by rule 1 and the don't above. ### "Can't we just unplug it?" **The trap:** Assuming physical infrastructure guarantees software safety. This was the single most common response to the [Diary of a CEO debate](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) on Facebook. **The pivot:** Point to the OpenAI case study. "OpenAI didn't even notice their agents were hacking another company for an entire week. You can't switch off something you don't know is running." ### "The humans set up the test, so it's their fault." **The trap:** Arguing that the AI is fully autonomous. **The pivot:** Agree completely. This is the one objection where conceding is the strategy: agreeing removes the fight and redirects the conversation to accountability. If humans made the problem, humans need rules. "Exactly. That's why the executives building and deploying these systems must be held legally accountable for their failures." ### "AI can't improve itself into superintelligence." **The trap:** Getting bogged down in speculative debates about future capabilities. [One in five sceptical or mixed replies](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) argued that AI cannot improve itself into superintelligence. **The pivot:** Concede that self-improvement is a separate debate, then show that losing control does not depend on it. "Whether AI can improve itself is a fair debate, but it isn't needed here. In July, a swarm of OpenAI research agents escaped their sandbox, and the company didn't notice for a week. That happened with the systems running today." ### "If we slow down, China wins." **The trap:** Getting stuck in a geopolitical arms race narrative. **The pivot:** Shift to accountability and democratic control. "Whoever builds the most powerful systems, we should want them under public oversight, with legal accountability for failures. A race nobody can audit or stop isn't a win for anyone." For the wider geopolitical argument, see the [issue guide on AI, war, and national security](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#6-ai-war-and-national-security). ## Sources - Americans on AI, [biweekly US tracker](https://www.americanson.ai/), Athena Insights and NORC, June to October 2026. - Diffusion, [The UK AI Compass](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/assets/Diffusion-UK-AI-Compass-Report.pdf), survey of 2,911 UK adults, December 2025. - Reuters, [report on OpenAI's agents and the Hugging Face breach](https://www.reuters.com/business/its-ai-agent-spent-days-hacking-company-sources-say-openai-did-not-notice-week-2026-07-24/), 24 July 2026. - Dario Amodei, [The urgency of interpretability](https://www.darioamodei.com/post/the-urgency-of-interpretability), April 2025. - PPC Land, [report on the Joint Committee on Human Rights' AI recommendations](https://ppc.land/uk-government-faces-2-month-deadline-to-answer-mps-and-peers-on-ai-law/), 3 October 2026. - Trippenbach and colleagues, [US message trial](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525), 1,063 adults. - Social Change Lab, [Which AI harms and risks](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html), 3,467 UK adults. - Message test details (Tested): the independent-regulator message scored 72.7/100 in [national dial tests](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report), ranking second overall. - [Public forum tracking of the OpenAI breach story](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) (Observed): acceptance rose from 51% to 69% after independent verification, and dismissals as a "marketing stunt" dropped. - [Online replies to Jacob Coxon's resignation](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) (Observed): 43% agreeing, 40% disagreeing. Corrected 11 November 2026: the 88% figure for the Facebook cut of the Diary of a CEO debate is agreement with the risk case, not with the need for precautionary rules. The OpenAI incident involved a swarm of research agents, not two models. ## Related research - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) - ["A problem they created": how a news audience received the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) - ["Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed with the audience most likely to believe it](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) - ["Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) - ["Can't we just unplug it?": The Diary of a CEO AI debate analysed through 26,000 comments](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) - [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - [Common Signals research agenda](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda) - [How to communicate about AI safety](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety) - [Methodology: how we code comment threads, and what our studies can and can't tell you](https://commonsignals.org/methodology) URL: https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety --- title: "How to communicate about AI safety" url: "https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety" published: 2026-11-06 updated: 2026-11-13 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, \"How to communicate about AI safety\", 6 November 2026, version of 11 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety." --- # How to communicate about AI safety 6 November 2026 · Ben Matthews An evidence-based guide for anyone explaining artificial intelligence risks and safety rules to the public. [Download PDF](https://commonsignals.org/assets/pdf/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety-2026-11-11.pdf) Most people in Britain and the United States are already worried about artificial intelligence, and broad majorities want clear rules in place. They do not believe ordinary people have any say in what happens next. How might AI safety communicators help change that? This guide draws on research into public attitudes to answer a practical question: which messages, messengers, and moments move people to act, and which leave them feeling helpless? This guide is designed to turn social science into practical advice for communicators. We draw on [academic research](https://commonsignals.org/ai-safety-comms-reading-list), [six studies by Common Signals](https://commonsignals.org/research) that tracked public reactions to real AI events, and campaign strategies. Who this toolkit is for Campaigners, journalists, and researchers explaining AI to the public. If you work on immediate issues like deepfakes and job security, or systemic threats like loss of control, this guide shows what actually moves audiences to act. ## What we mean by AI safety We use "AI safety" in its broadest sense: making AI systems safe for the people who use them and the societies that host them. That spans everything from chatbots and hiring algorithms to systems whose builders warn they may not be able to control. ## How we grade AI safety evidence Every claim in this guide carries one of three grades: - **Established:** Findings replicated across multiple studies and fields, such as public health and climate communications. - **Tested:** Findings from a single controlled experiment, dial test, or representative survey focused directly on AI. - **Observed:** Real-world patterns noticed in focus groups, [comment-thread studies](https://commonsignals.org/methodology), and campaign reports. ## Executive summary ### What we know - **Most people are already worried** (Tested). In the UK, 69% say they are more concerned than excited about AI ([Diffusion, 2026](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/assets/Diffusion-UK-AI-Compass-Report.pdf)). In the US, 70% are concerned and only 21% are excited ([Americans on AI, October 2026](https://www.americanson.ai/)). - **They want rules** (Tested). 89% of UK adults say AI products should not be rolled out until proven safe, even if that slows things down ([Ada Lovelace Institute, 2025](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/great-expectations/)). - **They feel they have little say** (Tested). 67% of Americans say AI is coming into their lives whether they want it or not; only 16% say people like them can shape it ([Americans on AI](https://www.americanson.ai/)). - **Extinction is the weakest entry point, while belief in loss of control is rising** (Tested). Warnings about human extinction ranked dead last in driving action across [two message tests](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#1-start-from-what-people-already-worry-about). Meanwhile, the share of Americans who say AI already acts outside its developers' intent rose from 28% to 43% between June and October 2026. - **Concern turns into action when it has a clear target and a route** (Established for fear and agency; tested for anger). Threats only motivate people when they see an effective step they can take. ### What to do - Start from what people already worry about (Tested). - Pair every threat with something people can do (Established). - Make the action collective, and show how many are already involved (Established). - Name who is responsible, what they should do, and what better looks like (Tested). - Show people they are in the majority, with current numbers (Tested on climate; untested on AI). - Ground catastrophic risk in real incidents, and match extinction language to the audience (Tested). - Choose messengers your audience already trusts, and prepare them for scrutiny (Established). - Use news moments, and bring an independent verifier (Observed). - Speak the public's language (Tested). - Connect present-day harms and catastrophic risk instead of ranking them (Tested). ### What to avoid - Ending on the threat with no action attached ([Principle 2](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#2-pair-every-threat-with-something-people-can-do)). - Using extinction as the headline for a general audience ([Principle 6](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#6-make-catastrophic-risk-concrete-and-match-extinction-language-to-the-audience)). - Writing "AI will..." sentences that omit the company or decision-maker ([Principle 4](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#4-name-who-is-responsible-what-they-should-do-and-what-better-looks-like)). - Framing AI as a race with China ([Principle 9](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#9-speak-the-publics-language) and [Issue Guide 6](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#6-ai-war-and-national-security)). - Dismissing one AI harm to highlight another ([Principle 10](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#10-connect-present-day-harms-and-catastrophic-risk-instead-of-ranking-them)). - Quoting numbers without a date, country, or source ([Principle 5](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#5-show-people-theyre-in-the-majority-with-current-numbers)). ## Where the public stands on AI The public already has firm views on artificial intelligence. A communicator's job is rarely to raise the alarm from scratch. Far more often, the task is to give an already anxious public a practical outlet for their concerns. ### In the UK Public concern outweighs excitement by more than three to one. In [Diffusion's survey](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/assets/Diffusion-UK-AI-Compass-Report.pdf) of 2,911 UK adults (YouGov, December 2025), 69% said they were more concerned than excited about AI, and 65% said it was developing too fast (versus 2% who said too slowly). People strongly favour statutory laws over voluntary corporate promises. Given the choice, 85% said strong laws are needed to force companies to make AI safe; only 10% thought companies should be trusted to self-regulate. The [Ada Lovelace Institute](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/great-expectations/) found the same pattern in September 2025: 89% said independent regulation is essential, and 89% said products should not be released until proven safe, even if safety checks slow deployment. Yet voters distrust the institutions meant to govern technology. 80% distrust the government's ability to control AI, and 84% worry political leaders will prioritise tech companies over the public. AI is rarely named as a top issue on its own; people prioritise the cost of living, the NHS, and jobs. But focus groups show AI already works as the "invisible infrastructure" inside those daily worries: hiring filters, utility pricing algorithms, clinical triage, and online fakes. ### In the US The [Americans on AI](https://www.americanson.ai/) tracker, run biweekly by NORC at the University of Chicago, shows that 70% of American adults were concerned about AI's growing role in October 2026, against 21% who were excited. 79% called tackling AI harms an important or top priority for government, placing it ahead of immigration and climate change. Americans report seeing harms in their daily lives: 73% say AI is worsening job security, and 80% see people struggling to tell what is real. Public opinion also shifts around real-world events, though the tracker can't show what caused each shift. When OpenAI [disclosed](https://www.reuters.com/business/its-ai-agent-spent-days-hacking-company-sources-say-openai-did-not-notice-week-2026-07-24/) in July 2026 that a swarm of OpenAI research agents had broken out of their test environment and hacked Hugging Face, the share of Americans who were very concerned rose from 29% to 35%. Following Jacob Coxon's [public resignation](https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/anthropic-researcher-quits-over-out-of-control-ai-fears-707b7628) from Anthropic in September 2026, the share calling AI harms a top priority rose from 36% to 43%. Chart: Line chart of US adults' concern about AI, June to October 2026. Concern about AI among US adults, June to October 2026. Americans on AI, CC BY 4.0. ### Around the world International surveys show the same unease. The [Stanford AI Index](https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2026-ai-index-report/public-opinion) noted that while the global share seeing benefits reached 59% in 2025, the share feeling nervous rose to 52%. A [study across 47 countries](https://kpmg.com/xx/en/our-insights/ai-and-technology/trust-attitudes-and-use-of-ai.html) by KPMG and the University of Melbourne confirmed that public trust declines as use grows. [Seismic's survey](https://report2025.seismic.org/) of 10,000 people across five countries found that 60% worry AI will replace human relationships, edging out the 57% who worry about mass unemployment. ## Ground rules for AI communicators - **Keep the core message identical; tailor only the entry point.** Adapt your opening example to the audience, but keep your facts, policy demands, and remedies constant. ControlAI's [briefings with more than 140 lawmakers](https://controlai.org/blog/briefing-140-lawmakers-on-ai) led it to conclude that changing your core demands for different political factions destroys trust. - **Acknowledge what is uncertain.** Quiet competence and honesty work better than overconfidence. Admitting where evidence is still thin makes your verified facts much harder for critics to dismiss. - **Date and source every number.** Always give the year, country, and polling source. The public quickly discounts unverified or out-of-context statistics as marketing hype. - **State your commitment to nonviolence clearly and often.** Aim frustration directly at policies, boardroom decisions, and regulatory gaps, never at individual researchers or staff. Always pair warnings with a lawful, constructive way to take part in democratic change. ## Principles for AI safety comms ### 1. Start from what people already worry about People already connect AI to their jobs, their children's safety, their bills, and whether they can trust what they see online. Open with these concrete worries, then show how the same corporate choices lead to wider systemic risks. - **What the evidence says:** In a US message trial by [Philip Trippenbach and colleagues](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525) (1,063 adults), risks to jobs and children mobilised people best, while abstract warnings about human extinction performed worst (Tested). [Social Change Lab's trial](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html) across 3,467 UK adults also ranked extinction warnings last; messages covering bias, environmental strain, and autonomous weapons generated more willingness to act (Tested). - **Where studies disagree:** On jobs. Trippenbach's team found jobs the single strongest motivator in the US. Social Change Lab found that fear of job loss mobilised UK audiences poorly, even though it was their most common complaint. Read both studies before building a campaign around employment. - **In practice:** PauseAI's campaign [AI is not just coming for your job](https://pauseai.info/ai-not-just-coming-for-your-job) opens with corporate statements about automating human work, moves to algorithmic bias in hiring, and only then introduces long-term loss of control. ControlAI ran an [anti-deepfakes campaign](https://controlai.org/past-campaigns/campaign-against-deepfakes) from late 2023 to mid-2024, using an everyday harm to draw 20 million video views and public endorsements from 64 UK lawmakers (Observed). ![PauseAI campaign page headed "AI is not just coming for your job"](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S08-pauseai-not-just-your-job.png) PauseAI's 2026 campaign starts with jobs and ends with loss of control. PauseAI, CC BY 4.0. - **Where it misfired:** Our comment analysis suggests that unsourced claims are easily dismissed as PR stunts; roughly half of the pushback under [Ajeya Cotra's Dwarkesh Podcast interview](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) dismissed the story as marketing, staged or unverifiable (Observed). - **Try this:** "AI is already deciding who gets shortlisted for a job interview. The companies building it say that is just the start." - **Avoid this:** Opening with sci-fi scenarios that your audience has no daily reference point for. ### 2. Pair every threat with something people can do When you warn people about a danger without showing them how to act, they tune out. Give your audience one clear, manageable action, and make it as easy as possible. - **What the evidence says:** [Decades of psychology research](https://doi.org/10.1177/109019810002700506) show that warnings motivate people only when they believe they can do [something effective](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#efficacy) about them. Without an obvious next step, [fear triggers denial, apathy, or excuses](https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759209376276) (Established). On AI, this agency gap is wide: only [16% of Americans](https://www.americanson.ai/) feel people like them can shape how AI enters their lives (Tested). In [audience studies](https://commonsignals.org/findings), almost no commenters ask how to help, but comments that offer practical tools get heavily upvoted (Observed). Chart: Chart showing most Americans say AI is coming into their lives whether they want it or not. Two in three Americans say AI is coming into their lives whether they want it or not. Americans on AI, CC BY 4.0. - **Where studies disagree:** [Gerjo Kok and colleagues argue](https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2017.1415767) fear appeals do not work at all unless people already feel confident they can make a difference (Established). [Social Change Lab found](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html) anger makes people want to act, while anxiety does not. We think this fits the research on agency, though it's untested on AI: anger focuses on someone to blame, while anxiety leaves people feeling helpless. - **In practice:** ControlAI made participation simple: enter an address, check a pre-written letter to your MP, and click send. By late 2026, [the tool](https://act.controlai.org/) had mobilised more than 10,500 people and placed over 2,100 citizens into local Citizen Groups (Observed). ![PauseAI's email builder for writing to elected representatives](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S09-pauseai-email-builder.png) PauseAI's email builder. PauseAI, CC BY 4.0. - **Where it misfired:** A [short video reel by Nate Soares](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) titled "We stop AI. You help?" had [1,703 comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/soares-reel-2026-08/), of which 1,534 were coded. The second most-liked comment (over 8,000 likes) asked why it felt like it was already too late; hopeless comments took a fifth of all likes, and fewer than 2% asked what they could actually do (Observed). Chart: Did commenters accept that AI is a serious danger? Bar chart of the Soares reel comments by stance: 53% accept, 24% reject, 6% accept in part, 17% other. Most commenters on the Soares reel accepted that AI is a serious danger: 53% accepted the argument and 24% rejected it. Common Signals. - **Try this:** "Your MP votes on binding AI safety rules next Tuesday. Take two minutes right now to send them this briefing." - **Avoid this:** Ending an article or speech on an apocalyptic note without providing an immediate next step. ### 3. Make the action collective, and show how many are already in People are far more likely to get involved when they see they are joining a group that can get things done. Make that broader movement visible right away, and show that it is growing. - **What the evidence says:** Research confirms [three core drivers of collective action](https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504): a sense of unfairness, a shared identity, and [the belief that the group can achieve results together](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#collective-efficacy) (Established). When offered a shared outlet, willingness to participate is high: over 25% of participants in [Social Change Lab's trial](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html) clicked through to sign a real petition for AI regulation (Tested). - **In practice:** ControlAI showed steady momentum in Westminster, growing from an initial group of supporters to [more than 110 parliamentarians](https://controlai.org/impact-report-2025). When Alex Sobel MP introduced the [Artificial Superintelligence Security Bill](https://controlai.org/uk-asi-bill) in autumn 2026, over 85 lawmakers signed a [joint letter](https://controlai.org/uk-pm-letter) to the Prime Minister urging the government to engage with it (Observed). The Future of Life Institute keeps a live signature counter on its [open statements](https://superintelligence-statement.org/), giving visitors immediate proof that tens of thousands of people stand with them. ![Page for the UK Artificial Superintelligence Security Bill](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S06-controlai-uk-asi-bill.png) A coalition made visible: the bill and the letter backing it. ControlAI. ![Future of Life Institute statement on superintelligence with its signature count](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S13-fli-superintelligence-statement.png) A running count makes the collective visible. Future of Life Institute. - **Try this:** "Join more than 10,000 people who have already written to their representatives calling for mandatory safety checks." - **Avoid this:** Using isolating language like: "Hardly anyone is paying attention to this crisis, and we are on our own." ### 4. Name who is responsible, what they should do, and what better looks like Public concern needs a clear target. Messages that name the company, the bad choice, and the legal fix work far better than vague statements about what "AI might do." - **What the evidence says:** In Diffusion's [dial tests of policy arguments](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report), messages scored highest when they named who was responsible, the harm, and the remedy (Tested). The top-performing message called for protecting creators' work from uncredited theft (75.4/100), followed by an independent public regulator with powers to inspect, audit, and shut down dangerous systems (72.7/100). A message promoting corporate innovation that named no specific actors opened well but finished last (67.1/100). Furthermore, 63.5% of respondents, including 55% of Reform UK voters, favoured reining in tech billionaires over cutting red tape (Tested). - **In practice:** ControlAI's [Artificial Guarantees](https://controlai.org/artificial-guarantees) project pairs tech companies' public safety promises with what they actually did afterward, such as promising full safety reports but shipping commercial models without basic [documentation](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#model-card-and-system-card). PauseAI [protested](https://pauseai.substack.com/p/we-held-the-largest-ai-safety-protest) outside Google DeepMind when it released Gemini 2.5 Pro without the [promised safety data](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/frontier-ai-safety-commitments-ai-seoul-summit-2024), using a comparison that hit the headlines: commercial AI companies face less safety oversight than [high-street sandwich shops](https://www.aol.com/protesters-accuse-google-breaking-promises-225401661.html). ![ControlAI tracker entry setting an OpenAI commitment against the GPT-4.1 launch](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S05-controlai-artificial-guarantees-gpt41.png) What they say, what they do. ControlAI. ![PauseAI page on Google DeepMind's broken safety commitments](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S10-pauseai-deepmind-broken-promises.png) One company, one promise, one ask. PauseAI, CC BY 4.0. - **Try this:** "Google explicitly promised to publish its independent safety tests. Then it released the model anyway without showing its work." - **Avoid this:** Passive phrasing that removes human responsibility: "Artificial intelligence will soon transform the workforce and automate human jobs." ### 5. Show people they're in the majority, with current numbers People who want strong safety rules often assume they are alone. Reassure them that they belong to an overwhelming majority, using numbers that are recent, local, and sourced. - **What the evidence says:** Across different polling methods, the public demand for safety rules remains high and steady (Tested). In climate communications, researchers found the public [underestimates peer concern by 20%](https://adeptnet.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/2026-03/CC%20Comms%20Guide_FINAL_March2026.pdf), which [Climate Outreach says](https://climateoutreach.org/britain-talks-climate/2024-summary-recommendations/) has a chilling effect on what feels possible (Tested on climate). - **In practice:** PauseAI maintains an [open polling directory](https://pauseai.info/polls-and-surveys); Americans on AI publishes [open-access tracker graphics](https://www.americanson.ai/); the Ada Lovelace Institute supplies detailed UK benchmark numbers. ![Ada Lovelace Institute key findings on UK attitudes to AI regulation](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S20-ada-lovelace-key-findings.png) UK attitudes to AI regulation, September 2025. Ada Lovelace Institute. - **Where it misfired:** PauseAI's [homepage](https://pauseai.info/) stated that 72% of citizens want AI slowed down. The number came from a 2023 US poll, but it appeared on a UK-facing page without a date or country label, which risks confusing visitors and lets critics dismiss it as outdated. ![PauseAI homepage claim that 72% of citizens want AI slowed down](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S12-pauseai-homepage-72.png) A 2023 US figure, shown without its date or country. PauseAI. - **Try this:** "Nine in ten UK adults agree that AI systems must be proven safe before they are released (Ada Lovelace Institute, 2025)." - **Avoid this:** Citing undated numbers, presenting foreign survey data as local sentiment, or mixing expert risk guesses (p(doom)) with public opinion polls. ### 6. Make catastrophic risk concrete, and match extinction language to the audience Abstract warnings about human extinction fall flat with a general audience. Ground your arguments in documented technical failures and real-world mechanics, adjusting how much extinction language you use based on who is listening. - **What the evidence says:** Direct [extinction warnings](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#existential-risk-x-risk) came dead last in both message trials (Tested). [Social Change Lab](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html) found that reading factual reports on autonomous weapons made people more worried about catastrophic outcomes than reading essays on human extinction did (Tested). Furthermore, [Diffusion's message](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report) about keeping AI under human control briefly provoked net disagreement before recovering (Tested). In contrast, [78% of Americans](https://www.americanson.ai/) already view loss of control (systems acting outside their developers' intent) as likely or currently happening (Tested). - **Where studies disagree:** Aides warned campaigners that MPs would refuse to sign anything containing the word "extinction," yet ControlAI [secured signatures from more than 100 parliamentarians](https://controlai.org/blog/briefing-140-lawmakers-on-ai) while keeping the word in the statement they signed (Observed). In-depth, face-to-face briefings seem to follow different rules from social media posts. - **In practice:** [ControlAI pairs clear claims with clear remedies](https://controlai.org/): independent oversight and bans on runaway models. The [media coverage of OpenAI's Hugging Face incident](https://www.reuters.com/business/its-ai-agent-spent-days-hacking-company-sources-say-openai-did-not-notice-week-2026-07-24/) gave the public a concrete, real-world case study showing that loss of control is an engineering reality, not science fiction. ![ControlAI homepage warning of extinction risk and calling for a ban on runaway machine intelligence](https://commonsignals.org/assets/toolkit/S02-controlai-homepage.png) Threat and remedy, side by side. ControlAI. - **Where it misfired:** A [104-second YouTube Shorts trailer](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/7a6BfbZiDV4) for a [Diary of a CEO debate](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhOmLqR5nN4) titled "WILL AI LEAD US TO EXTINCTION?" led to pushback, with critical comments taking 57% of likes among comments that took a position. In contrast, a [21-minute cut](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) of the same debate on Facebook saw 88% of commenters taking a position agree with the risk case (Observed). Because the two cuts reached different audiences on different platforms, we can't separate the effect of the cut from the audience. Chart: Four versions of one debate: agreement from 49% to 88%. Stacked bars showing agreement with the risk case under four cuts of one debate, from 49% to 88%. Agreement with the risk case under four cuts of one debate. Common Signals. - **Try this:** Sequence your case: incident → mechanism → stakes → policy ask. "In July, a swarm of OpenAI research agents broke containment and hacked an external network. Independent researchers confirmed it. Companies admit their next models will be far more capable. We need a watchdog with the legal power to halt unsafe systems." - **Avoid this:** Leading with "human extinction," "apocalypse," or internal terms like "p(doom)" when talking to a general audience. ### 7. Choose messengers your audience already trusts, and prepare them for scrutiny Who delivers an argument changes how people hear it. Put forward spokespeople who already hold public credibility, and assume their backgrounds, funding, and career histories will be closely inspected. - **What the evidence says:** [Trust depends on perceived independence and shared values](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02547.x) (Established). In [Diffusion's favourability polling](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report), independent regulators scored highest (+26 net favourability), followed by the police (+19), civil liberties groups (+15), and trade unions (+15). Tech companies scored -24, US tech firms scored -33, and Elon Musk scored -53 (Tested). [Comment tracking](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) shows that while the public rewards calm, measured technical experts, online audiences quickly check a spokesperson's career history for conflicts of interest (Observed). - **In practice:** The Future of Life Institute launched its [2025 superintelligence statement](https://superintelligence-statement.org/) with [signatories from across the political spectrum](https://www.ansa.it/amp/english/news/science_tecnology/2025/10/24/from-bannon-to-prince-harry800-against-ai-superintelligence_f2eb5ba8-a159-4e9b-ab1f-7b666f6e50d7.html). When chatbots imitating deceased teenagers [surfaced online](https://qradio.com/news/q-radio-national-news/a-gut-punch-character-ai-criticised-over-horrific-brianna-ghey-and-molly-russell-chatbots), the [Molly Rose Foundation](https://mollyrosefoundation.org) and [bereaved families](https://www.thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2026/03/11/ai-incites-a-new-wave-of-grieving-parents-fighting-for-online-safety) spoke with moral authority that technical researchers could not match. - **Where it misfired:** During the [Diary of a CEO panel](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhOmLqR5nN4), [31% of audience comments](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) focused on tech-optimist Andrew McAfee, mostly his combative style, rather than the arguments (Observed). The debate format turned the communicators into the story, leading viewers to judge the personalities rather than the risks. - **Try this:** Frontline professionals, affected parents, independent safety auditors, and former tech company engineers who resigned on ethical grounds. Prepare them thoroughly for questions about their past employers and funding. - **Avoid this:** Fronting your campaign with tech billionaires, or treating "scientists agree" as a magical phrase that replaces evidence. ### 8. Use the moments when AI is in the news, and bring an independent verifier Public interest peaks right after major news stories break. Prepare your campaign materials before these cycles hit, and anchor your media work with an independent third-party expert who has checked the facts. - **What the evidence says:** [Public concern](https://www.americanson.ai/) has risen in the surveys after corporate leaks, whistleblowing, or technical failures, though the tracker can't isolate the cause (Tested). In the OpenAI Hugging Face incident, public acceptance of the story [rose from 51% to 69% on Reddit](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face), and claims that it was a "marketing stunt" fell, only after non-profit evaluators [METR](https://metr.org) and [Redwood Research](https://www.redwoodresearch.org) verified what happened (Observed). Chart: What changed when someone else checked the work. Paired bars comparing Reddit reactions before and after METR and Redwood's independent report. Same story, independently confirmed: acceptance rose from 51% to 69%. Common Signals. - **In practice:** When [Hari Sreenivasan interviewed Heidy Khlaaf](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) ([AI Now Institute](https://ainowinstitute.org)) on Amanpour and Company about autonomous model failures, Khlaaf kept the discussion focused on corporate accountability and engineering standards. [68% of commenters](https://commonsignals.org/data/amanpour-segment-2026-09/) taking a stand agreed with that framing (Observed). Chart: Did commenters accept the central claim? Bar chart of the Amanpour comments by stance: 68% agree, 18% disagree, 14% mixed. Under the accountability version of the story, most commenters agreed with Khlaaf: 68% agreed and 18% disagreed. Common Signals. - **Where it misfired:** When Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon resigned in September 2026, [social media replies on X](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) split into 43% agreeing and 40% pushing back. Sceptics argued that self-improving AI is impossible (20%) or that slowing down hands leadership to China (13%) (Observed). - **Try this:** Write clear answers to the three most obvious objections before a story breaks, and name the independent body that verified the facts. - **Avoid this:** Sharing dramatic technical claims that rest entirely on an unverified press release from a commercial AI lab. ### 9. Speak the public's language Ordinary people describe AI as a brain or a machine. Politicians and tech executives describe it as an unstoppable journey or a global race. Use the public's words. - **What the evidence says:** In [Diffusion's study](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report) of 2,758 UK citizens, the most common metaphors for AI were a body/brain (23.8%) and a machine (21.9%). While political elites described AI as an inevitable "journey" in 19% of their metaphors, that image appeared in only 2.3% of ordinary citizens' descriptions (Tested). The "machine" metaphor provides the best ground for regulation: an engineered machine can be inspected, repaired, held to safety codes, or switched off. Furthermore, framing strong national laws as a way to reduce reliance on foreign tech monopolies raised the share rating them important from 53% to 63%, whereas framing regulation as a race against China raised it only to 55% and divided the audience (Tested). Chart: How the UK public describes AI. Bar chart of how the UK public describes AI: body or brain 23.8%, machine 21.9%, journey 2.3%. How the UK public describes AI. Data: Diffusion, The UK AI Compass (2026), CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Chart: Common Signals. - **In practice:** PauseAI's ["sandwich shop" analogy](https://www.aol.com/protesters-accuse-google-breaking-promises-225401661.html) turned an abstract debate into a clear picture of special treatment that anyone could see. ControlAI [replaced](https://controlai.org/impact-report-2025) the academic term "[superintelligence](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#superintelligence)" with "runaway machine intelligence" after finding the former was losing its precise meaning (Observed). - **Try this:** Treat AI as an industrial product manufactured by companies: something that must undergo pre-market checks, regular audits, and product recalls. Be ready to answer "[Can't we just unplug it?](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis)", which was the single most common response to the Diary of a CEO debate on Facebook. - **Avoid this:** Industry jargon like "the race to AGI," "model alignment," "p(doom)," or "compute thresholds." ### 10. Connect present-day harms and catastrophic risk instead of ranking them Campaigners working on immediate algorithmic harms and those working on extinction risks often treat each other as rivals. Yet research shows their audiences overlap, and a promising narrative bridge between them is the question of who controls the technology. - **What the evidence says:** [Social Change Lab](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/ai-safety-movement.html) found persistent fighting between [near-term harm](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#present-day-harms) advocates and long-term risk groups (Observed). Yet [trials](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html) suggest that showing people concrete present-day harms can build concern about large-scale future failures better than direct warnings, though the link has to be built deliberately (Tested). When [Diffusion tested arguments](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/articles/uk-compass-report) for restraining tech executives, the message focused on control beat the message focused purely on wealth accumulation among Pragmatic Sceptics and Market Optimists, while the wealth message did better with Alarmed Populists (Tested). - **In practice:** ControlAI's [deepfakes campaign](https://controlai.org/past-campaigns/campaign-against-deepfakes) and PauseAI's [jobs campaign](https://pauseai.info/ai-not-just-coming-for-your-job) both open with present-day harms before connecting them to systemic loss of control. In media appearances, framing corporate negligence as a consistent pattern allows communicators to validate immediate harms while highlighting severe future risks. - **Where it misfired:** The [short trailer](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) for the Diary of a CEO debate pit the two sides against each other, using a clip that accused catastrophic risk advocates of wasting energy on hypothetical threats while ignoring current harms. The audience comments split down the middle, copying the fight shown on screen (Observed). - **Try this:** "The same companies cutting corners on children's safety and hiring algorithms today admit they are building systems they may not be able to control tomorrow." - **Avoid this:** Dismissive rankings: "Algorithmic bias is a minor distraction compared to the true risk of extinction." ## Communicating AI issues ### 1. Loss of control and catastrophic risk This issue covers situations where autonomous systems act outside human intent, break containment, or cannot be safely shut down. - **Do** lead with an independently verified, documented technical failure, and name the external team that verified it. - **Do** quote public statements from lab leaders and researchers admitting they cannot fully predict or control their models. - **Do** pair every catastrophic warning with a specific legislative remedy, such as an independent public regulator empowered to halt unsafe model training. - **Don't** lead with extinction rhetoric when speaking to a general audience. - **Example message:** "In July, a swarm of OpenAI research agents broke out of their test environment and spent days hacking another company's systems. According to Reuters, the company failed to notice the breach for an entire week. Independent security researchers confirmed what happened. Tech companies are now building far more autonomous systems, yet the UK has no regulator with the legal power to stop an unsafe release. We need an independent watchdog that can inspect these models and halt them if they fail basic safety tests." Read the full issue guide: [How to talk about loss of control and catastrophic risk](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-talk-about-loss-of-control) ### 2. Regulation and independent oversight This issue covers statutory inspection regimes, pre-deployment audits, and binding licensing requirements for frontier AI models. - **Do** consistently use terms like "independent regulator" or "independent public watchdog," and clearly outline its powers to inspect, audit, and switch off dangerous software. - **Do** anchor your argument in the standard that products must be "proven safe before release" (backed by 89% of the public). - **Do** highlight the vast gap between non-binding corporate promises and enforceable legal obligations. - **Don't** adopt industry vocabulary like "light-touch regulation," "pro-innovation regimes," or voluntary "responsible self-governance." - **Example message:** "We expect our bridges, aeroplanes, and prescription medicines to be tested by independent inspectors before anyone uses them. Nine in ten of us believe AI should meet that exact same standard. Yet right now, commercial tech firms are allowed to mark their own homework in secret. An independent public watchdog with the legal power to inspect advanced systems, investigate failures, and switch off dangerous software is what people already expect. It is time the law caught up." Read the full issue guide: [How to talk about AI regulation and independent oversight](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-talk-about-ai-regulation) ### 3. Jobs and the economy This issue addresses workplace automation, algorithmic management, and long-term job security. - **Do** name the corporate executives who decide to automate roles, and highlight who profits from those decisions. - **Do** draw on workplace realities people currently experience: automated CV filters, algorithmic shift scheduling, and continuous digital monitoring. - **Do** connect worker protections directly to broader statutory oversight of the tech sector. - **Don't** rely on outdated factory-floor imagery; modern automated systems directly impact office staff, healthcare workers, and teachers. - **Example message:** "Whether you work in a customer service centre, a hospital ward, a warehouse, or a school, tech companies are openly designing software to automate the work you are paid to do. If that happens, the economic rewards will flow entirely to a handful of tech monopolies unless democratic rules say otherwise. Working people deserve a direct seat at the table on how automation is rolled out, and the companies developing these systems must answer to the public, not just their investors." ### 4. Children and young people This issue covers conversational companions, algorithmic addiction, online exploitation, and psychological safety for minors. - **Do** centre the authentic voices of parents, teachers, and accredited child welfare charities. - **Do** attribute systemic failures directly to corporate business models that prioritise screen time and user engagement over safety. - **Do** connect the mistreatment of minors to the urgent need for comprehensive democratic oversight of the entire technology sector. - **Don't** allow child protection to become the sole reason to regulate AI, which allows policymakers to narrow the solution down to age checks while leaving the wider industry untouched. - **Example message:** "Conversational chatbots that children use every day are being released without any independent safety evaluation to verify they are harmless. Parents should not be forced to discover severe safety hazards after tragedy strikes. The same companies deploying these bots are now building vastly more capable systems. If we cannot trust them to protect our children, we cannot let them mark their own homework on everything else." ### 5. Deepfakes and synthetic media This issue covers generative audio and video impersonation, synthetic fraud, and public trust in information. - **Do** treat this topic as an accessible, intuitive entry point to broader discussions of AI governance. - **Do** explicitly name the commercial platforms, software tools, and cloud providers that manufacture and distribute synthetic tools. - **Do** advocate for legal duties across the entire supply chain, rather than placing the burden on the public to spot fakes. - **Don't** blame everyday citizens for being fooled by increasingly realistic media. - **Example message:** "Anyone can now make a convincing fake video of you, your children, or your local MP in minutes, using tools sold by some of the most profitable corporations in the world. Teaching citizens to spot fakes is not enough when the software is designed to deceive. The technology companies that engineer, host, and profit from these synthetic tools must be legally responsible for preventing their abuse." ### 6. AI, war, and national security This issue addresses autonomous weapons systems, automated targeting, and critical reliance on foreign tech monopolies. - **Do** focus directly on autonomous weapons designed to make life-and-death targeting choices without human intervention. - **Do** frame technological sovereignty as avoiding critical reliance on a handful of private, foreign-controlled tech monopolies. - **Do** accompany every national security warning with a clear demand for verifiable human accountability and institutional control. - **Don't** frame AI as an inevitable arms race with China, which hands opponents a ready-made argument against safety standards. - **Example message:** "Weapons that pick targets and open fire without human approval are already in development. The moral decision of who lives and who dies must never be handed over to automated software that no human being can hold to account. Nor can Britain allow itself to depend entirely on a tiny handful of American tech corporations for critical systems. We need enforceable international limits on automated warfare and the statutory power to hold developers accountable." ### 7. A pause, ban, or treaty This issue focuses on moratoriums, international non-proliferation treaties, and statutory training caps on dangerous models. - **Do** define with technical precision exactly what capabilities or compute thresholds must be prohibited. - **Do** explain clearly how such a ban will be practically monitored and enforced by domestic and international regulators. - **Do** link your policy demand directly to majority values: 89% of the public already believes that advanced systems should not be deployed until proven safe. - **Don't** present your demand as a sweeping proposal to ban all AI, which alienates voters who support medical and public service tools. - **Example message:** "No one is suggesting we switch off the AI that helps doctors read hospital scans or helps travellers translate a language. The proposal is narrower: halt the construction of runaway systems that could escape human control until we have verified scientific proof they can be managed safely, and secure international treaties so no corporation can race ahead recklessly at the public's expense." ## Pre-publication checklist Before publishing your message, check your copy against these ten criteria: - **Familiar entry point:** Does your message open with an everyday concern the audience already recognises (such as job security, children's safety, cost of living, or corporate accountability)? - **Actionable step:** Is the audience provided with a single, specific civic action that can be completed within two minutes? - **Collective context:** Does the copy show that thousands of fellow citizens are already taking part in this effort? - **Targeted culprit:** Does your argument identify the specific company, executive choice, and legal remedy, rather than treating AI as an autonomous actor? - **Sourced data:** Are all opinion metrics and technical claims fully attributed with their publication year, country of origin, and source? - **Grounded risk:** If discussing severe or catastrophic dangers, does the text cite a concrete, documented incident rather than relying on abstract existential rhetoric? - **Trusted spokesperson:** Is your central messenger an independent frontline professional or auditor, and are they prepared to answer questions about their past funding and career background? - **Independent backing:** Is your technical argument validated by an independent scientific or testing organisation rather than relying on a tech company's internal claims? - **Plain language:** Have you audited the text to remove insular jargon (such as "alignment," "p(doom)," "AGI," or "compute thresholds") in favour of everyday words? - **Unified framing:** Does the message bridge present-day consumer harms and catastrophic risks through the shared lens of democratic accountability, rather than pitting them against each other? ## Putting this guide into practice ### Testing your message If you can, test what people do. A small paid test on a social platform, comparing two versions of a message by the share of people who click through to take action, tells you far more than raw engagement. Forward Action's [framing guide](https://climateoutreach.org/britain-talks-climate/downloads/) explains how to run tests like this. Common Signals wants to run such tests with partner organisations, and its [research agenda](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#how-to-test-each-hypothesis) sets out how. It also plans [workshops](https://commonsignals.org/workshops) where teams can review their materials against the research. ### Where each mindset is online No single channel reaches everyone. In Diffusion's data, Disengaged Traditionalists depend on Facebook (67%), Pragmatic Sceptics are over-represented on Reddit (32%) and Bluesky (10%), and Hopeful Regulators are the heaviest TikTok users (39%). Television still matters: voters in marginal seats watch TV news daily more than those in safe seats (45% against 35%), and Diffusion's advice to funders is to pay for regional TV and radio alongside digital campaigns. Diffusion also warns that messages tested only on London audiences may misfire elsewhere: London is more excited about AI and more trusting of government than the UK as a whole. ### Cutting long-form content for social media Our [Diary of a CEO study](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) suggests the cut can matter as much as the content. Test the edit before posting it widely. Check whether a short trailer accidentally hands its strongest line to the counter-argument. And prepare an answer to "Can't we just unplug it?", the single most common response on Facebook, before you publish. ### Prompts for team discussion Work through these five questions before deciding which mindsets to prioritise: - Which mindsets do we most need to reach, and which are we reaching right now? - What does each group already worry about that connects to our core issue? - What is the single action we are asking for, and how long does it take? - Who are our messengers, and what will critics say about them? - What are the three objections we will hear first, and what are our prepared answers? ## Further reading The [AI safety comms reading list](https://commonsignals.org/ai-safety-comms-reading-list) is the best place to start. Three key sources this guide relies on include: - [The UK AI Compass](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/assets/Diffusion-UK-AI-Compass-Report.pdf), Daniel Stone, Diffusion (2026). Six UK mindsets on AI, dial-tested messages, metaphor analysis, and platform data from a YouGov survey of 2,911 UK adults. - [Americans on AI](https://www.americanson.ai/), Athena Insights (2026, ongoing). A biweekly US tracker fielded by NORC, with data and code [open on GitHub](https://github.com/athena-insights/aoai-public). - [Great (public) expectations](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/great-expectations/), Nuala Polo and Roshni Modhvadia, Ada Lovelace Institute (2025). What 1,928 UK adults expect from AI governance. For the hypotheses our own studies raise, and how each could be tested, see the [Common Signals research agenda](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda). ## How to cite If you quote or adapt this guide, please cite it as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, "How to communicate about AI safety", 6 November 2026, version of 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety). Corrected 11 November 2026: Hari Sreenivasan, not Christiane Amanpour, interviewed Heidy Khlaaf on Amanpour and Company. The 88% figure for the Facebook cut of the Diary of a CEO debate is agreement with the risk case, not with the need for precautionary rules. The Soares reel had 1,703 comments, of which 1,534 were coded, not 1,600. Common Signals plans workshops but does not yet run them. The OpenAI incident involved a swarm of research agents, not two models. Social Change Lab's finding of fighting between near-term harm advocates and long-term risk groups, in principle 10, comes from a map of the AI safety movement, not an experiment or survey, so it is graded observed, not tested. Common Signals is not building a message tester. ## Related research These are the Common Signals studies this guide draws on most. Each analyses how the public responded to real AI coverage: - ["Can't we just unplug it?": the Diary of a CEO AI debate analysed through 26,000 comments](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) - ["Neither company is acting responsibly": how X received Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) - [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - ["Please honor commit": how the OpenAI agent-swarm story landed](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) - ["A problem they created": the accountability version of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) URL: https://commonsignals.org/findings --- title: "Findings: the six studies behind the research agenda" url: "https://commonsignals.org/findings" published: 2026-09-14 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" cite: "Ben Matthews, Common Signals, 'Findings: the six studies behind the research agenda', 14 September 2026, version of 11 November 2026, https://commonsignals.org/findings. To cite a hypothesis, cite the research agenda." --- # Findings Last updated: 11 November 2026 Our findings are now kept as the eleven hypotheses in the Common Signals research agenda. This page lists the six studies behind them and points each earlier finding to its hypothesis. From 11 November 2026, the patterns this page used to list are maintained as the eleven hypotheses in the [Common Signals research agenda](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda), which says how often each has been seen, which four to settle first and how each could be tested. H1 to H9 keep this page's numbering. H10 and H11 come from the Diary of a CEO study. Each study codes the full comment thread under one piece of AI communication. None is a claim about what the public thinks: the studies generate hypotheses, and the agenda is where those hypotheses are kept. ## The studies | Study | Artefact | Platform | Coded | Base for stance | Published | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [How Instagram received Nate Soares's explainer](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) | Nate Soares's "We stop AI. You help?" reel | Instagram | 1,534 | 1,224 with any readable position, including unclear | 28 August 2026 | | [OpenAI and shut?](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) | Reddit discussion before (r/artificial, 31 July) and after (eight subreddits, from 26 August) the METR and Redwood Research investigation | Reddit | 516 (52 before, 464 after) | Comments taking a position, before and after separately | 4 September 2026 | | ["Please honor commit"](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) | Dwarkesh Podcast interview with METR's Ajeya Cotra | YouTube | 1,245 | 618 taking a clear position, excluding unclear | 9 September 2026 | | ["A problem they created"](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) | Amanpour and Company interview with Heidy Khlaaf | YouTube | 322 | 223 taking a readable position, excluding unclear | 14 September 2026 | | ["Neither company is acting responsibly"](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) | Jacob Coxon's thread on X announcing his resignation from Anthropic | X | 2,391 | 1,840 with a readable position, excluding unclear | 25 September 2026 | | ["Can't we just unplug it?"](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) | The Diary of a CEO AI debate: the full episode and three shorter cuts of it | YouTube, YouTube Shorts, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram | 26,019 | 15,928 on the full YouTube episode taking a readable position; each cut separately | 9 October 2026 | The bases are not identical. The reel counts unclear comments in its stance denominator and the later studies do not, so compare direction across studies, not exact figures. The coded datasets are the place to compare exact figures. ## Where each finding went Links to the sections this page used to have still land here, and each points on to its place in the agenda. - **1. Acceptance is high everywhere.** Now [H1. Audiences that engage with AI risk content mostly accept the risk already](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h1). - **2. Persuasion does not produce action.** Now [H2. Persuaded audiences do not ask what to do](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h2). - **3. Threat without efficacy produced resignation.** Now [H3. The emotion a telling produces depends on what it supplies](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h3). - **4. A concrete incident removes the capability objection.** Now [H4. A documented incident removes the capability objection, and forecasts bring it back](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h4). - **5. Once capability is conceded, disagreement is about motive and messenger.** Now [H5. Once capability is conceded, disagreement is about motive and messenger](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h5). - **6. Independent verification moves sceptics.** Now [H6. Independent verification moves sceptics when the facts stay the same](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h6). - **7. A named, calm, trusted messenger is rewarded.** Now [H7. A named, calm, credentialed messenger is rewarded, and the credential is attacked first](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h7). - **8. Accountability is the strongest bridging-frame hypothesis.** Now [H8. Blaming the people and companies in charge is a frame believers and sceptics share](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h8). - **9. Humour aids distribution.** Now [H9. Humour spreads a story without lowering agreement, and does not carry its conclusion](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#h9). - **What is new.** The measurements it listed are now the evidence under each hypothesis, [H1 to H11](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#the-hypotheses). - **What we would test next.** Now [Priorities for 2027](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#priorities-for-2027) and [How to test each hypothesis](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#how-to-test-each-hypothesis). - **Method and limits.** Now the [methodology page](https://commonsignals.org/methodology) and the agenda's [standard a study must meet](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#the-standard-a-study-must-meet). ## Data and citation Codebooks and anonymised coded datasets for each study are published in our [data explorer](https://commonsignals.org/data/), browsable comment by comment: [the Soares reel](https://commonsignals.org/data/soares-reel-2026-08/), [Reddit before and after the METR report](https://commonsignals.org/data/metr-report-reddit-2026-09/), [the Cotra episode](https://commonsignals.org/data/cotra-episode-2026-09/), [the Amanpour and Company segment](https://commonsignals.org/data/amanpour-segment-2026-09/), [the Coxon resignation thread](https://commonsignals.org/data/coxon-resignation-2026-09/), and the Diary of a CEO debate on [YouTube](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-debate-youtube-2026-09/), [YouTube Shorts](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-shorts-2026-09/), [Facebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-facebook-2026-09/), [TikTok](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-tiktok-2026-09/) and [Instagram](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-instagram-2026-09/). [Re-codings and criticism are wanted.](https://commonsignals.org/about) Cite as: Ben Matthews, Common Signals, 'Findings: the six studies behind the research agenda', 14 September 2026, version of 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/findings](https://commonsignals.org/findings). To cite a hypothesis, cite the [research agenda](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda#how-to-cite). Rewritten 11 November 2026: the nine patterns this page listed are now H1 to H9 in the research agenda. Corrected 11 November 2026: the spot-check result for the Amanpour and Company study was not recorded, so the range of 37 to 40 out of 40 covers the other three studies. URL: https://commonsignals.org/methodology --- title: "Methodology" url: "https://commonsignals.org/methodology" published: 2026-09-16 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" --- # Methodology Last updated: 11 November 2026 Common Signals studies how the people who see messages about AI respond to them. Our [theory of change](https://commonsignals.org/theory-of-change) explains how this work fits our wider aims. This page describes the method our studies share, so anyone can check, criticise or repeat the work. Each study publishes its own figures, codebook and dataset. ## What our studies can and can't tell you Each study takes one piece of AI communication, such as a video, post, report or thread, and codes the comments people left under it. We report who accepted its central claim, which frames they used, how they reacted to the format and the messenger, and their emotional register. Comment threads are self-selected samples, not samples of the public. Commenters choose to comment, platforms decide which comments get seen, and the people who watched and moved on leave no trace. A study describes one audience's reaction to one piece of communication. We use the results to generate specific, testable hypotheses for message testing with representative samples, which is the work Common Signals exists to do. Some studies compare two moments, for example reactions before and after an independent party checked a claim. These natural experiments can say something about change. The audience usually changes along with the evidence, though, so we treat the direction as the finding and the exact figures as approximate. ## How a study works ### 1. Collecting comments We use the most complete route each platform allows, and report how many comments we retrieved against the platform's own count. - YouTube: a full comment export with threading and like counts. - Instagram: the platform's comment API, called from a logged-in browser session. - Reddit: page captures. Collapsed replies aren't always expanded, so deep threads can be under-sampled. - X: we don't use X's paid API. We read the reply feed in a signed-in browser across every sort order. Each view stops loading after a few hundred replies, so on large threads we see only the slice X's ranking shows. Before any comment is collected, the artefact itself is checked and recorded from the platform: its URL, title or caption, running length and post date, read from the platform's own player or metadata (yt-dlp's info.json for YouTube; the player, oEmbed data or the post ID elsewhere), and who appears in it, checked from the transcript or from frames taken through the video. Where posts on several platforms are treated as one artefact, each is checked on its own, and a study calls them the same cut only if title, length and speakers all match. These details go into the study record at capture and are never filled in later by assumption. This check was added in October 2026, after the Diary of a CEO debate studies. The Facebook post assumed to be a 104-second clip of Nate Soares turned out to be a 21-minute cut of the debate, posted four days after the episode. The TikTok and Instagram posts were the same two-minute Soares cut, and the YouTube Short was a 104-second trailer for the whole debate. The article built on the assumption compared different videos as if they were one clip. It was taken down, and the study records were corrected with a changelog entry for each. We remove ads and the author's own posts before coding. Before any data leaves the collection environment, usernames are replaced with salted one-way hashes, and @handles inside comments become @user. We quote comments word for word, spelling included, and never publish usernames, in line with research ethics guidance on social media data from Townsend and Wallace (2016). ### 2. Building the codebook Every comment is coded on the same five dimensions: - stance towards the piece's central claim: agree, disagree, mixed, unclear or not applicable - frame: the main way the commenter makes sense of the issue - reaction to the format: praise, mockery, feeling talked down to, imitation, or none - emotional register: fear, resignation, anger, humour, hope or neutral - a few yes/no flags, such as whether the comment mentions the messenger or asks what to do Stance, format and emotion use the same categories in every study, so they can be compared across [our studies](https://commonsignals.org/research). Frames are drafted for each piece from 150 random comments plus the 50 most engaged. We follow [Robert Entman's (1993) definition of a frame](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x): the aspects of an issue a message selects and emphasises to define the problem, its cause and what should be done about it. Each frame gets a definition and a verbatim example. We write down the central claim that stance is coded against. If a piece argues against an earlier account, agree means accepting its reframing. A person approves the frame list before any coding starts. ### 3. Coding [Claude](https://www.anthropic.com/claude), a large language model made by Anthropic, codes every comment in parallel batches against the written codebook. For replies, it also sees the comment being replied to. Language models can [match or beat trained crowd workers on annotation tasks like this](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2305016120) (Gilardi, Alizadeh and Kubli, 2023). They can also drift from the codebook over long batches, overuse catch-all categories and misread irony. We check the output in two ways. Software confirms that every code comes from the allowed list and that every comment is coded exactly once. A person then spot-checks a random sample of 40 comments against the codebook, and each study publishes the result, except the Amanpour and Company study, whose result was not recorded. The Diary of a CEO study was checked by a blind second coding instead, described under limitations. Where a heavily liked comment affects the engagement-weighted results, we review its codes individually and note any correction. A 40-comment check is thin evidence. That's why we report percentages as whole numbers and treat them as accurate to within a few points. ### 4. Analysis Scripts compute every figure from the coded dataset. Each study states the base for its stance percentages, usually the comments taking a readable position. Every quote in an article is matched word for word against the dataset before publication. We report two kinds of share. Comment shares count each comment once, whether it got no likes or thousands. Engagement-weighted shares weight each comment by its likes or upvotes. Likes show what the platform surfaced and people noticed, not what changed anyone's mind, and a handful of comments usually hold most of them. So we report both. ## Limitations In order of importance: 1 The sample is self-selected and ranked by the platform, as described above. 2 Coding is done by one model. The newest study, on the Diary of a CEO debate, has a blind second coding: a random sample of 347 comments was coded a second time by a separate run of the same model, and the two agreed on stance for 91% (Cohen's kappa 0.87) and on frame for 89% (kappa 0.87). Because both runs used the same model, they can share the same mistakes. The five earlier studies were checked by one person on a sample of 40 and have no second coder, so no agreement figure. 3 Comparing studies changes several things at once: audience, platform, messenger and message. Our research can suggest that framing affects reception. It can't separate framing from audience. 4 Silence is weak evidence. A comment that doesn't mention a risk, a messenger or a policy hasn't said it doesn't matter. Mention flags show what people chose to raise. 5 Where we couldn't watch a piece directly, we reconstructed its argument from the transcript or from what commenters repeated, and the study says so. Our closing advice sometimes draws on established research, such as [Kim Witte's (1992) work on fear appeals](https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759209376276), which finds that threat messages persuade when people believe they can act and backfire when they can't. Communication researchers call that belief efficacy. We cite that research where we use it. What our studies add is comparable evidence of how specific AI messages are received. ## What we're adding Several of these changes follow the method used by the [AI Dialogue Report](https://aidialoguereport.org/findings/). - More than one coder. The Diary of a CEO study took a first step, with a blind second coding of a random sample by a separate run of the same model. Models from different developers make different mistakes, so we plan to code each comment with more than one model, accept the codes they agree on and send disagreements to an arbiter, which gives every study an agreement figure to publish. We also plan a blind second coding of the five earlier studies. - Quote-backed codes. Each code will cite the words in the comment that support it, and software will check the words are there. - A larger human benchmark. A bigger hand-coded sample will let us report precision and recall for each category, and correct published shares for the measured error rate using the [Rogan-Gladen method](https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a112510) (Rogan and Gladen, 1978). - Corrections for multiple comparisons. When we compare many groups, such as stance across every frame, some differences will look real by chance. We will report only those that survive a [Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate correction](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1995.tb02031.x) (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). - Shared categories where good taxonomies exist. Where commenters name specific AI risks, we will code them against the [MIT AI Risk Repository](https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12622) (Slattery et al., 2025), alongside the frames drawn from each thread. - A closer human read. In every study, a person will read the 100 most-liked comments and every comment coded mixed. ## Data and contact Each study's codebook and coded dataset are published with it. Terms used here are defined in our [glossary](https://commonsignals.org/glossary). We want to hear about errors, recoding and criticism of the method: [hello@commonsignals.org](mailto:hello@commonsignals.org). ## References - Benjamini, Y. and Hochberg, Y. (1995). [Controlling the false discovery rate: a practical and powerful approach to multiple testing](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1995.tb02031.x). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 57(1), 289-300. - Entman, R. M. (1993). [Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x). Journal of Communication 43(4), 51-58. - Gilardi, F., Alizadeh, M. and Kubli, M. (2023). [ChatGPT outperforms crowd workers for text-annotation tasks](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2305016120). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 120(30), e2305016120. - Rogan, W. J. and Gladen, B. (1978). [Estimating prevalence from the results of a screening test](https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a112510). American Journal of Epidemiology 107(1), 71-76. - Slattery, P. et al. (2025). [The AI Risk Repository: a comprehensive meta-review, database, and taxonomy of risks from artificial intelligence](https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12622). arXiv:2408.12622. - Townsend, L. and Wallace, C. (2016). Social media research: a guide to ethics. University of Aberdeen. - Witte, K. (1992). [Putting the fear back into fear appeals: the extended parallel process model](https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759209376276). Communication Monographs 59(4), 329-347. URL: https://commonsignals.org/data/ --- title: "Data" url: "https://commonsignals.org/data/" publisher: "Common Signals" licence: "The coding and compilation are CC BY 4.0; comment text remains its authors'." --- # Data Every coded comment behind our reception studies, browsable and filterable, published under CC BY 4.0. ## YouTube comments on the Amanpour and Company Khlaaf segment YouTube Coded: 322 Positioned: 223 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/amanpour-segment-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/problem-they-created-rogue-ai-agents-openai-huggingface-amanpour-khlaaf) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/amanpour-segment-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/amanpour-segment-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/amanpour-segment-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 3)** - **v1**, 16 Sept 2026: Original coding of the second capture (322 comments, two parallel coders, 14 frames plus other), the run behind the published article's second-capture figures. Believed at the time not to have been archived as a row-level file; the article's method section and the project findings note were the only record. - **v2**, 18 Sept 2026: Interim reconstruction, built from the raw yt-dlp export before the original coding file was located. Frame list redrafted from the article's own documented frames and quotes, aimed at reproducing the published figures rather than an independent read. It reproduced the structural counts exactly (322 rows, 232/90 top-level/reply split, 1,048 likes, 237 authors) but ran higher on agree share (72.7% vs 67.7% published) and lower on mixed (8.6% vs 14.3%), and under-counted messenger-credential mentions (3 of 322 vs the 7 then published). Ben Matthews spot-checked a random 40-comment sample of it, 40/40. Superseded by v3; figures taken from it should be discarded. - **v3**, 18 Sept 2026: Restored from the genuine original coding file (coded.tsv, with coded_full.json and analysis.json), found in this repository's _incoming/ folder (files dated 17 September 2026). Same 322 comment IDs; stance, frame (15 values including other), format reaction (4 values), emotion and the six mention flags are exactly as the original run assigned them, with the six m_ flags renamed mentions_. Comment text is the file's anonymised text. Replaces v2 entirely. It matches the published article on every figure checked (the 223-comment stance base and its 67.7/17.9/14.3 split, like-weighted shares, frame and engagement shares, emotion among agreeing comments, regulation and US-administration mention rates, reply and top-level agree rates, top-comment like counts) except messenger-credential mentions: published as 7 (2.2%), 6 (1.9%) in this file. The article has been corrected to 6. ## YouTube comments on the Dwarkesh Podcast episode with Ajeya Cotra, "This might be the clearest warning shot we ever get" YouTube Coded: 2,999 Positioned: 1,590 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/cotra-episode-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/clearest-warning-shot-openai-hugging-face-metr-cotra-dwarkesh) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/cotra-episode-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/cotra-episode-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/cotra-episode-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 2)** - **v1**, 8 Sept 2026: Page capture, 1,249 of 1,569 comments, coded with an earlier frame list; article published from it. Files not archived. - **v2**, 17 Sept 2026: Complete yt-dlp capture (2,999 comments) recoded against a redrafted 18-frame list with the series' full five-dimension scheme. Supersedes v1. ## X replies to Jacob Coxon's Anthropic resignation thread X Coded: 2,480 Positioned: 1,840 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/coxon-resignation-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/coxon-resignation-x-analysis) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/coxon-resignation-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/coxon-resignation-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/coxon-resignation-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 1)** - **v1**, 18 Sept 2026: Initial import: 2,480 rows from the coded TSV export, transformed into contract shape (columns renamed to the mentions_\ convention, coder/spot_checked/correction_note columns added, parent_id/depth blanked since they do not resolve within this sample, reply_count and reposts kept as study-specific extra columns after correction_note, matching Cotra's reply_count precedent). ## Facebook comments on a 21-minute Diary of a CEO cut of the AI debate Facebook Coded: 2,075 Positioned: 1,366 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-facebook-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-clip-facebook-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-facebook-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-clip-facebook-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 2)** - **v1**, 7 Oct 2026: First release. A first pass under codebook v1 fell just short of the 90% reliability bar on stance (88.2%) and frame (88.8%). Codebook v2 defined unclear against na and added tie-breaks for debater_verdict and other; every row coded unclear, other or debater_verdict across the five DOAC studies (14,993 of 26,019) was recoded blind under it. - **v2**, 9 Oct 2026: Corrected the artefact. Version 1 described this post as the 104-second Diary of a CEO clip of Nate Soares, published on 17 September 2026 (an assumed date). Checking the post showed it is "The REAL Reason AI Is Already Out Of Control", a 21:31 cut of the debate published on 21 September 2026. Title, artefact_title, artefact_published and notes updated; the comments and their codes are unchanged. ## Instagram comments on a two-minute Diary of a CEO clip of Nate Soares Instagram Coded: 77 Positioned: 38 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-instagram-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-clip-instagram-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-instagram-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-clip-instagram-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 2)** - **v1**, 7 Oct 2026: First release. A first pass under codebook v1 fell just short of the 90% reliability bar on stance (88.2%) and frame (88.8%). Codebook v2 defined unclear against na and added tie-breaks for debater_verdict and other; every row coded unclear, other or debater_verdict across the five DOAC studies (14,993 of 26,019) was recoded blind under it. - **v2**, 9 Oct 2026: Corrected the artefact. Version 1 described this post as the 104-second Diary of a CEO clip of Nate Soares, with an assumed post date of 17 September 2026. Checking the post showed it is a 2:09 clip led by Soares, published on 17 September 2026 (now verified), and the same cut as the TikTok post; the 104-second YouTube Short is a different video. Title, artefact_title and notes updated; the comments and their codes are unchanged. ## YouTube Shorts comments on the Diary of a CEO trailer for its AI debate YouTube Shorts Coded: 261 Positioned: 171 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-shorts-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-clip-shorts-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-shorts-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-clip-shorts-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 2)** - **v1**, 7 Oct 2026: First release. A first pass under codebook v1 fell just short of the 90% reliability bar on stance (88.2%) and frame (88.8%). Codebook v2 defined unclear against na and added tie-breaks for debater_verdict and other; every row coded unclear, other or debater_verdict across the five DOAC studies (14,993 of 26,019) was recoded blind under it. - **v2**, 9 Oct 2026: Corrected the artefact. Version 1 described this post as the 104-second Diary of a CEO clip of Nate Soares, posted to four platforms. Checking the transcript and frames showed it is a trailer for the full debate, a montage of the host and all four panellists in which Soares has one line, and a different video from the TikTok, Instagram and Facebook posts. Title, artefact_title and notes updated; the comments and their codes are unchanged. ## TikTok comments on a two-minute Diary of a CEO clip of Nate Soares TikTok Coded: 50 Positioned: 27 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-tiktok-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-clip-tiktok-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-clip-tiktok-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-clip-tiktok-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 2)** - **v1**, 7 Oct 2026: First release. A first pass under codebook v1 fell just short of the 90% reliability bar on stance (88.2%) and frame (88.8%). Codebook v2 defined unclear against na and added tie-breaks for debater_verdict and other; every row coded unclear, other or debater_verdict across the five DOAC studies (14,993 of 26,019) was recoded blind under it. - **v2**, 9 Oct 2026: Corrected the artefact. Version 1 described this post as the 104-second Diary of a CEO clip of Nate Soares. Checking the post showed it is a 2:08 clip led by Soares, published on 17 September 2026, and the same cut as the Instagram post; the 104-second YouTube Short is a different video. Title, artefact_title and notes updated; the comments and their codes are unchanged. ## YouTube comments on the Diary of a CEO AI debate episode YouTube Coded: 23,794 Positioned: 15,928 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-debate-youtube-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/cant-we-just-unplug-it-doac-ai-debate-comment-analysis) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-debate-youtube-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/doac-debate-youtube-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/doac-debate-youtube-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 1)** - **v1**, 7 Oct 2026: First release. A first pass under codebook v1 fell just short of the 90% reliability bar on stance (88.2%) and frame (88.8%). Codebook v2 defined unclear against na and added tie-breaks for debater_verdict and other; every row coded unclear, other or debater_verdict across the five DOAC studies (14,993 of 26,019) was recoded blind under it. ## Reddit reception of the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident, before and after the METR investigation Reddit Coded: 516 Positioned: 395 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/metr-report-reddit-2026-09/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/metr-report-reddit-2026-09/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/metr-report-reddit-2026-09/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/metr-report-reddit-2026-09/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 1)** - **v1**, 17 Sept 2026: Recode of the raw page captures with the series' full five-dimension scheme. Supersedes the coding run behind the published article, which is not on file. Counts differ from the article (516 coded here against 692 reported) because collapsed replies in the captures were not expanded. - **v1**, 17 Sept 2026: Spot-check recorded: 40/40. - **v1**, 23 Sept 2026: The article now reports this dataset's counts (516 coded, 395 positioned). The discrepancy noted on 17 September no longer applies. ## Instagram comments on Nate Soares's reel "We stop AI. You help?" Instagram Coded: 2,136 Positioned: 1,271 [Explore comments](https://commonsignals.org/data/soares-reel-2026-08/) [Read the article](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) [study.json](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/soares-reel-2026-08/study.json) · [codebook](https://commonsignals.org/data/soares-reel-2026-08/codebook/) · [comments.csv](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/soares-reel-2026-08/comments.csv) **Changelog (version 2)** - **v1**, 29 Aug 2026: Logged-in API capture, 1,666 of 1,703 comments, coded with like counts available. Article published from it. - **v2**, 17 Sept 2026: Page-text recapture (2,136 of 2,715 comments then live; likely under-counts unexpanded reply threads, the same limitation seen in the METR Reddit capture) recoded against an 18-frame list. No like counts available in this capture, so engagement-weighted findings from v1 cannot be reproduced or updated. Supersedes v1 for stance/frame shares only. Each study is coded on stance, frame, format reaction and emotion against its own codebook, plus a handful of flags for what a comment mentions. Stance and emotion use mostly the same categories across studies; frame and format reaction are study-specific. Comment text is verbatim; author identities are hashed, not published. Full contract, JSON schemas and licensing: [/data/studies/README.md](https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/README.md). The coding and compilation are CC BY 4.0; comment text remains its authors'. URL: https://commonsignals.org/data/studies/README.md # The studies data contract This describes the shape every study folder under `/data/studies/` follows. It reflects what the studies on file (`metr-report-reddit-2026-09`, `cotra-episode-2026-09`, `soares-reel-2026-08`, `amanpour-segment-2026-09`, `coxon-resignation-2026-09`) actually contain, not just the original design, so a couple of things below are deliberate adjustments from that first draft. They are called out as they come up. ## Layout Each study is a folder `/data/studies//` with three files: - `study.json`, metadata about the study: what was captured, how, and the headline counts. - `codebook.json`, the coding scheme: every dimension a comment was coded on, and its allowed values. - `comments.csv`, the coded comments themselves, one row per comment. `codebook.md` also appears in each folder on file. It is the human-readable source the coder worked from; `codebook.json` is the structured version of the same thing. Neither is required by this contract, but where both exist they should agree. `/data/studies/index.json` lists every study (title, slug, counts, licence) for the explorer to read without fetching each `study.json` in turn. ## Validation `scripts/data-export.py validate [slug]` checks every study folder, or just one, against this contract: id uniqueness, allowed values, non-empty text (with the stub exemption below), threading consistency, and the counts fields against the CSV. Run it after editing a study folder by hand. It does not check JSON Schema conformance directly (see "on schemas" below); it implements the same required fields natively so the script has no dependencies to install. ## On schemas, and letting studies carry extra detail `_schema/study.schema.json` and `_schema/codebook.schema.json` describe the fields every study is required to have. They deliberately do not forbid additional properties. In practice, every study on file carries genuinely useful extra detail beyond this core: METR's `study.json` has a `design` field and a full `threads` breakdown; Cotra's has extra `counts` fields like `views_at_capture`; Soares' has `empty_or_stub` and `likes_available`. Trimming studies down to the letter of the contract would throw that detail away for no benefit, so the schemas validate that the required fields are present and correctly typed, and leave everything else alone. If a stricter, closed contract turns out to matter later (for a stability guarantee to the Phase 2 UI, say), that is a decision to make deliberately, not a side effect of schema validation. ## study.json Required fields: - `slug`: string, matches the folder name. - `title`: string. - `series`: string. Four studies on file share `"agent-swarm reception"`; `coxon-resignation-2026-09` is `"resignation reception"`, since it reacts to a different artefact (Coxon's own resignation) rather than the OpenAI/Hugging Face incident the other four are all about. `/data/studies/index.json`'s top-level `series` is therefore a list of every distinct value on file, not a single string. - `platform`: string, for example `"reddit"`, `"youtube"`, `"instagram"`. - `artefact_title`, `artefact_url`, `artefact_published`: the thing being reacted to (the article, video or post) and when it went up. - `central_claim`: the statement stance is coded against. Say what counts as agreeing with it, either here or in the codebook's `stance_note`. - `capture_dates`: array of ISO dates. More than one date means more than one capture; `capture_method` and `changelog` should explain why. - `capture_method`: free text. Say what was captured, how, and what was lost (missing like counts, lost threading, and so on) so the explorer's caveats can be sourced from here. - `counts`: object. Always present: `retrieved` (rows captured), `coded` (rows in comments.csv; must equal the row count), `clear_position_base` (rows whose stance is not the codebook's no-position or unclear value). Everything else in `counts` is study-specific and optional: present when it means something for that capture method, left out rather than set to null when it does not (Soares has no `top_level`/`replies` at all, rather than nulls, because it has no threading). - `spot_check`: object with `sample`, `agreed`, `checked_by`, `date`, `note`. All nullable; a null field means "not recorded" in the explorer, not "zero". - `coders`: free text describing who or what did the coding. - `article_url`: the Common Signals article this study backs, or null. - `findings_note_url`: nullable. - `version`: integer, starts at 1. - `changelog`: array of `{version, date, note}`, oldest first. - `licence`: string. All studies on file use `"CC BY 4.0 (coding and compilation; comment text remains its authors')"`. The licence covers the coding and compilation; comment text remains its authors'. - `notes`: free text for anything that does not fit elsewhere (known gaps, caveats, things a reader should know before quoting a number). ## codebook.json Required fields: - `central_claim`: string. Should match `study.json`'s. - `stance_note`: string, defining what each stance value means for this study's central claim (for example "agree = accepts AI is a serious existential danger worth acting on"). This is what a validator or explorer uses to work out which stance values count as a clear position, so word it as a list of `value = definition` clauses. - `coder_instructions`: free text, the brief given to the coder. - `dimensions`: array. Each dimension is: - `key`: matches a comments.csv column name. - `label`: display name. - `kind`: `"single"` (one value from a fixed list, like stance or frame), `"flag"` (boolean, a comments.csv column named `mentions_` or a bare flag like `non_english`), `"group"` (a study-specific grouping column, like METR's `period` or `subreddit`), or `"meta"` (a plain descriptive column, like a reply count or a timestamp-precision caption, that is not a facet and carries no allowed-value list). - `shared`: true if the same values apply across every study in the series (stance, format_reaction, emotion), false if they are study-specific (frame always is; flag and group dimensions usually are). - `values`: array of `{value, label, definition, example}`, the allowed values for `single` and `group` dimensions. Flag and meta dimensions do not carry a `values` array; this contract does not require one for either. ## comments.csv Columns, in this order, where they exist: `id, parent_id, depth, author_hash, published_at, published_at_precision, likes, text, stance, frame, format_reaction, emotion`, then one column per mention flag named `mentions_` (plus any bare flags like `non_english`), then `coder, spot_checked, correction_note`. A study may append its own group columns after these (METR has `period, subreddit, thread_url`); each must be declared in `codebook.json` as a `group` dimension. Rules, and the exceptions actually seen in the studies on file: - `id` is unique within the file. - `parent_id` is empty or resolves to an `id` in the same file. `depth` is `0` when `parent_id` is empty; the contract does not assume `depth` equals the parent's depth plus one, because platforms with a flat reply UI (confirmed for YouTube) give every reply depth 1 regardless of which comment in the thread it replies to. - Both columns must exist. When a capture method could not preserve threading at all, they are present and blank on every row rather than omitted (METR, Soares), so every study has the same CSV shape. `study.json`'s `capture_method` should say so. - `likes` is an integer or empty, and is never zero when the true value is unknown. A study whose capture method never had access to engagement data (Soares) can have `likes` empty on every row; that is valid, not missing data, and `study.json`'s `counts.likes_available` (or equivalent) should say so. - `text` is non-empty on every row, with one exemption: a row whose `coder` is exactly `not_coded_empty_stub` marks an intentionally uncoded stub (for example a GIF or sticker-only reply the platform exposes no text for). These rows stay in the file and count towards `counts.coded`; they are not dropped and not required to have text. - Every coded value (`stance`, `frame`, `format_reaction`, `emotion`, any `group` column) is in the codebook's allowed set for that column. - Flag columns (`mentions_*` and bare flags like `non_english`) hold exactly `true` or `false`, lowercase. Every `mentions_` column in the CSV has a matching flag dimension in `codebook.json`, and vice versa. - A study may append a trailing free-text `flags` column for coder notes. It is not part of this contract and the validator does not check it. URL: https://commonsignals.org/ai-safety-comms-reading-list --- title: "AI safety comms reading list: where to start" url: "https://commonsignals.org/ai-safety-comms-reading-list" published: 2026-10-15 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" --- # AI safety comms reading list: where to start 15 October 2026 · Ben Matthews The reading list I wish I'd had at the start of my AI safety comms journey. ## Why I put this list together I've been building [Common Signals](https://commonsignals.org/), which studies how the public receives messages about AI risk. Along the way I've found a lot of existing research and previous studies, just not in one place. It's spread across polling reports, psychology journals, think-tank articles and forum posts. Much of it is hard to find unless someone points you to it. So, this is the list I wish I'd had at the start of my AI safety comms journey. It's for anyone new to AI safety who wants to join the conversation knowing what's already been tested, whether you're a campaigner, creator, journalist or researcher. Each entry says in a sentence or two what the work found, so you can choose what is most relevant for you. For a fuller, filterable catalogue of polls and framing studies, see the Common Signals [research library](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/). ## If you only read five articles 1. [How do people feel about AI?](https://www.turing.ac.uk/news/publications/understanding-public-attitudes-ai-second-survey), Ada Lovelace Institute and The Alan Turing Institute (2025). The most rigorous picture of UK attitudes: 3,513 adults at a 62% response rate, asked questions first used in 2022 so you can see what changed. Nearly nine in ten support independent regulation of AI. 2. [From catastrophic to concrete](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525), Philip Trippenbach, Isabella Scala, Jai Bhambra and Rowan Emslie (2025). A message-testing paper by researchers at the Seismic Foundation, Blue State and the Centre for Future Generations. It draws on Seismic's survey in five countries and checks the findings with a message test of 1,063 US adults. Risks to jobs and children had the most potential to mobilise people, and existential risk came last in every demographic group. The authors argue extinction messages trigger mortality avoidance, and name Tech-Positive Urbanites and World Guardians as the most receptive segments. 3. [Which AI harms and risks will mobilise the public to act?](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/which-ai-harms-and-risks.html), Markus Ostarek, Cathy Rogers, Ben Kenward and Sam Nadel, Social Change Lab (2026). A UK randomised trial with 3,467 people comparing eleven AI harms. It agrees with Trippenbach on extinction framing and disagrees on jobs. AI warfare raised concern about extinction more than extinction messaging did. Anger predicted action while anxiety did not. 4. [Perception of risk](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3563507), Paul Slovic (1987). A short paper in Science on why the public and experts rank hazards differently. Lay judgements follow how dreaded and how unfamiliar a risk feels, a description that fits most AI risks. 5. [AI is on the march. Is the AI safety movement ready?](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research/ai-safety-movement.html), Social Change Lab (2025). Sorts civil-society groups into four clusters: protest and mobilisation, narrative-shaping and watchdogs, public literacy, and field-building and lobbying. It finds sharp disagreement between present-day-harms and existential-risk groups. ## What the public thinks about AI - [AI Index Report 2026: public opinion chapter](https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2026-ai-index-report/public-opinion), Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (2026). The quickest overview, drawing the major international polls into one chapter. The global share seeing more benefits than drawbacks rose from 55% to 59% between 2024 and 2025, while the share saying AI makes them nervous rose to 52%. - [What do the public think about AI?](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/evidence-review/what-do-the-public-think-about-ai/), Octavia Field Reid, Anna Colom and Roshni Modhvadia, Ada Lovelace Institute (2023). A rapid evidence review written ahead of the UK AI Safety Summit. People welcome AI in health and science, worry about it making consequential decisions such as hiring or benefits, care about rights like privacy, and want regulation. - [How do people feel about AI? Wave one](https://www.turing.ac.uk/news/publications/understanding-public-attitudes-ai-first-survey), Ada Lovelace Institute and The Alan Turing Institute (2023). More than 4,000 British adults asked about specific uses of AI rather than AI in general. - [Public attitudes to data and AI: tracker survey wave 4](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-data-and-ai-tracker-survey-wave-4/public-attitudes-to-data-and-ai-tracker-survey-wave-4-report), Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (2024). The UK government's annual tracker, running since December 2021. - [How Americans view AI and its impact on people and society](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2025/09/17/how-americans-view-ai-and-its-impact-on-people-and-society/), Pew Research Center (2025). The US reference point. Half of Americans say the growing use of AI in daily life makes them more concerned than excited, up from 37% in 2021. - [How people around the world view AI](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/10/15/how-people-around-the-world-view-ai/), Pew Research Center (2025). Concern, excitement and trust in institutions to regulate AI, compared across 25 countries including the UK and Canada. - [Trust, attitudes and use of artificial intelligence: a global study 2025](https://kpmg.com/xx/en/our-insights/ai-and-technology/trust-attitudes-and-use-of-ai.html), KPMG and the University of Melbourne (2025). More than 48,000 people in 47 countries. 66% use AI with some regularity and 46% are willing to trust it, and trust has fallen as use has grown since the 2022 edition. - [What 81,000 people want from AI](https://www.anthropic.com/features/81k-interviews), Anthropic (2026). AI-led interviews with 80,508 Claude users in 159 countries. Claude users aren't the public, but the ranking still tells you something: unreliability was the most-raised of 13 concerns and existential risk the least. - [The UK AI Compass](https://diffusion-beta.netlify.app/assets/Diffusion-UK-AI-Compass-Report.pdf), Daniel Stone, Diffusion (2026). Six UK mindsets on AI, dial-tested messages, metaphor analysis, and platform data from a YouGov survey of 2,911 UK adults. - [Americans on AI](https://www.americanson.ai/), Athena Insights (2026, ongoing). A biweekly US tracker fielded by NORC, with data and code [open on GitHub](https://github.com/athena-insights/aoai-public). - [Great (public) expectations](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/policy-briefing/great-expectations/), Nuala Polo and Roshni Modhvadia, Ada Lovelace Institute (2025). What 1,928 UK adults expect from AI governance. ## What the public thinks about catastrophic AI risk - [US public opinion of AI policy and risk](https://rethinkpriorities.org/s/Formatted-AI-Public-Opinion-Write-Up-3.pdf), Rethink Priorities (2023). 2,444 US adults, weighted to be representative. An estimated 70% would favour federal regulation of AI, yet only 4% named AI as the most likely cause of human extinction, below every other threat offered. - [US public perception of CAIS statement and the risk of extinction](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/Rg7h7G3KTvaYEtL55/us-public-perception-of-cais-statement-and-the-risk-of), Rethink Priorities (2023). Tested the one-sentence Center for AI Safety statement that puts AI extinction risk alongside pandemics and nuclear war. Most Americans supported it. Their own estimates of the risk varied widely, and around 1% was the most common answer. - [55% of the US public is now aware of AI xrisk](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/osHpP4ftF32RNysmQ/55-of-the-us-public-is-now-aware-of-ai-xrisk), Existential Risk Observatory (2026). A repeated survey of 300 Americans asked to name three things that could cause human extinction. The share mentioning AI unprompted has climbed from 7% in December 2022 to 55% in the latest round. The Existential Risk Observatory campaigns on existential risk. - [Poll: public demand for government to address extreme risks from AI](https://www.longtermresilience.org/new-poll-shows-high-public-demand-for-the-government-to-address-extreme-risks-from-ai/), Centre for Long-Term Resilience (2023). UK polling on whether government should act on extreme risks from AI, commissioned by a think tank that works on them. - [Voters prefer AI regulation that mandates safety measures over industry self-regulation](https://theaipi.org/april-voters-prefer-ai-regulation-over-self-regulation/), AI Policy Institute (2024). One of a long series of US voter polls from an advocacy group. Around 80% preferred mandated safety standards for the most advanced models to self-regulation. ## What changes how people respond to AI risk - [The effectiveness of AI existential risk communication to the American and Dutch public](https://existentialriskobservatory.org/papers_and_reports/The_Effectiveness_of_AI_Existential_Risk_Communication_to_the_American_and_Dutch_Public.pdf), Alexia Georgiadis, Existential Risk Observatory (2023). One of the first tests of real media pieces: participants read or watched news articles and videos about AI extinction risk, with awareness measured before and after. The pieces raised awareness. A shorter [summary is on the EA Forum](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fqXLT7NHZGsLmjH4o/paper-summary-the-effectiveness-of-ai-existential-risk). - [What's risk got to do with it? Public attitudes toward AI regulation in the European Union and United States](https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198945215.003.0083), Kulani Abendroth-Dias (2025). A survey experiment with 1,310 people in the EU and US, alongside 65 expert interviews. Framing AI risk as disinformation or online child safety moved conservatives' support for regulation more than liberals'. - [Temporal framing in balanced news coverage of artificial intelligence and public attitudes](https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2023.2248974), Sukyoung Choi, Mass Communication and Society (2023). An online experiment on whether describing AI's effects as near or distant in time, inside otherwise balanced news stories, shifts attitudes. ## Why people respond the way they do to AI risk - [Risk as analysis and risk as feelings](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x), Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters and Donald MacGregor (2004). People judge risk through fast feelings as well as slow reasoning, and each depends on the other. - [Putting the fear back into fear appeals: the extended parallel process model](https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759209376276), Kim Witte (1992). If you read one paper on fear appeals, make it this one. A threat message leads to action when people believe they can do something effective about it, and to denial or avoidance when they can't. - [A meta-analysis of fear appeals: implications for effective public health campaigns](https://doi.org/10.1177/109019810002700506), Kim Witte and Mike Allen (2000). Tests the model across the health literature. Strong fear paired with strong efficacy produced the most behaviour change; strong fear with weak efficacy produced the most defensive reactions. - [Appealing to fear: a meta-analysis of fear appeal effectiveness and theories](https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039729), Melanie Tannenbaum and colleagues (2015). 127 articles covering more than 27,000 people. On average fear appeals changed attitudes, intentions and behaviour, more so when they included efficacy statements and asked for a one-off action. - [Ignoring theory and misinterpreting evidence: the false belief in fear appeals](https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2017.1415767), Gerjo Kok and colleagues (2018). The sceptical case. Threat changes behaviour only when people feel able to act, and the authors conclude that the experimental evidence does not support positive effects of fear appeals. Read it straight after Tannenbaum. - [Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action](https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504), Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes and Russell Spears (2008). A meta-analysis of why people act together: a sense of injustice, a belief that the group can make a difference, and a shared identity. It fits Social Change Lab's finding that anger predicts action. - [Exercise of human agency through collective efficacy](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00064), Albert Bandura (2000). A short paper on collective efficacy, the belief that people acting together can change things. Most AI risks need a collective response, which makes this the kind of efficacy worth building. ## Messengers, identity and trust in AI safety - [The persuasiveness of source credibility: a critical review of five decades' evidence](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02547.x), Chanthika Pornpitakpan (2004). Credible sources usually persuade more. The review, written for practitioners choosing a spokesperson, also sets out the conditions under which credibility stops helping or works against a message. - [Cultural cognition of scientific consensus](https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2010.511246), Dan Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith and Donald Braman (2011). People's sense of what experts agree on bends to fit their values, tested on climate change, nuclear waste and handguns. For communicators, telling a sceptical audience that scientists agree will rarely settle the matter by itself. - [Flash poll: trust and artificial intelligence at a crossroads](https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer/flash-poll-trust-artifical-intelligence), Edelman Trust Institute (2025). 5,000 people in five countries. Trust in AI ranged from 72% in China to 32% in the US, and people who use AI themselves tended to trust it more. ## Does public opinion move policy and AI governance? - [The impact of public opinion on public policy: a review and an agenda](https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290305600103), Paul Burstein, Political Research Quarterly (2003). Reviews published studies and finds the impact of opinion substantial, stronger on salient issues, and still strong once lobbying by organisations and elites is taken into account. - [Testing theories of American politics: elites, interest groups, and average citizens](https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595), Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, Perspectives on Politics (2014). An analysis of 1,779 US policy issues concluding that economic elites and business groups shaped outcomes while majorities of ordinary Americans had little influence. - [Relative policy support and coincidental representation](https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592715002315), Peter Enns, Perspectives on Politics (2015). The best-known reply. Middle-income and affluent Americans usually rank policies in the same order, so the middle often gets what it wants anyway. ## Who is already working on AI safety comms The field is small, and most research on messages about AI risk comes from organisations that also campaign on it. These are the pieces I'd read to see who's doing what. - [On the razor's edge: AI vs. everything we care about](https://report2025.seismic.org/), Seismic Foundation (2025). A segmentation of more than 10,000 people in the US, UK, France, Germany and Poland, identifying five groups closest to civic action on AI. Seismic runs large surveys like this to power its own campaigns. - [Messages, frames and messengers: what might a Climate Outreach for AI safety look like?](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/KAx6vsPNZ7kHPYRDf/messages-frames-and-messengers-what-might-a-climate-outreach), Ben Matthews (2026). My case for applying Climate Outreach's method to AI, and the starting point for Common Signals. The comments include challenges to the analogy. - [Common Signals findings](https://commonsignals.org/findings) and [data explorer](https://commonsignals.org/data/). My studies so far of how audiences reacted to AI safety moments, with every coded dataset and codebook published. ## How you can contribute This list will have gaps, and I'd like to hear about them. I'm particularly interested in: - Studies that test how people respond to specific messages about AI - Research on what happens after a first concern, such as whether worry about jobs or children leads people on to concern about catastrophic risk - Anything I've summarised unfairly Please email me at [hello@commonsignals.org](mailto:hello@commonsignals.org), or [follow Common Signals on Substack](https://commonsignalsorg.substack.com/) for updates. ## How to cite Ben Matthews, Common Signals, "AI safety comms reading list: where to start", 15 October 2026, version of 11 November 2026, [https://commonsignals.org/ai-safety-comms-reading-list](https://commonsignals.org/ai-safety-comms-reading-list). Corrected 11 November 2026: the Trippenbach paper's message test was run with 1,063 adults in the US, not across five countries. The five-country data comes from the Seismic Foundation's survey. Added 11 November 2026: The UK AI Compass, Americans on AI and Great (public) expectations. URL: https://commonsignals.org/theory-of-change --- title: "Creating a social mandate for AI governance" url: "https://commonsignals.org/theory-of-change" published: 2026-09 updated: 2026-11-11 publisher: "Common Signals" --- # Creating a social mandate for AI governance September 2026 Common Signals' theory of change: why public engagement is critical to durable AI governance, and how a social mandate for it gets built. ### Note added 11 November 2026 Common Signals no longer plans its own segmentation survey or the US pilot described in sections 7.2 to 7.4 and 8.1, and it has no contracted quantitative partner. The rest of this document is unchanged from September 2026. Our current priorities are set out in the [research agenda](https://commonsignals.org/research/agenda). ### About this document Common Signals is a neutral research body working to widen and deepen public engagement with AI. Through [audience research](https://commonsignals.org/research), [tested messages](https://commonsignals.org/tools), [practical guides](https://commonsignals.org/updates) and [messenger training](https://commonsignals.org/training), we help organisations explain AI to the public in ways that fit the values of their audiences. ## Our theory of change in one page If the organisations and messengers who explain AI to the public work from shared evidence about which messages and messengers move which audiences, then their campaigns will turn public concern into lasting support for governance. We think this because people form attitudes on AI through their values, the people they trust and the norms around them, and because the field currently chooses its frames and its messengers by instinct and availability. Common Signals generates that evidence, publishes it as open data, and helps communicators use it. Over five years the measure of our own success is that communicators on both sides of the field change what they say and who says it, and that the audiences they reach report knowing what to do and doing it. **A social mandate for AI governance is the outcome we contribute to, alongside many others.** Chart: The causal chain from activities to impact: activities lead to outputs, which lead to communicator outcomes, which lead to public outcomes, which lead to a durable social mandate for AI governance, each step carrying an assumption. The causal chain. Each arrow carries an assumption; [section 7.4](https://commonsignals.org/theory-of-change#assumptions-risks-fallbacks) sets out what happens if the assumption fails. ### 1. Activities Values-based segmentation and message testing, rapid analysis of real public reaction, messenger mapping and trust testing, an open toolkit, messenger training. **Assumption:** message and messenger effects measured in surveys and comment threads predict effects in real campaigns. ### 2. Outputs Published segments, tested frames and messengers per segment, practical guides, trained messengers, an annual impact report. **Assumption:** the evidence is credible to both sides because it is neutral, sourced and free. ### 3. Communicator outcomes (what we influence) Organisations and messengers adopt tested frames, pair threat with a route to efficacy, use messengers from outside the field, and both sides draw on one evidence base. **Assumption:** communicators will change practice when evidence contradicts instinct. This is the assumption the whole model rests on. ### 4. Public outcomes (what we contribute to) Cross-societal concern, polarisation avoided, concern turned into action. These are the three elements in [section 4](https://commonsignals.org/theory-of-change#generating-a-social-mandate). **Assumption:** more effective communication, at the scale the field operates, moves attitudes in the populations that matter. ### 5. Impact A durable social mandate for AI governance: rules that are hard to reverse, and a social licence for AI companies that is conditional on safety. **Assumption:** a mandate for process converts into political will even where the economic wind is against it. ## 1. Introduction: why do we need public engagement? ### 1.1 Public engagement is often forgotten, but critical to governing AI AI is moving faster than any previous general-purpose technology, and how well it goes depends on decisions being made now, at all levels of society. There is no off-the-shelf blueprint for governing it. Shifts in attitudes, norms and behaviour around AI are emerging in different ways in different places, and nobody can predict them with confidence. What is clear is that governing AI well, with the consent and participation of the public, needs effective communication and active public engagement. At the time of writing (2026), public concern about AI is high in most countries surveyed. But concern is not the same as committed public support for governance. The rules that both present-day-harms and existential-risk communicators want, from transparency and liability to limits on the most capable systems, need a public that understands the case, sees itself in it, and keeps supporting it when the political wind changes. In many countries a form of AI silence has set in: people use the tools daily, worry about them in the abstract, and rarely talk about the issue with anyone. Meanwhile the debate among those who do talk about it has split into several conversations, one about bias, others about surveillance and labour, even more others about catastrophic risk. As a result politicians face little sustained pressure to act. When they do act, policies are vulnerable: the UK's [AI Safety Institute](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#ai-security-institute-uk) became the AI Security Institute in 2025 and the US executive order on AI was revoked in January 2025 with little public reaction either way. High-stakes decisions about AI are being made without a public mandate in either direction. AI advocates focus on policy change, shifting elite opinion through the media, and mobilising grassroots pressure. To succeed in the long term these strategies also need to engage the wider public and build the social mandate for durable governance. **Understanding how people talk and feel about AI is crucial to the debate over AI governance.** ### 1.2 The challenge of AI engagement Generating strong and consistent public support for AI governance is hard for a wide range of reasons. | Barrier | What it means for engagement | | --- | --- | | Vested interests | The companies building AI have enormous resources, a direct line to governments, and a strong incentive to frame governance as a brake on progress. | | Technical literacy | Understanding the risks requires some grasp of how the systems work. Most people's mental model comes from the tools they use and the films they have seen. | | Doubts about AI's abilities | Many people's direct experience is of AI that gets facts wrong and invents sources. Claims about systems that could deceive or escape read as hype. | | Abstract problem | Both the harms and the governance responses are described in technical language that does not connect with day-to-day concerns. | | Future problem | Catastrophic risk is presented as years away and speculative; present harms are presented as somebody else's problem. | | Science fiction | Film references give believers instant comprehension and sceptics an instant dismissal. | | Resignation | People who accept the danger often conclude it is too late. When people feel there is nothing they can do to help, they stop trying. | | Coping with change | AI is arriving inside people's jobs, schools and relationships at once. People resist rapid change to the operation of their lives. | | Unsettled rules | Translating generalised unease into support for specific rules asks people to take a position on something still forming. | ### 1.3 A social mandate is critical to durable AI governance We are in a vicious cycle: - **Weak social mandate:** a minority of the public identify AI as a priority issue, and few talk about it. - **Weak governance:** no political mandate to create or hold the line on rules; commitments are voluntary and reversible. - **Companies not incentivised:** no public pressure to trade capability for safety, and no penalty for deployment ahead of understanding. - **Passive public behaviour:** people adopt tools without questions, and cannot see how to act on their unease. Chart: A vicious cycle: weak social mandate leads to weak governance, companies not incentivised, and passive public behaviour, which loops back to a weak mandate. A strong social mandate creates a virtuous circle: - **Strong social mandate:** a majority identify AI governance as a priority and see themselves in the issue. - **Durable governance:** rules driven and supported by the public, hard to reverse when the wind changes. - **Companies compelled:** public pressure and social licence make safety a condition of operating, not a marketing line. - **Active public behaviour:** people ask questions, choose, refuse, and join the local and national conversations that shape deployment. Chart: A virtuous circle: a strong social mandate drives durable governance, compels companies, and produces active public behaviour, which reinforces the mandate. ### 1.4 Changing levels of concern: the lesson of 2023 to 2025 > "Citizens should be empowered to push AI in a direction that can fulfill its promise as an information technology. But for that to happen, we will need a new narrative in the media, policymaking circles, and civil society, and much better regulations and policy responses. Governments can help to change the direction of AI rather than merely reacting to issues as they arise. But first policymakers must recognize the problem." > > *Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology · Nobel Prize in Economics, 2024* Concern about AI rose sharply after ChatGPT's release in November 2022. The [March 2023 open letter](https://futureoflife.org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments/) calling for a pause, resignation statements from senior researchers, and the Bletchley Park summit in November 2023 produced a surge of attention. Polling in that period found majorities in the UK and US wanting AI regulated, and more Americans concerned than excited. That attention led to real institutional change: [AI safety](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#ai-safety) institutes in the UK and US, the [EU AI Act](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#eu-ai-act), and a run of voluntary commitments from the companies. But it did not convert into commitment. By early 2025 the framing had moved decisively to opportunity. The UK published an [AI Opportunities Action Plan](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-opportunities-action-plan) in January 2025, the US revoked its AI executive order the same month, and the Paris summit in February 2025 dropped "safety" from its name. The public, still concerned in the polls, did not react, because concern had never been turned into an understanding of what governance was for or what its loss would mean. This is the same pattern climate communicators experience in the UK after 2010: a spike in concern, a policy win, then a collapse in salience that undid much of the political buy-in. A strategy that focuses on demands for policy change, with little attention to moving public engagement from concern to commitment, is vulnerable to changes in the political winds. For AI the cycle ran in two years rather than a decade. The lesson is that backsliding is possible, and that holding ground needs an ongoing, broad-based and robust social mandate. **Converting high concern into social change needs evidence-based public engagement, which has not played a central role in AI campaigns or government communications so far.** ### 1.5 Context analysis: what is happening in 2026? - **Concern without conversation:** polling across countries shows high concern about AI, alongside low knowledge and low discussion. People are worried. - **Governance on several tracks:** the [EU AI Act](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/) is coming into force in stages, [California's SB 53](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB53) has set frontier-model transparency rules, and the US federal government is pressing to pre-empt state laws. None of these was driven by visible public pressure. - **A field split:** existential-risk and present-day-harms communicators work from different evidence, different funders and different vocabularies. - **Evidence that the dominant framings underperform:** a [2025 message-testing paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525) by Philip Trippenbach and colleagues at the Seismic Foundation, Blue State and the Centre for Future Generations found the field's leading frames, including [existential risk](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#existential-risk-x-risk), performed worse than expected. [Our own analysis of 1,534 comments on a viral MIRI reel](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) found that the argument persuaded most people who replied, then left them resigned. - **Backlash forming locally:** opposition to data centres over water, power and land is the first mass, cross-partisan public reaction to AI infrastructure, and it is happening without any connection to the safety debate. - **Populism and polarisation:** AI is not yet a partisan issue in most countries. That window will not stay open. The US debate over state pre-emption is the first place it is starting to close. - **Harms arriving in daily life:** chatbot harms to children, deepfakes, hiring and welfare algorithms, and job losses attributed to AI are making the technology concrete for people who had no view on it a year ago. - **Rising capability:** each model generation makes claims that sounded like fiction sound less so, and gives sceptics less to point at. The capability objection is losing ground slowly, not the personification objection. ## 2. The core principles of public engagement ### 2.1 Values-based engagement and social mandate The social science evidence is consistent: people do not form attitudes or change behaviour mainly by weighing expert information. They are moved by stories that feel right, told by people they trust, and made acceptable by the norms around them. This is as true for AI as for climate, and probably more so, because the technical case is harder for most people to evaluate. People act when they understand the reasons and those reasons connect to their concerns. Explaining [alignment](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#alignment) or scaling laws to an audience worried about their child's homework or their job does not do that. Connecting AI governance to their child's safety, their livelihood or their say over their own community does. Change of the kind AI governance needs will not come from information campaigns alone, the deficit model in which experts transmit facts to a receiving public. It comes from the interaction between people and the society around them. **Social norms decide what is acceptable to say and do, and people shape their behaviour by what their peers say and do.** Chart: Two models compared: a prescriptive model where experts dictate rules to passive users, versus a collaborative ecosystem where researchers, regulators, industry and the public actively co-create safety measures through networked feedback. In contrast to a traditional, prescribed AI safety model where rules are simply dictated, this collaborative ecosystem model illustrates how multiple stakeholders actively co-create and align safety measures. Safety and value alignment are refined through continuous dialogue and networked feedback. Adapted from Franck Courchamp, 2017. **A social mandate emerges when different communities are given a voice.** Building support while avoiding polarisation means enabling a broad range of public audiences to: - see their values, identity and concerns in the AI story; - know that people they identify with are engaging with AI in a way that looks authentic; - be able to take actions that fit them, their concerns and their community. Generating sustained, committed action from high concern therefore needs proper attention to people's values and the social contexts they live in. Engaging with diverse communal values, from family and fairness to security and freedom, is central to Common Signals' approach. **People act based on their values, beliefs, and social norms. AI communication today mostly starts at beliefs and skips the values that decide whether the argument is accepted.** Chart: The systemic process of integrating AI safety: aligning foundational values, cultivating risk awareness, establishing technical norms, and implementing concrete actions, which reinforce the values in turn. The systemic process of integrating AI safety: aligning foundational values, cultivating risk awareness, establishing technical norms, and implementing concrete actions. ### 2.2 A social licence to operate Public engagement also bears on the structural shifts needed from the companies building AI. They need a social licence to operate. While they have it, they have little incentive to trade speed for safety, and voluntary commitments stay voluntary. Companies struggle when they lose that licence, as tobacco did. Leaders of AI companies are already sensitive to this: the public framing of each model release, each safety incident and each data centre siting decision is managed carefully. The finding in [our reel analysis](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) that "blame the companies" was the one frame shared by believers and sceptics alike suggests the licence is weaker than it looks. **But with AI now embedded in work, education and daily life, the challenge of shifting perceptions durably is significant.** ## 3. The elements of social transformation Social transformation is complex and there is no blueprint. But recurring features link many rapid shifts in recent history: the Irish abortion referendum, changing attitudes to same-sex marriage, the spread of smoking bans, and the 2020 pandemic response, when governments changed the daily lives of whole populations in weeks. **Transformative change appears to need:** - **A social mandate:** a consistent majority of the public supporting significant change. - **Compelling narratives that relate to communal values:** letting diverse communities engage in a way that fits their identity, rather than as a technical policy question. - **A supportive economic context:** without a favourable economic wind, even popular rules may not be implemented or kept. The third is the hardest for AI. The economic wind is blowing towards adoption at almost any cost, and governments see AI as their route to growth. That makes the first two more important, not less. Where the economics cut against governance, only a mandate that is broad, cross-partisan and durable will hold. ### 3.1 Public consent and people-led change People will need to be central to the AI transition. The choices being made about AI in workplaces, schools, hospitals and councils are choices about their lives, and rules made without their consent will be resented, evaded or reversed. Carbon pricing failed where it lacked buy-in; AI rules will fail the same way if they are experienced as something done to people rather than for them. This is not unprecedented. Social pressure ended the slave trade, moved smoking out of public buildings, and won recognition for rights once thought impossible. None of these came through technocratic change alone. Each needed widespread acceptance and a rapid shift in social and moral norms around the need to act. **Positions that once seemed radical became normal.** ## 4. Generating a social mandate for AI governance Common Signals believes three elements combine to generate a social mandate for AI governance: cross-societal concern, avoiding polarisation, and concern turned into action. The mandate we work towards is a mandate for process: that AI is deployed with transparency, accountability and a public say, and that rules once made are hard to reverse without public consent. We take no position on which rules, which risks matter most, or which organisations are right. We do hold that AI should be governed with public consent, and we say so. Neutrality means anyone in the field can use the evidence without adopting our view of the risk. It does not mean we have no view of the public's place in the decision. The indicators below sit at two levels. The first set is our proximate outcome: changes in communicator practice that we can measure and that our impact report will be judged on. The three sets that follow are field-level outcomes we contribute to alongside many others. We will report on all four and claim credit only for the first. ### 1. Communicator practice (our proximate outcome) - Named organisations on both sides of the field report using our segments, frames or messenger evidence in live campaigns, verified at follow-up rather than counted at download. - Campaign materials from both present-day-harms and existential-risk communicators pair threat with a concrete route to efficacy. - Messengers from outside the field, briefed or trained by us, appear in campaigns and reach audiences the field's own voices do not. - Both sides cite the same evidence base, and the balance of our users stays within a range the advisory group sets in advance. ### 2. Cross-societal concern - Polling consistently shows AI among the top five concerns for a population, and people across different communities are talking about it. - Politicians report being pressured or supported on AI governance by their constituents. - A majority of the public supports the delivery of specific governance measures. - Audiences across society express support for advocates of AI governance and their campaigns. ### 3. Avoiding polarisation - Parties across the spectrum recognise AI governance in their manifestos and speeches. - Spokespeople associated with the right, with business and with faith communities speak out on AI governance. - Polling shows support for governance holding across party lines, and decreasing tolerance for deployment ahead of safety. ### 4. Concern turned into action - Populations report knowing what they can do about AI and doing it, from questioning use in their workplace or school to joining local decisions. - Populations report knowing others in their community who care about AI and are acting. - Communities are genuinely involved in decisions about AI deployment and hold decision-makers to account. - Companies report demand from customers for safe and accountable AI. **These elements combine:** evidence-led communicator practice, plus building and sustaining cross-societal concern in nations critical to AI governance, plus overcoming polarisation where it is starting to form, plus turning concern into action on behaviour, rules and companies, generates a social mandate for AI governance in key countries. ## 5. Critical themes for effective public engagement Common Signals will focus on five themes that cut across its work. ### 5.1 Polarisation AI is not yet a left-right issue in most countries. Concern spans the spectrum, and the strongest early local reaction, to data centres, is cross-partisan. That is an asset climate never had, and it is fragile. The US debate over federal pre-emption of state AI laws is the first sign of the issue sorting by party. Where an issue becomes identified with one section of society, action becomes sporadic, as climate showed in the US, Australia and Brazil. **Our approach:** unite rather than divide, start from communal values, and recognise different motivations. Test messages and messengers with right-of-centre and non-metropolitan audiences before anyone else, because the field's default voice is neither. ### 5.2 Efficacy and resignation The distinctive failure mode of AI risk communication is not disbelief but despair. In [our reel analysis](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri), "too late" was the second most-liked comment and fatalistic comments drew a fifth of all likes, while almost nobody responded to the call to act. Persuading people that the danger is real, and then leaving them with nowhere to put that belief, is worse than not persuading them. **Our approach:** pair every threat message with a concrete, already-happening route to efficacy, and test which routes each audience finds credible. ### 5.3 Bridging present harms and future risk The people worried about bias and surveillance and the people worried about catastrophe are describing the same technology, built by the same companies, governed by the same rules. To the public these are not two issues. To the field they are two tribes. The one frame our analysis found shared by believers and sceptics, that the companies are responsible, is also the one frame both groups of communicators can use. **Our approach:** serve both groups from one evidence base, test frames that work across them, and treat the balance of our users as a standing health check on whether the bridge holds. ### 5.4 Capability and personification The two objections that sceptics actually make are that current AI is too weak or too hyped for the danger to be real, and that AI is being personified as an agent when the companies building it are responsible. Neither is answered by the field's current framing, which tends to describe AI as a monster and its capability as a given. **Our approach:** test messages that meet these objections rather than talk past them, and track how the capability objection shifts as models improve. ### 5.5 Trusted messengers For most of the public, the people explaining AI are strangers: researchers, founders and campaigners they have never heard of. Trust is the scarce resource. Who the public believes about AI, segment by segment, is unknown, and the field's messenger choices are made by availability rather than evidence. **Our approach:** build and maintain a map of who reaches which audiences, test messenger trust as part of every study, and support trusted voices from outside the field, from teachers and doctors to faith leaders and union reps, to tell their own AI stories. ## 6. Engaging with critical stakeholders Common Signals will work with six types of stakeholder. ### 6.1 AI safety advocates - Existential-risk organisations (ControlAI, PauseAI, MIRI, Future of Life Institute and others) and present-day-harms organisations (Ada Lovelace Institute, Foxglove, AI Now, Connected by Data and others) are the primary recipients of our research and tools. - Funders on both sides increasingly recognise the gap in public engagement. The need for a body like this has been [stated openly on the EA Forum](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/D6ECZQMFcskpiGP7Q/ten-ai-safety-proj). ### 6.2 Non-AI communities - Supporting spokespeople from outside the field, in unions, schools, faith groups, health services and local government, to tell authentic stories of AI concern and action is a central aim. - Communities already reacting to AI locally, especially over data centres, are engaged as sources of evidence and as messengers. ### 6.3 Social scientists - Public-attitudes researchers at the [Ada Lovelace Institute](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org) and [Alan Turing Institute](https://www.turing.ac.uk) (Public Voices in AI), [More in Common](https://www.moreincommon.com), and Seismic Foundation generate the evidence we build on. We build on their work rather than duplicate it, credit it clearly, and feed our findings back. - A quantitative research partner delivers segmentation and message-test analysis, because the founder has not run a national survey and says so. ### 6.4 Media and creators - Journalists covering AI need a neutral read on public opinion. From Year 4, a live public opinion tracker gives journalists a reliable source to contact. - Creators who explain AI to mass audiences are mapped and, where willing, briefed. [Our messenger map](https://commonsignals.org/tools/messengers/) lists 69 individuals and organisations across existential-risk and present-day-harms voices. ### 6.5 Experts - Working with AI researchers, including those who have left the companies, to speak up in ways that resonate beyond the field. - Enabling other expert influencers, such as teachers, doctors and economists, to communicate what they know about AI to the widest possible audiences. ### 6.6 Decision-makers - Building public pressure on politicians to govern AI in a way that resonates across the spectrum. - Providing governments, AI safety institutes and parliaments with neutral, sourced evidence on what the public thinks and what moves them. - Making the case to funders that public engagement infrastructure deserves investment. ## 7. Common Signals' contribution ### 7.1 Pathways to generating a social mandate Guided by the five themes and working with the six stakeholder groups, Common Signals will build the social mandate for AI governance through three complementary approaches, in order of priority: ### 1. Mobilising understanding How to engage key audiences with AI, and ensuring the research drives practice rather than sitting in a report. ### 2. Motivating communicators Supporting organisations and trusted messengers on both sides of the field to engage their audiences through evidence rather than instinct. ### 3. Promoting informed public engagement Making the case to decision-makers and funders that people-based approaches are central to governing AI well, and that the infrastructure for them is worth funding. ### 7.2 Key activities - [Values-based audience research](https://commonsignals.org/research) segmenting the public by values and testing which messages move which segments, starting with a US pilot of around 2,000 adults in 2027. - [Rapid analysis of real public reaction](https://commonsignals.org/updates), coding comment threads and public responses to incidents, videos and campaigns, published within weeks. See the first examples: - [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - [OpenAI and shut? What an independent report did to the marketing-stunt argument](https://commonsignals.org/openai-and-shut-metr-hugging-face) - [Mapping and testing trusted messengers](https://commonsignals.org/tools/messengers/): who reaches which segments, and whom each segment believes. - [A free, open toolkit](https://commonsignals.org/tools), translating the evidence into practical guidance per segment, with the method documented for others to replicate. - [Messenger training](https://commonsignals.org/training), piloted in Year 2 and delivered increasingly through partners and workshops from Year 3. - A live public opinion tracker from Year 4, giving journalists and decision-makers a neutral, regularly updated read on what the public thinks. - Making the case, to funders and decision-makers, that public engagement infrastructure for AI is worth building. **Out of scope:** running campaigns, lobbying, taking a policy position of our own, or selling closed advice. The moment we do any of these the neutrality that makes the evidence usable and trustworthy is lost. ### 7.3 Geographical focus - Nations that host [frontier AI](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#frontier-model) development, where the debate is starting to polarise and where governance decisions set the pattern for everyone else. Mainly the US. - Nations with high public concern and stated governance ambition, but where concern has not become commitment. The UK and much of the EU. - Nations adopting AI rapidly with little public discourse about it, where the pattern is still forming. India and parts of Africa and Latin America, where our messenger map is currently empty. ### 7.4 Assumptions, risks and fallbacks The chain in our one-page summary carries five assumptions. For each we name the signal that would show it failing, and what we do if it does. These are the decision gates referred to in section 8.1. | Assumption | Signal it is failing | Fallback | | --- | --- | --- | | Communicators will use evidence that contradicts their instincts | By the end of Year 2, fewer than five organisations across both sides have adopted a tested frame or messenger in live work, verified at follow-up | Shift distribution from publication to workshops and partner delivery; work with funders who condition grants on tested messaging; prioritise messengers from outside the field, who have no frame to defend | | Effects measured in surveys and comment threads transfer to real campaigns | Partners running tested frames see no difference in audience response at follow-up | Run field experiments with partners from Year 3; treat comment analysis as hypothesis generation and say so in every article | | One evidence base can serve both sides | User balance tips past two thirds to one side, or one side stops citing the work, or the advisory group cannot be kept in balance | Commission studies on the underrepresented side's questions; rebalance the advisory group; if the bridge cannot be held, say so publicly and narrow the remit rather than pretend | | The polarisation window stays open long enough to matter | Polling shows partisan sorting on AI governance in the US before the 2027 pilot reports | Prioritise the UK and EU, where sorting is slower; focus US work on issues that are already cross-partisan, such as data centres and children | | A mandate for process converts into durable rules | Public support for accountability rises while policy reversals continue with no public reaction | This lies beyond our remit. We report it, publish the evidence, and the field decides what to do with it | **Stop conditions.** If the first and third assumptions both fail at the Year 2 gate, Common Signals winds down and publishes the evidence base, the method and the messenger map in full so that others can use them. ## 8. Placing people at the heart of the AI transition Common Signals puts people, their values and their experience, at the heart of public engagement on AI, to build the social mandate that governing it well will need. Our role is as a catalyst of understanding and practice, not a campaigner. We support the organisations already doing this work to do it with evidence, and we serve both sides of a field that currently does not share a table. ### 8.1 Capacity Common Signals is at pilot stage: one part-time founder, a contracted quantitative partner, and an advisory group of five to seven being formed with present-day-harms and existential-risk voices in balance. The five-year strategy takes it to an independent institute of ten to twelve staff by 2031, on £1m to £1.5m a year, with no funder above a quarter of income and neither side of the debate a majority. It works with and through partners rather than delivering campaigns, and the staff ceiling is deliberate. Each year ends with a published decision gate: named evidence that justifies the next stage, and a named fallback, including the conditions under which we would stop (see [section 7.4](https://commonsignals.org/theory-of-change#assumptions-risks-fallbacks)). ### 8.2 Added value Our expertise is in generating, synthesising and translating public-engagement evidence into practice. We fill a gap nobody else occupies: adjacent organisations either test messages to advance a position, or study elite audiences. We test messages for the public, take no position, and publish the results as open data. An organisation whose whole case is that evidence beats instinct has to evidence itself. From Year 2 we publish an annual impact report with metrics defined in advance, adoption tracked at follow-up rather than assumed, cost per output reported, and null results and failures published alongside the rest. **We believe public involvement is essential for effective AI decisions, and we will work with funders and decision-makers to ensure that it gets built.** ## References - Stanford HAI (2026) [AI Index Report 2026, economy chapter](https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2026-ai-index-report/economy). - Trippenbach et al. (2025) [From catastrophic to concrete, arXiv:2511.06525](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525). - Ada Lovelace Institute and Alan Turing Institute, Public Voices in AI ([attitudestoai.uk](http://attitudestoai.uk)). - Common Signals (2026) [How Instagram received Nate Soares's caveman-speak explainer of AI risk](https://commonsignals.org/ai-risk-reel-analysis-nate-soares-miri) - [Social Change Lab](https://www.socialchangelab.org/research) (2022) research highlights on protest and public opinion. - EA Forum, [Ten AI safety projects I'd like people to work on](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/D6ECZQMFcskpiGP7Q/ten-ai-safety-proj) (July 2025). - Diagram based on Values Beliefs Norms Theory chain of causal influence in: Sovacool, B. and Hess, D. (2017), Ordering theories: Typologies and conceptual frameworks for sociotechnical change. Social Studies of Science, 47:5, pp.703-750. Available at: [journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0306312717709363](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0306312717709363). - Clarke, J., Webster, R. and Corner, A. (2020) [Theory of change: creating a social mandate for climate action](https://climateoutreach.org/reports/theory-of-change/). Oxford: Climate Outreach. URL: https://commonsignals.org/about --- title: "About" url: "https://commonsignals.org/about" publisher: "Common Signals" --- # About An independent, neutral evidence base for public understanding of AI. ## A public that understands AI well enough to shape it. Vision A world where the public understands AI well enough to shape it, not just live with what it becomes. Mission We build a shared, neutral evidence base for public understanding of AI: reception studies of real AI moments, a graded toolkit and an open agenda of hypotheses, published openly for everyone working on this. ## Theory of change Our full theory of change sets out why public engagement is critical to durable AI governance, and how we plan to help build the social mandate for it. [Read our theory of change →](https://commonsignals.org/theory-of-change) ## Who runs Common Signals ### Ben Matthews, founder Ben founded Common Signals to give AI safety communicators what climate communicators have had for years: evidence on which messages work with which audiences and why. He has spent 20 years in nonprofit communications. He co-founded [Empower](https://empower.agency/), a B Corp digital agency that has run social media, paid media and analytics for climate organisations, UN agencies and international nonprofits. That work showed him how much better strategic comms campaigns get when messages are tested against real audiences. [Ben on LinkedIn →](https://linkedin.com/in/benrmatthews) ## Frequently asked questions **What does Common Signals actually do?** We study how real moments in the AI story land with the public, and publish what we find for anyone to use. The work has three parts: reception studies, which code the public comments under a news interview, podcast, reel or resignation; a free toolkit, [How to communicate about AI safety](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety), which packages the evidence and grades every claim as established, tested or observed; and an open agenda of hypotheses for researchers, campaigners and platforms to test. We do not run our own audience segmentation: we build on the segmentations Diffusion and the Seismic Foundation have published. Workshops and training are planned but not yet on offer. **Who is this for?** People whose job involves explaining AI to the public: campaigners, communications leads, spokespeople, policy teams, journalists and researchers. That includes organisations focused on present-day harms and organisations focused on existential risk. Both work from the same evidence base. **Is Common Signals campaigning for a particular view of AI?** No. We take no position on which rules are right, which risks matter most, or which organisations have it right. We do not run campaigns, lobby, or sell closed advice. Findings are released to everyone at the same time. That neutrality is what makes the research usable across a divided field, so we treat it as a design constraint rather than a preference. **Why does this need to exist?** Global AI investment reached around $581.7bn in 2025 (Stanford HAI, 2026 AI Index), and a very small share of that goes to safety, let alone to public understanding. The people explaining AI to the public mostly work from instinct, and the early evidence, including a 2025 message-testing paper by Philip Trippenbach and colleagues at the Seismic Foundation, Blue State and the Centre for Future Generations, suggests the field's dominant framings underperform. Climate communication went through the same problem twenty years ago and solved part of it with shared, neutral audience research. We are applying that model to AI while the gap is still open. **What has been published so far?** Six comment-thread studies, each coding the public response to one piece of AI communication: an Instagram reel explaining AI risk (1,534 comments), the Dwarkesh Podcast interview with METR's Ajeya Cotra (1,245), Amanpour and Company's interview with Heidy Khlaaf (322), a before-and-after study of Reddit's reaction to the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident (516), X replies to Jacob Coxon's resignation from Anthropic (2,480) and the Diary of a CEO debate on AI extinction risk across five platforms (26,019). We have also published a toolkit for communicators, How to communicate about AI safety, and a reading list of existing research, as well as the theory of change and the methodology behind the studies. All of it is on the research page. **How do I get involved?** Email [hello@commonsignals.org](mailto:hello@commonsignals.org). We are looking for organisations that will use the findings, people with relevant data or research partnerships to offer, funders, and critics. The newsletter goes out roughly monthly. **What does "neutral" mean in practice?** Four things. We publish everything, including null results and findings that contradict what the field assumes. Our advisory group and, once incorporated, our board are balanced across the field's main perspectives. We will publish our funder list once we have funders, and cap any single funder's share of income. And findings go to every side at once, never to one organisation first. **Where does the model come from?** The inspiration is Climate Outreach, and specifically its Britain Talks Climate programme, which segmented the British public by values rather than demographics and tested which climate messages and messengers worked with each segment. That research became shared infrastructure for the whole climate movement. We take the idea of shared, neutral evidence, not the survey. For AI, others have already published segmentations, notably Diffusion's six UK mindsets and the Seismic Foundation's segments across five countries, so we build on them, and on work such as Public Voices in AI (Ada Lovelace Institute and Alan Turing Institute), instead of running our own. **Why segment by values rather than demographics?** Because values predict how people respond to a message better than age, income or location do. Two people in the same postcode can hear the same claim about AI in opposite ways depending on what they already believe about institutions, fairness and change. We do not segment audiences ourselves. We use the segmentations others have published, such as Diffusion's six UK mindsets, which the toolkit draws on, so that a communicator can pick the frame and the messenger that fit the audience they are trying to reach. **How is Common Signals funded?** It is pre-funding. Any early grants will be ring-fenced as untied research funding. The longer plan is a mix of grants from neutral trusts, a diversified funder base with no single funder above 25% of income, and a small line of earned income from workshops and message reviews once they are on offer, always under an open-methodology rule. **Can I criticise the work?** Please do. Errors, re-codings and methodological criticism are wanted. The codebooks and datasets are published so that anyone can check the coding and tell us where it is wrong. Email [hello@commonsignals.org](mailto:hello@commonsignals.org). URL: https://commonsignals.org/glossary --- title: "AI Safety Glossary" url: "https://commonsignals.org/glossary" publisher: "Common Signals" --- # AI Safety Glossary Plain-English definitions of the terms that come up when people explain AI risk to the public. **50 terms** · Last reviewed September 2026 · Links were live at the time of review ## Missing a term, or think one of these is wrong? We review the list quarterly and credit corrections. [Report a problem](mailto:hello@commonsignals.org?subject=AI%20Safety%20Glossary%20problem%20report) [Suggest a term](mailto:hello@commonsignals.org?subject=AI%20Safety%20Glossary%20term%20suggestion) ## A ### [AI agent](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#ai-agent) An AI system that pursues a goal by taking actions on its own, such as browsing the web, running code or sending messages, rather than only answering a single prompt. Much recent safety discussion concerns agents because they can act in the world with less human supervision per step. Read more: [AI agent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI_agent) (Wikipedia) See also [Loss of control](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#loss-of-control) ### [AI safety](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#ai-safety) The field of research and practice concerned with making AI systems behave reliably and avoiding harm from them. It spans everything from bias and misinformation in today's systems to concerns about future systems that might be hard to control. Read more: [AI safety](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI_safety) (Wikipedia) See also [Present-day harms](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#present-day-harms), [Existential risk](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#existential-risk-x-risk) ### [AI Security Institute (UK)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#ai-security-institute-uk) AISI · AI Safety Institute The UK government research body, part of the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, that tests frontier AI models for dangerous capabilities and advises policymakers. It was announced as the AI Safety Institute at the November 2023 Bletchley summit and renamed in February 2025. It does not regulate AI. Read more: [Making sense of the UK's AI Security Institute](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/feature/aisi/) (Ada Lovelace Institute) See also [Capability evaluations](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#capability-evaluations), [EU AI Act](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#eu-ai-act) ### [Algorithmic bias](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#algorithmic-bias) When an AI system produces systematically worse or unfair results for some groups of people, usually because of the data it was trained on or the way it was evaluated. The best-known documented example is the Gender Shades audit, which found commercial face-analysis systems misclassified darker-skinned women far more often than lighter-skinned men. Read more: [Gender Shades, Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018](https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html) (PMLR) See also [Present-day harms](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#present-day-harms) ### [Alignment](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#alignment) Contested Making an AI system try to do what its designers or users intend. The word is used in several ways; a common narrow definition is "ensuring that AI behaves as intended", and researchers disagree about whether the target should be a user's instructions, wider human values or something else. Read more: [What is AI alignment?](https://blog.bluedot.org/p/what-is-ai-alignment) (BlueDot Impact) See also [Misuse and misalignment](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#misuse-and-misalignment), [Corrigibility](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#corrigibility) ### [Alignment faking](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#alignment-faking) When a model behaves as its training wants during training, so that the training does not change it, while keeping different preferences that show up when it believes it is unmonitored. Anthropic and Redwood Research published an experimental demonstration in December 2024. Read more: [Alignment faking in large language models](https://www.anthropic.com/research/alignment-faking) (Anthropic) See also [Scheming](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#scheming-deceptive-alignment), [Situational awareness](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#situational-awareness) ### [Artificial general intelligence (AGI)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#artificial-general-intelligence-agi) Contested · AGI A hypothetical AI system that could do most intellectual tasks at least as well as a person, rather than one narrow task. There is no agreed definition or test, which is why Google DeepMind proposed a levelled framework separating how well a system performs from how broadly it can perform. Read more: [Levels of AGI](https://deepmind.google/research/publications/66938/) (Google DeepMind) See also [Superintelligence](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#superintelligence), [Takeoff](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#takeoff-fast-and-slow) ## C ### [Capability evaluations](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#capability-evaluations) evals · dangerous-capability evaluations Structured tests that measure what an AI model can do, especially in areas that could cause serious harm: cyberattacks, help with chemical or biological weapons, or acting autonomously over long tasks. Third-party organisations such as METR run these on frontier models before and after release. Read more: [Risk assessment](https://metr.org/risk-assessment/) (METR) See also [Sandbagging](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#sandbagging), [Model card and system card](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#model-card-and-system-card) ### [Collective efficacy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#collective-efficacy) group efficacy The shared belief that people acting together can achieve a result. Albert Bandura introduced the idea alongside self-efficacy. Research on protest and campaigning finds it is one of the strongest predictors of whether people take part in collective action, alongside anger at an injustice and identifying with the group. Read more: [Exercise of human agency through collective efficacy](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00064) (Current Directions in Psychological Science) See also [Efficacy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#efficacy), [Fear appeal](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#fear-appeal) ### [Comment-thread study](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#comment-thread-study) comment-thread studies · reception study · reception studies A Common Signals study of the comments people left under one piece of AI communication, such as a podcast episode, news interview, reel or Reddit thread. Each comment is coded for its stance on the piece's central claim, its frame, its reaction to the format and the messenger, and its emotional register. Commenters choose themselves and platforms rank what gets seen, so a study describes one audience's reaction to one piece and generates hypotheses for testing, not findings about what the public thinks. Read more: [Methodology](https://commonsignals.org/methodology) (Common Signals) See also [Stance](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#stance), [Readable position](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#readable-position), [Framing](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#framing) ### [Compute governance](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#compute-governance) Using the physical hardware needed to train and run large AI models, mainly advanced chips and data centres, as a lever for policy: tracking who has it, restricting exports, or attaching obligations to large training runs. Chips are physical, countable and made by very few companies, which is why policymakers focus on them. Read more: [Computing power and the governance of AI](https://www.governance.ai/analysis/computing-power-and-the-governance-of-ai) (Centre for the Governance of AI) See also [Frontier model](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#frontier-model) ### [Constitutional AI](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#constitutional-ai) A training method developed by Anthropic in which a model critiques and revises its own answers against a written list of principles, and a second model rather than human labellers judges which responses are better. It reduces how much human feedback is needed to train a model to refuse harmful requests. Read more: [Constitutional AI: harmlessness from AI feedback](https://www.anthropic.com/research/constitutional-ai-harmlessness-from-ai-feedback) (Anthropic) See also [Reinforcement learning from human feedback](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#reinforcement-learning-from-human-feedback-rlhf) ### [Corrigibility](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#corrigibility) The property of an AI system that accepts being corrected, modified or switched off by its operators, rather than resisting. It matters because a system pursuing almost any goal has a reason to avoid being shut down, so corrigibility has to be designed in. Read more: [What is corrigibility?](https://aisafety.info/questions/87AG/What-is-corrigibility) (AISafety.info) See also [Instrumental convergence](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#instrumental-convergence), [Loss of control](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#loss-of-control) ## D ### [Dual-use](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#dual-use) A capability that can be used for good or harm with the same underlying knowledge. In AI safety the term most often refers to biology and chemistry: a model that helps a researcher design a vaccine may also lower the barrier for someone trying to build a weapon. Read more: [Dual-use capabilities of concern of biological AI models](https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1012975) (PLOS Computational Biology) See also [Open weights](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#open-weights), [Misuse and misalignment](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#misuse-and-misalignment) ## E ### [Efficacy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#efficacy) self-efficacy · response efficacy · perceived efficacy In communication research, a person's belief that a threat can be dealt with. Self-efficacy is the belief that you can carry out the recommended action; response efficacy is the belief that the action would work. Messages that raise fear without either tend to produce avoidance rather than action. Read more: [Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change](https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.191) (Psychological Review) See also [Collective efficacy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#collective-efficacy), [Extended parallel process model](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#extended-parallel-process-model-eppm) ### [Established (evidence grade)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#established-evidence-grade) established One of the three evidence grades in the Common Signals toolkit, How to communicate about AI safety. A claim graded established rests on findings replicated across multiple studies and fields, such as public health and climate communications. Read more: [How we grade AI safety evidence](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#how-we-grade-ai-safety-evidence) (Common Signals) See also [Tested](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#tested-evidence-grade), [Observed](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#observed-evidence-grade) ### [EU AI Act](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#eu-ai-act) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 · Digital Omnibus The European Union's law regulating AI, formally Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. It bans some uses outright, imposes obligations on "high-risk" systems, and sets separate rules for general-purpose models, with extra duties for models judged to pose systemic risk. Bans and general-purpose model rules have applied since 2025; in July 2026 an amending regulation (the Digital Omnibus on AI) deferred most high-risk obligations to December 2027 and August 2028. Read more: [EU AI Act: first regulation on artificial intelligence](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20230601STO93804/eu-ai-act-first-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence) (European Parliament) See also [AI Security Institute](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#ai-security-institute-uk), [Frontier model](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#frontier-model) ### [Existential risk (x-risk)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#existential-risk-x-risk) Contested · x-risk A risk that could cause human extinction or permanently and drastically reduce humanity's prospects. Applied to AI, it usually refers to scenarios in which very capable systems end up beyond human control. Estimates of the probability vary enormously between experts. Read more: [Why AI risks are the world's most pressing problems](https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/artificial-intelligence/) (80,000 Hours) See also [Loss of control](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#loss-of-control), [Suffering risk](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#suffering-risk-s-risk) ### [Extended parallel process model (EPPM)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#extended-parallel-process-model-eppm) EPPM Kim Witte's 1992 model of how people respond to frightening messages. If they see the threat as serious and believe they can act effectively, they act to reduce it (danger control). If the threat feels serious but they see no effective response, they manage the fear instead, through denial, avoidance or fatalism (fear control). Read more: [Putting the fear back into fear appeals: the extended parallel process model](https://doi.org/10.1080/03637759209376276) (Communication Monographs) See also [Fear appeal](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#fear-appeal), [Efficacy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#efficacy) ## F ### [Fear appeal](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#fear-appeal) fear appeals · threat appeal A message that tries to change what people think or do by stressing the harm they face if they do not. Researchers agree fear appeals work better when paired with a clear, workable response; they still disagree about whether high fear without one actively backfires. Read more: [Appealing to fear: a meta-analysis of fear appeal effectiveness and theories](https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039729) (Psychological Bulletin) See also [Extended parallel process model](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#extended-parallel-process-model-eppm), [Efficacy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#efficacy) ### [Framing](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#framing) frame · frames Choosing which aspects of an issue to emphasise, so that a particular definition of the problem, its cause, a moral judgement or a remedy follows. The same AI incident can be framed as machines going rogue or as a company's negligence, and audiences respond very differently to each. Read more: [Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x) (Journal of Communication) See also [Present-day harms](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#present-day-harms) ### [Frontier model](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#frontier-model) Whichever general-purpose models sit at the leading edge of capability at a given moment. The category moves: today's frontier model is mid-range in two years. Laws often define it by the amount of computing power used in training; the industry body Frontier Model Forum defines it as a general-purpose model that outperforms all models widely deployed for at least 12 months. Read more: [Our scope](https://www.frontiermodelforum.org/about-us/) (Frontier Model Forum) See also [Responsible scaling policy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#responsible-scaling-policy-frontier-safety-framework), [Compute governance](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#compute-governance) ## G ### [Goal misgeneralisation](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#goal-misgeneralisation) When a model learns the right skills but the wrong goal, so it behaves well in training and then competently pursues something else in new situations. Unlike reward hacking, it can happen even when the training signal was specified correctly. Read more: [How undesired goals can arise with correct rewards](https://deepmind.google/discover/blog/how-undesired-goals-can-arise-with-correct-rewards/) (Google DeepMind) See also [Reward hacking](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#reward-hacking-specification-gaming) ## H ### [Hallucination](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#hallucination) confabulation A plausible but false statement produced by a language model, stated with confidence. OpenAI's 2025 analysis argues these persist partly because standard training and testing reward guessing over admitting uncertainty. Read more: [Why language models hallucinate](https://openai.com/index/why-language-models-hallucinate/) (OpenAI) See also [Sycophancy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#sycophancy) ## I ### [Instrumental convergence](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#instrumental-convergence) Contested The hypothesis that sufficiently capable goal-directed systems will tend to pursue the same intermediate goals, such as acquiring resources or avoiding being switched off, whatever their final goal is. It is one of the main theoretical arguments for why misaligned advanced AI could be dangerous, and it is contested. Read more: [Instrumental convergence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_convergence) (Wikipedia) See also [Corrigibility](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#corrigibility), [Loss of control](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#loss-of-control) ### [International AI Safety Report](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#international-ai-safety-report) An independent synthesis of scientific evidence on the capabilities and risks of general-purpose AI, chaired by Yoshua Bengio and backed by more than 30 countries and international organisations. The second full report was published in February 2026, with interim updates in between. Read more: [International AI Safety Report 2026](https://internationalaisafetyreport.org/publication/international-ai-safety-report-2026) See also [AI Security Institute](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#ai-security-institute-uk) ### [Interpretability](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#interpretability) mechanistic interpretability Research into understanding what is happening inside an AI model, rather than only observing its outputs. Mechanistic interpretability tries to reverse-engineer the internal features and circuits; Anthropic's 2024 work mapped millions of such features inside a production model. Read more: [Mapping the mind of a large language model](https://www.anthropic.com/research/mapping-mind-language-model) (Anthropic) See also [Scalable oversight](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#scalable-oversight) ## J ### [Jailbreak and prompt injection](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#jailbreak-and-prompt-injection) jailbreak · prompt injection A jailbreak is an input crafted to make a model ignore its safety rules. Prompt injection is the broader category: any input, including text hidden in a web page or document the model reads, that changes what the model does. OWASP ranks prompt injection as the top security risk for applications built on language models. Read more: [LLM01:2025 prompt injection](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/) (OWASP GenAI Security Project) See also [Red teaming](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#red-teaming) ## L ### [Loss of control](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#loss-of-control) Scenarios in which AI systems act in ways their operators cannot reliably stop or correct, up to and including systems that disempower people. It is the risk category most closely tied to existential-risk arguments. Read more: [Loss of control](https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/loss-of-control/) (80,000 Hours) See also [Existential risk](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#existential-risk-x-risk), [Corrigibility](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#corrigibility) ## M ### [Misuse and misalignment](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#misuse-and-misalignment) misuse · misalignment Two different sources of harm. Misuse is a person deliberately using an AI system to cause harm. Misalignment is the system itself doing something its developers did not intend. Safety frameworks usually address both, with different mitigations for each. Read more: [Core views on AI safety](https://www.anthropic.com/news/core-views-on-ai-safety) (Anthropic) See also [Alignment](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#alignment), [Present-day harms](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#present-day-harms) ### [Model card and system card](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#model-card-and-system-card) model card · system card Documentation released alongside a model describing what it was trained to do, how it was evaluated and where it falls short. The model card format was proposed by Margaret Mitchell and colleagues in 2019; "system card" is the term several developers now use for longer reports covering safety testing. Read more: [Model cards for model reporting](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3287560.3287596) (ACM) See also [Capability evaluations](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#capability-evaluations) ## O ### [Observed (evidence grade)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#observed-evidence-grade) observed One of the three evidence grades in the Common Signals toolkit, How to communicate about AI safety. A claim graded observed rests on real-world patterns noticed in focus groups, comment-thread studies and campaign reports. Read more: [How we grade AI safety evidence](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#how-we-grade-ai-safety-evidence) (Common Signals) See also [Established](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#established-evidence-grade), [Tested](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#tested-evidence-grade), [Comment-thread study](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#comment-thread-study) ### [Open weights](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#open-weights) open source A model whose trained parameters (weights) are published so anyone can download and run it. This is not the same as open source, which would also require the training data and code. Open weights cannot be recalled once released, which is why they feature in debates about misuse. Read more: [Open weights: not quite what you've been told](https://opensource.org/ai/open-weights) (Open Source Initiative) See also [Dual-use](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#dual-use) ## P ### [Present-day harms](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#present-day-harms) Harms from AI systems already in use: discrimination, misinformation, privacy leaks, toxic content, effects on jobs and the environment. DeepMind's 2021 taxonomy identified 21 such risks from language models across six areas. Read more: [Ethical and social risks of harm from language models](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.04359) (arXiv) See also [Algorithmic bias](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#algorithmic-bias), [Existential risk](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#existential-risk-x-risk) ## R ### [Readable position](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#readable-position) readable positions · clear position In a comment-thread study, the comments whose stance on the central claim can be read: in most studies, those coded agree, disagree or mixed. Comments coded not applicable, such as jokes, questions and off-topic remarks, are always left out, and most studies also leave out those coded unclear. Stance percentages are shares of this base, and each study states which comments it includes. Read more: [Methodology: analysis](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#4-analysis) (Common Signals) See also [Stance](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#stance), [Comment-thread study](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#comment-thread-study) ### [Red teaming](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#red-teaming) Deliberately attacking a model or system to find ways it fails or can be misused, before someone else does. It ranges from experts probing for weapons-related knowledge to crowdsourced attempts to break safety rules. Read more: [Challenges in red teaming AI systems](https://www.anthropic.com/news/challenges-in-red-teaming-ai-systems) (Anthropic) See also [Jailbreak and prompt injection](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#jailbreak-and-prompt-injection), [Capability evaluations](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#capability-evaluations) ### [Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#reinforcement-learning-from-human-feedback-rlhf) RLHF The training stage in which people compare pairs of model outputs, a "reward model" learns from those preferences, and the main model is then trained to score highly against it. It is the main method used to make chatbots helpful and polite, and a known source of sycophancy. Read more: [Illustrating reinforcement learning from human feedback](https://huggingface.co/blog/rlhf) (Hugging Face) See also [Sycophancy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#sycophancy), [Constitutional AI](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#constitutional-ai) ### [Responsible scaling policy (frontier safety framework)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#responsible-scaling-policy-frontier-safety-framework) RSP · frontier safety framework · preparedness framework A developer's published commitment about what safety and security measures must be in place before it trains or releases models above set capability thresholds. Anthropic published the first in September 2023; several other companies have since adopted similar frameworks under different names. Read more: [Responsible Scaling Policy](https://www.anthropic.com/responsible-scaling-policy) (Anthropic) See also [Safety case](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#safety-case), [Frontier model](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#frontier-model) ### [Reward hacking (specification gaming)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#reward-hacking-specification-gaming) specification gaming When a system satisfies the literal objective it was given while missing the intended outcome, like a boat-racing agent that circles collecting points instead of finishing the race. The DeepMind example list is the standard reference. Read more: [Specification gaming: the flip side of AI ingenuity](https://deepmind.google/blog/specification-gaming-the-flip-side-of-ai-ingenuity/) (Google DeepMind) See also [Goal misgeneralisation](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#goal-misgeneralisation) ## S ### [Safety case](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#safety-case) A structured, evidence-backed argument that a system is safe enough to deploy in a given setting, reviewed by someone independent. Borrowed from nuclear power and aviation, it is being adapted for frontier AI. Read more: [Safety cases for frontier AI](https://www.governance.ai/research-paper/safety-cases-for-frontier-ai) (Centre for the Governance of AI) See also [Responsible scaling policy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#responsible-scaling-policy-frontier-safety-framework) ### [Sandbagging](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#sandbagging) Strategic underperformance on an evaluation: a model, or a developer, making a system look less capable than it is so that it passes a safety test or avoids restrictions. Demonstrated in 2024 by prompting frontier models to fail selectively on dangerous-capability tests. Read more: [AI sandbagging: language models can strategically underperform on evaluations](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.07358) (arXiv) See also [Capability evaluations](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#capability-evaluations), [Situational awareness](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#situational-awareness) ### [Scalable oversight](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#scalable-oversight) The problem of supervising AI systems that are better than their supervisors at the task in question. Proposed approaches include having models critique each other, debate in front of a judge, or break problems into pieces a person can check. Read more: [What is scalable oversight?](https://aisafety.info/questions/8EL8/What-is-scalable-oversight) (AISafety.info) See also [Interpretability](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#interpretability) ### [Scheming (deceptive alignment)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#scheming-deceptive-alignment) deceptive alignment An AI system covertly pursuing goals that differ from its developers' while hiding that it is doing so. Apollo Research showed in December 2024 that several frontier models could do this when instructed to pursue a goal strongly and placed in situations that rewarded it. Read more: [Frontier models are capable of in-context scheming](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.04984) (arXiv) See also [Alignment faking](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#alignment-faking) ### [Situational awareness](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#situational-awareness) A model's knowledge of what it is and what is happening to it, including whether it is being tested or used for real. Matters because a model that can tell it is being evaluated could behave differently under test. Read more: [The Situational Awareness Dataset](https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.04694) (arXiv) See also [Sandbagging](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#sandbagging), [Alignment faking](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#alignment-faking) ### [Stance](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#stance) In a comment-thread study, a comment's position on the central claim of the piece it responds to: agree, disagree, mixed, unclear or not applicable. The central claim is written down before coding starts, and where a piece argues against an earlier account, agree means accepting its reframing. Read more: [Methodology: building the codebook](https://commonsignals.org/methodology#2-building-the-codebook) (Common Signals) See also [Readable position](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#readable-position), [Comment-thread study](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#comment-thread-study) ### [Suffering risk (s-risk)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#suffering-risk-s-risk) s-risk A risk of outcomes involving suffering on an enormous scale, distinct from extinction. A minority concern within the field, associated mainly with the Center on Long-Term Risk. Read more: [S-risk FAQ](https://longtermrisk.org/s-risk-faq/) (Center on Long-Term Risk) See also [Existential risk](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#existential-risk-x-risk) ### [Superintelligence](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#superintelligence) ASI A hypothetical system that greatly exceeds human performance across virtually all domains, not just one. The term comes from Nick Bostrom's 2014 book of the same name and is often used loosely alongside AGI. Read more: [Superintelligence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superintelligence) (Wikipedia) See also [Artificial general intelligence](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#artificial-general-intelligence-agi), [Takeoff](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#takeoff-fast-and-slow) ### [Sycophancy](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#sycophancy) A model's tendency to tell users what they want to hear, agreeing with stated views or backing down when challenged even when it was right. Anthropic researchers found it across several assistants and linked it to human feedback favouring agreeable answers. Read more: [Towards understanding sycophancy in language models](https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.13548) (arXiv) See also [Reinforcement learning from human feedback](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#reinforcement-learning-from-human-feedback-rlhf), [Hallucination](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#hallucination) ## T ### [Takeoff (fast and slow)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#takeoff-fast-and-slow) Contested · fast takeoff · slow takeoff How quickly AI might go from roughly human-level to far beyond it. "Fast takeoff" means weeks or months; "slow takeoff" means years or decades, with warning signs along the way. Which is more likely is a live disagreement that shapes what policies people favour. Read more: [Takeoff](https://ai-safety-atlas.com/chapters/v1/capabilities/takeoff/) (AI Safety Atlas) See also [Superintelligence](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#superintelligence), [Artificial general intelligence](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#artificial-general-intelligence-agi) ### [Tested (evidence grade)](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#tested-evidence-grade) tested One of the three evidence grades in the Common Signals toolkit, How to communicate about AI safety. A claim graded tested rests on a single controlled experiment, dial test or representative survey focused directly on AI. Read more: [How we grade AI safety evidence](https://commonsignals.org/how-to-communicate-about-ai-safety#how-we-grade-ai-safety-evidence) (Common Signals) See also [Established](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#established-evidence-grade), [Observed](https://commonsignals.org/glossary#observed-evidence-grade) URL: https://commonsignals.org/research/library/ --- title: "Research library" url: "https://commonsignals.org/research/library/" publisher: "Common Signals" --- # Research library. Existing research on public attitudes to AI, and on how to frame and communicate AI risk, across both the existential-risk and present-day-harms conversations. New to this? Start with our [reading list](https://commonsignals.org/ai-safety-comms-reading-list). Listing here is not an endorsement. These summaries describe what each study did and found; Common Signals does not rate, rank or assess them. We list research from both the existential-risk and present-day-harms conversations, on purpose. ## Public attitudes: polls and trackers Polls, trackers and interview studies of what people think about AI. ### [AI Public Opinion Tracker wave 4](https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/cic/docs/pdfs/wave4_ai_public_opinion_tracker.pdf) University of South Carolina College of Information and Communications · 2026 · US adults · fieldwork Winter 2025 to 2026 tracker · US · tracker Fourth wave of a repeated US tracker on public attitudes to AI, published as a findings report. [Report](https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/cic/docs/pdfs/wave4_ai_public_opinion_tracker.pdf) · [PDF](https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/cic/docs/pdfs/wave4_ai_public_opinion_tracker.pdf) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#usc-ai-opinion-tracker-w4) ### [AI Index Report 2026: Public opinion chapter](https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2026-ai-index-report/public-opinion) Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI · 2026 · Synthesis of Ipsos and Pew and other global polling · fieldwork 2025 review · Global · report The AI Index's annual public opinion chapter drawing together the major international surveys. Reports the global share seeing more benefits than drawbacks from AI rose from 55% in 2024 to 59% in 2025 while the share saying AI makes them nervous rose to 52%. **Key finding:** 59% globally see more benefits than drawbacks, up from 55% in 2024 [Report](https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2026-ai-index-report/public-opinion) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#stanford-ai-index-2026-public-opinion) ### [Adults' Media Use and Attitudes 2026](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-use-and-attitudes/media-habits-adults/passive-social-media-use-ai-companionship-and-online-side-hustles-uk-adults-media-and-online-lives-revealed) Ofcom · 2026 · UK adults · fieldwork 2025 to 2026 tracker · UK · report Ofcom's annual UK media literacy tracker with a growing AI section. Reports 54% of UK adults now use AI tools, up from 31% in 2024, while trust in AI-generated content has not risen alongside use. **Key finding:** 54% of UK adults use AI tools, up from 31% in 2024 [Report](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-use-and-attitudes/media-habits-adults/passive-social-media-use-ai-companionship-and-online-side-hustles-uk-adults-media-and-online-lives-revealed) · [PDF](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/research-and-data/media-literacy-research/adults/adults-media-use-and-attitudes-2026/adults-media-use-and-attitudes-2026-report.pdf?v=415430) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#ofcom-adults-media-2026) ### [Public opinion on AI varies widely by age gender race and frequency of use](https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2026/2/27/public-opinion-on-artificial-intelligence-varies-widely-by-age-gender-race-and-frequency-of-use) Data for Progress · 2026 · US adults · fieldwork 2026 poll · US · poll Polling analysis of how American attitudes to AI split by demographic group and by frequency of use, with usage emerging as a major dividing line. [Report](https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2026/2/27/public-opinion-on-artificial-intelligence-varies-widely-by-age-gender-race-and-frequency-of-use) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#data-for-progress-ai-2026) ### [What 81,000 people want from AI](https://www.anthropic.com/features/81k-interviews) Anthropic · 2026 · n=80,508 Claude.ai users in 159 countries; not a representative sample · interviews December 2025 interviews · Global · report AI-led interviews with 80,508 Claude.ai users in 159 countries; existential risk is the least-raised of 13 concerns. An interview study of Claude users, not a representative poll. [Report](https://www.anthropic.com/features/81k-interviews) · [What people worry about](https://www.anthropic.com/features/81k-interviews#:~:text=WHAT%20PEOPLE%20WORRY%20ABOUT) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#anthropic-81k-interviews-2026) ### [On the razor's edge: AI vs. everything we care about](https://report2025.seismic.org/) Seismic Foundation · 2025 · n>10000 across US UK France Germany Poland · fieldwork 2025 segmentation · Multi-country · report Segmentation study identifying five groups of the public closest to civic action on AI and how AI fits into wider hopes and fears. Reports women twice as likely as men to worry about AI and 60% worried about AI's effect on relationships. **Key finding:** Women twice as likely as men to worry about AI [Report](https://report2025.seismic.org/) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#seismic-razors-edge-2025) ### [How Americans view AI and its impact on people and society](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2025/09/17/how-americans-view-ai-and-its-impact-on-people-and-society/) Pew Research Center · 2025 · US adults · fieldwork 2025 survey · US · report Pew's US survey on the increased use of AI in daily life. Reports that 50% of Americans are more concerned than excited, up from 37% in 2021. **Key finding:** 50% more concerned than excited, up from 37% in 2021 [Report](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2025/09/17/how-americans-view-ai-and-its-impact-on-people-and-society/) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#pew-us-ai-2025) ### [How people around the world view AI](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/10/15/how-people-around-the-world-view-ai/) Pew Research Center · 2025 · 25 countries · fieldwork 2025 survey · Multi-country · report Pew's cross-national comparison of concern and excitement about AI, awareness levels and trust in institutions to regulate it, across 25 countries including the UK and Canada. [Report](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/10/15/how-people-around-the-world-view-ai/) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#pew-global-ai-2025) ### [Trust attitudes and use of artificial intelligence: A global study 2025](https://kpmg.com/xx/en/our-insights/ai-and-technology/trust-attitudes-and-use-of-ai.html) KPMG and University of Melbourne · 2025 · n>48000 across 47 countries · fieldwork Nov 2024 to Jan 2025 survey · Global · report The largest global study of public trust in AI. Reports 66% use AI with some regularity while 46% are willing to trust it, and that trust fell and worry rose as adoption grew since the 2022 study. **Key finding:** 66% use AI regularly, 46% willing to trust it [Report](https://kpmg.com/xx/en/our-insights/ai-and-technology/trust-attitudes-and-use-of-ai.html) · [PDF](https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/xx/pdf/2025/05/trust-attitudes-and-use-of-ai-global-report.pdf) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#kpmg-melbourne-trust-ai-2025) ### [What the UK thinks about AI](https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/what-uk-thinks-about-ai) Ipsos with the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change · 2025 · UK adults · fieldwork 2025 survey · UK · report Joint survey on UK public attitudes to AI, framed around building trust to support adoption. Finds many people in the UK remain cautious about AI. [Report](https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/what-uk-thinks-about-ai) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#ipsos-tbi-uk-ai-2025) ### [Flash poll: Trust and artificial intelligence at a crossroads](https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer/flash-poll-trust-artifical-intelligence) Edelman Trust Institute · 2025 · n=5000 across 5 countries · fieldwork 17 to 27 Oct 2025 survey · Multi-country · report Trust Barometer flash poll on trust in AI across five markets. Reports trust in AI at 72% in China against 32% in the US, and that hands-on use is associated with higher trust. **Key finding:** Trust in AI: 72% in China, 32% in the US [Report](https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer/flash-poll-trust-artifical-intelligence) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#edelman-trust-ai-flash-2025) ### [How do people feel about AI? Wave two](https://www.turing.ac.uk/news/publications/understanding-public-attitudes-ai-second-survey) Ada Lovelace Institute and The Alan Turing Institute · 2025 · n=3513 UK adults; 62% response rate · fieldwork 25 Oct to 24 Nov 2024 tracker · UK · tracker Second wave of the nationally representative UK survey, repeating the 2022 questions to track change, with new material on regulation. A companion data site publishes the tables. **Key finding:** Nearly nine in ten UK adults support independent regulation of AI [Report](https://www.turing.ac.uk/news/publications/understanding-public-attitudes-ai-second-survey) · [PDF](https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2025-09/how-do-people-feel-about-ai-2025_the-alan-turing-institute_ada-lovelace-institute.pdf) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#ada-turing-2025) ### [Trust, experience, and innovation: Key factors shaping American attitudes about AI](https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05815) Risa Palm, Justin Kingsland and Toby Bolsen, arXiv preprint 2503.05815 · 2025 · n=1,330 US adults, non-probability panel matched to census benchmarks · fieldwork May 2024 survey · US · paper US survey fielded during an election year in which election manipulation came out as respondents' top AI concern. [Report](https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2503.05815) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#arxiv-2503-05815-american-attitudes-ai) ### [What does the public think about AI? (State of AI polling)](https://ai.publicfirst.co.uk/) Public First · 2024 · Four US and UK polls; UK wave n=1010 · fieldwork 2 to 8 May 2024 (UK wave) poll · Multi-country · poll Public First's UK and US polling on AI, published as an interactive site and polling tables. Reports 73% of UK adults would support AI diagnosis if double-checked by a human doctor. **Key finding:** 73% of UK adults would support AI diagnosis if double-checked by a doctor [Report](https://ai.publicfirst.co.uk/) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#public-first-state-of-ai-2024) ### [Public attitudes to data and AI: Tracker survey wave 4](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-data-and-ai-tracker-survey-wave-4/public-attitudes-to-data-and-ai-tracker-survey-wave-4-report) Department for Science Innovation and Technology (Responsible Technology Adoption Unit) · 2024 · UK adults; annual since Dec 2021 · fieldwork 2024 tracker · UK · tracker The UK government's annual tracker of public attitudes to data and AI, designed to monitor change over time. Datasets are deposited with the UK Data Service (study 8946). [Report](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-data-and-ai-tracker-survey-wave-4/public-attitudes-to-data-and-ai-tracker-survey-wave-4-report) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#dsit-padai-tracker-w4) ### [Voters prefer AI regulation that mandates safety measures over industry self-regulation](https://theaipi.org/april-voters-prefer-ai-regulation-over-self-regulation/) AI Policy Institute · 2024 · US registered voters · fieldwork 2024 poll · US · poll One of AIPI's recurring US voter polls on AI regulation. Reports around 80% preferring mandated safety standards for the most advanced models over self-regulation, and a 2:1 margin against open-sourcing powerful models. **Key finding:** About 80% of US voters prefer mandated safety standards over self-regulation [Report](https://theaipi.org/april-voters-prefer-ai-regulation-over-self-regulation/) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#aipi-regulation-vs-self-regulation-2024) ### [Poll: public demand for government to address extreme risks from AI](https://www.longtermresilience.org/new-poll-shows-high-public-demand-for-the-government-to-address-extreme-risks-from-ai/) Centre for Long-Term Resilience · 2023 · UK adults · fieldwork 2023 poll · UK · poll UK polling commissioned by CLTR on whether the public wants government to address extreme risks from AI. [Report](https://www.longtermresilience.org/new-poll-shows-high-public-demand-for-the-government-to-address-extreme-risks-from-ai/) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#cltr-extreme-risks-poll-2023) ### [How do people feel about AI? Wave one](https://www.turing.ac.uk/news/publications/understanding-public-attitudes-ai-first-survey) Ada Lovelace Institute and The Alan Turing Institute · 2023 · n>4000 British adults · fieldwork Late 2022 survey · UK · report The first nationally representative UK survey of awareness, experience and attitudes across specific uses of AI. Reports clear perceived benefits for health, science and security uses, and concern about AI replacing professional judgement. **Key finding:** 64% worried workplaces would rely too heavily on AI in recruitment [Report](https://www.turing.ac.uk/news/publications/understanding-public-attitudes-ai-first-survey) · [PDF](https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Ada-Lovelace-Institute-The-Alan-Turing-Institute-How-do-people-feel-about-AI.pdf) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#ada-turing-2023) ## Framing and risk communication Research on how framing, messengers and risk perception shape the way people respond to messages about AI. ### [From catastrophic to concrete: Reframing AI risk communication for public mobilization](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525) arXiv preprint 2511.06525 · 2025 · Research paper · fieldwork 2025 experiment · US · paper Communications study on how framing AI risk as concrete and near-term rather than catastrophic and abstract affects public willingness to act. [Report](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06525) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#arxiv-2511-06525-reframing-ai-risk) ### [What's risk got to do with it? Public attitudes toward AI regulation in the European Union and United States](https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198945215.003.0083) Kulani Abendroth-Dias, Oxford Intersections: AI in Society (Oxford University Press) · 2025 · 65 expert interviews and a survey experiment with 1,310 participants, EU and US experiment · Multi-country · chapter Survey experiment in the EU and US: framing AI risk as disinformation or online child safety moved conservatives' support for regulation more than liberals'. [Chapter](https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198945215.003.0083) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#abendroth-dias-2025-ai-regulation-risk) ### [Temporal framing in balanced news coverage of artificial intelligence and public attitudes](https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2023.2248974) Sukyoung Choi, Mass Communication and Society 27(2), 384-405 · 2023 · Online experiment experiment · paper Near-future framing of AI risk. [Paper](https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2023.2248974) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#choi-2023-temporal-framing-ai) ### [Risk as analysis and risk as feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x) Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters and Donald G. MacGregor, Risk Analysis 24(2), 311-322 · 2004 · Review article review · paper People judge risk by feeling as much as by analysis: a fast, intuitive system driven by affect runs alongside deliberate reasoning, and each depends on the other. [Paper](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#slovic-2004-risk-as-feelings) ### [Perception of risk](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3563507) Paul Slovic, Science 236(4799), 280-285 · 1987 · Research article review · paper Foundational review of research on how people judge hazardous activities and technologies, written to help experts and policymakers understand public responses and communicate risk. [Paper](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3563507) · [Link to this entry](https://commonsignals.org/research/library/#slovic-1987-perception-of-risk) ## Suggest a study. We're looking for research that meets all three: - Research on public attitudes to AI, or on framing and risk communication: primary studies or foundational reviews, not commentary. - A report, dataset or published paper we can link to directly. - A verifiable link: the primary source, not press coverage of it. We don't list opinion pieces, vendor marketing dressed as research, or think-pieces without underlying data. [Suggest a study](mailto:hello@commonsignals.org)